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FOREWORD
This report is one of five documents covering the results of the Space
Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study conducted under Contract
NASI-17242. The study documentation is designated as follows:
Vol. I - Final Summary Report (NASA CR-3854)
Vol. II - Threat Development(NASA CR-3855)
Vol. III - Safety Impact of Human Factors (NASA CR-3856)
Vol. IV - Appendices (NASA CR-3857)
Vol. V - Space Station Safety Plan (NASA CR-3858)
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Space Station Crew Safety AlternativeStudy objectiveswere to
developa threat definitionfor the space stationas concernscrew safety,
postulateand assess strategyoptionsto addressthe threatsand develop
tilreat-alleviatingsafety criteriaand guidelines. The specialstudiesof
extravehicularactivity,escape/rescueand safety impactsof human factorsare
coveredelsewherein this report:
ExtravehicularActivity - Volume I, Section6
Escape/Rescue - Volume I, Section 5
Safety Impactsof Human Factors - Volume III
APPROACH
The approachused to developthe threatsis shown in Figure l-l. A
candidatebaselinesafetyphilosophywas presentedto NASA-HQand the safety
communityin April, 1983. This philosophy,subsequentlyaccepted,is stated
as:
Threats to the space stationshall cause no damageto the
space stationor injuryto the crew which will result in a
suspensionof plannedtasks or a loss of tilemission.
This selectedphilosophywas a trade-offbetweena threat causingno
damage to the stationand no injuryto the crew and a threat forcingcrew
survivalat the cost of the station. The formerwould probablynot be
achievablewithin realisticcost constraintsand the latterwould pose an
extremelyhigh risk to the station. The selectedphilosophythen allows some
risk acceptanceand appearsto be within reasonabledollarconstraints. This
philosophywas a guidingfactor in assessingconfigurations,scenariosand
operations.
It should be noted that normalmission redundancyrequirementthat will
be leviedon space stationdesigndoes much to alleviatethreat impact,and as
sucil,these costs to achievesystem redundancyare not wholly chargeableto
safety. This assumedredundancypostureis noted in Volume IV, AppendixE of
this report.
THREAT DEFINITION
Accordingto the logic flow in Figurel-l, tileconfiguration,the
scenariosand the operationsdefineda threatposture. Assessmentof these
three missionelementsdefinedthe threat postureas shown in Table l-l. The
candidatespace stationhazardsare subsetsof the threat. For instance,the
twenty-threethreatsgeneratedapproximatelyone-hundredfifty candidate
hazards. On Table l-l, the threatsmarkedwere selectedas being tileprogram
cost drivers. This initialpreselectionhad to be made so that the study
could stay within its cost and scheduleconstraints.
CANDI_TECREWSAFETY
CRITERIA
SAFETf STATION
PHILO •CREWPROTECTION BASELINE
•DA_GE TOLE_NCE ASSU_TIONS
STATIONINTEGRITY
•CONTINGENCYCONTROL I
l
I,, T
CONFIGU_TION SPACE APPROACHTO SAF_Y
I SCENARIOS THREATS STATION CONTROL GUIDELINES
I OPE_TIONS _ZARDS THREATS
ISSUES • ASSU_TIONSJl
Figure I-I Threat Development Approach
TABLE I-I SPACESTATIONCREWSAFETYTHREATLIST
- Fire InadvertentOperations
Leakage Lack of Crew Coordination
TUmbling/Lossof Control Abandonmentof Space Station
- Biologicalor Toxic Contamination ElectricShock
- Injury/Illness - MeteoroidPenetration
Grazing/Collision Stores/ConsumablesDepletion
Corrosion StructuralErosion
MechanicalDamage Orbit Decay
- Explosion Loss of Access to a Hatch
- Loss of Pressurization TemperatureExtremes
- Radiation - Debris
Out-of-ControlIVA/EVAAstronaut Free Orbit (EVA Astronaut)
THREAT ASSESSMENT
Each of the threats highlightedin Table l-l is addressedseparatelyin
this volume. A summaryassessmentof the issues,Table I-2, indicatedthat
not all the selectedthreatswere as severeas anticipated,that is, fire,
explosion,loss of pressurizationwere controllableby design/operational
solutions. Both design-to-precludeand design-to-controlapproachesto
resolvethese threatsappear to be within the state-of-the-artor good design
practice. Tilemeteoroidissue appearsto be less a driver than is debris.
Tim probabilityof a largemeteoroidhit is about l in 10,000years in the low
earth orbit. On the other hand. the "Lack of Crew Coordination", together
with "Injury/lllness" prompted a study follow-on task to investigate the
safety impacts of human factors (See Volume III of this report).
THREATIMPACTSU_,IARY
Table I-2 summarizes the major threats that drive program costs and
indicates alleviating strategies recommendedto address each issue.
Strategies whose implementation require further study are discussed in Section
12 of this volume, Section 13 of Volume III and summarized in Section 8 of
Volume I.
As stated, this volume addresses the following threats:
SECTION THREAT
2. Fire
3. Biological or Toxic Contamination
4. Injury/ll I ness
5. Expl osi on/Impl osi on
6. Loss of Pressurization
7. Radiation
8. Meteoroid Penetration
9. Debris
In each case, the threat is defined, and the threat background is
discussed. Figure I-2 suggests handling strategies. The strategy options
selected drive the criteria definition. Section I0 of this volume shows the
relationship of the criteria to the driving threats. The criteria were not
developed necessarily on a threat-per-threat basis. That is why the
relationships, summarized in Section I0, have one or more threats per
criterion.
TABLE I-2 THREAT SUMMARY ISSUES
ENVIRONMENT
(THREATS) THREAT STRATEGIES
NATURAL ,DEBRIS "INTEGRATEDBARRIERSYSTEMDEVELOPMENT
"RADIATION
INDUCED "CONTAMINATION "MATERIALREQUIREMENTSDEVELOPMENT,SCREENING
CATALOGING,REAL-TIMEMONITORING,INVENTORYING,
DISPOSAL& CONTROLSYSTEM
•LACKOF COORDINATIONm -CREWSELECTIONORIENTATION,INDOCTRINATION&
•HUMAN/SOFTWARE TRACKINGPROGRAM
SYSTEMINTERACTION
"MAN/MACHINE ,CREW(ORBIT/GROUND)TRAININGPROGRAM
INTERACTION
•ATTITUDEISSUES
INHERENT "INJURY/ILLNESS "LOW "GU RESCUEVEHICLE
•REAL-TIMEHEALTHMONITORING
•CREWFITNESSMAINTENNICE
•MINIMUMMEDICALFACILITY
NOT INITIALLYRECOGNIZEDAS MAJORTHREAT
SELECT POSTULATE PREPARE
ISSUE STRATEGY OPTIONS CRITERIA
MISSION
REQUIREMENTS
oDESIGNTO
PRECLUDE
• DESIGNTO
CONTROL
_ •PROVIDE OPERATIONAL
THREAT PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS
DEVICES --I
•PROVIDE
OPERATIONAL
WORKAROUNDS
•ACCEPTRISK
DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS
Figure I-2 Criteria Development
2. FIRE
DEFINITION
Fire threatsare associatedwith an area containingsubsystems
equipment,electricalwiring,or laboratoryequipment,or in personnelareas
which damagesand puts out of commissionunprotectedoperatingequipmentin a
compartment. Fire preventionin designleans heavilyon isolatingthe
elementsof combustion: Fuel, Oxidizerand Ignition. In a two-gassystem
(80% N2 and 20% 02), the fuel is excludedonly if all materialsare screened
for flammability. Applying"NASA MSC Requirements_r Materialsand
Processes",JSC-SE-OOO6B,throughthe RI-SD MaterialControl (MATCO)program,
screenedshuttlematerialsfor flammability. In a I00% 02 environment(such
as in EVA pre-breathingareas),all surfacetemperaturesmust be analyzedto
ensure that no ignitionsourcesare availableand the containedmaterialsare
not flammableat hign 02 concentrations. "EnvironmentRequirementsand Test
Criteriafor the OrbiterVehicle",MFO004-OI4C,cites maximum allowable
surfacetemperaturesin each of the compartmentsbased on the potentialfluid
leaked into the compartment. Fluid leaks are consideredcredible.
Additionally,smoke/firesensingand supressioncould be includedin Damage
Controldesign.
DISCUSSION
Fire on board the space stationis the threatwith potentiallythe most
catastrophicconsequences.Hence, every precautionmust be taken to preclude
its occurrence. An added precautionis also essential-- that the adequate
strategiesexist to mitigateits consequencesshoulda fire occur. The
developmentof strategiesrequiresthat one fully understandsthe causative
factorsinvolvedin a fire as well as the added parametersthat a space
station introducesto the problem. First, becausethere is a zero or micro-g
environment,the only convectioncurrentsin tileatmospherewould be those
introducedby fans used in coolingavionicsor other hardwarewhich may cause
a brief fine intensity. A second differenceis that flame frontsbehave and
propogatedifferently(more slowly,in general)in a zero or micro-g
environment(refs.271, 272, 269 & 273). A third differenceis the proximity
to the vacuum of space which has both advantagessuch as ease of depletingthe
oxygenlevel below the oxygen partialpressure (ref.271, pg.9),which will
supportcombustion,and disadvantagessuch as a ruptureor penetrationof a
pressurewall that can cause a turbulencein the atmosphereand unpredictable
damage. Flashoverto adjacentmaterial is also possible (ref.271, pg. 9).
Although these parametersdo not presentinsurmountableissues,they are a
portionof the environmentand shouldbe consideredas a segmentof a total
strategy.
CAUSES
The followingparagraphssummarizethree major causes of fire. Similar
emphasisis also placedon electricalignitionsourcesbecauseof the unique
characteristicthat most electricalignitionsourcesmay result in continuous
power applicationand greaterprobabilityof pyrolisis.
These causitivefactorsand correspondingstrategiesare shown in Table
2-I. (Thisis not an all-inclusivelist as there are other causitivefactors
and attendantstrategies. For example,among the issuesthat are not
addressedare fire-fightingtechniquesand attendantlimitations. This
discussionis beyond the scope of the study.)
5
TABLE2-I STRATEGYDEVELOPMENTFORTHETHREATOF FIRE
THREAT CAUSATIVEFACTORS STRATEGY(IES)
FIRE GROUND& SPACEHABITABLEAREAS ]. EXCLUDETWO OF THE THREEELEMENTS
• FUEL/OXIDIZER/IGNITIONS URCES 2. WHENTWO ELEMENTSARE PRESENT,INERTCOEXIST
3. MATERIALSCONTROLS
SPACENONHABITABLEAREAS 1, EXCLUDETHREEOFTHE FIVE ELEMENTS
•FUEL/OXIDIZER/IGNITIONS URCES/ 2. MATERIALSCONTROL
TEMPERATURE/PRESSURECOEXIST
•CATALYTICREACTION I. INERTENVIRONMENT
2. CONTROLSURFACETEMPERATURE
3. MATERIALSCONTROL
•CHEMICALREACTION I. INERTENVIRONMENT
2. MATERIALSCONTROLS
3. EXTINGUISHINGAGENTS
•IGNITIONSOURCES I. PROPERGROUNDING/BONDING
(ELECTRICAL/ELECTROSTATIC) 2. WIRINGCONTROLS °
3. PROPERCIRCUITPROTECTION
4. ISOLATIONOF CIRCUITSFROMCOMBUSTIBLE
MATERIALS
5. MATERIALSELECTION
Coexistanceof IgnitionSource/Fuel/Oxidizer
Considerthe first entry in Table 2-I, which is perhapsthe most common
sourceof fire particularlyin a pre-launchenvironment. To illustratethe
strategyby drawingupon some shuttleexperience,visualizea fire triangle
consistingof fuel, oxidizerand an ignitionsource. Generally,one feels
comfortablewheneverone leg of a fire triangleis broken. However,in the
case of the shuttle,it was part of the fail-safedesignphilosophyto break
blo legs of the fire triangleso that shouldanotherleg occur as the result
of a failureor other incident,the vehicleis still safe. Always being
"fail-safe"means that if fuel exists,oxidizersand an ignitionsource are
excluded,etc. When two of the three elementsexist, tilenthere are other
methods of safing,such as inerting. Other optionsthat are availableinclude
the judiciousselectionof materials. Particularlyimportantis the
requirementthat no flammablematerialsare selectedfor use within a
habitablearea. Another requirementis that flammablefluidsor oxidizersbe
excludedfrom habitableareas.
The above scenarioappliesto the fire threat in the pre-launch
environmentor in a habitablearea on orbit. When consideringother
environmentsof orbitaloperations,the fire trianglebecomesa penta-ringby
expandingit to includethe two additional"sides"of temperatureand
pressure. By the reductionor eliminationof one or more sides, a fire can be
preventedor extinguished. For example,dumpingto vacuum is an accepted
techniqueof quenchinga fire for those very limitedcases where it can be
used.
Generallysolidsand liquidsdo not burn by themselves. Except for a
few materialssuch as carbon and some metals, a change of state is necessary.
Only gases burn, whether in the free state or releasedfrom solidsor liquids
by an evaporationprocess. In order for solidsor liquidsto performas
fuels, the first step is for energy, frequentlyin the form of heat, to
evaporatesome of the materialto a gas. This energycan be generatedby
compressionor frictionwith adjacentmaterials;or suppliedby a high-
temperaturesource in conjunctionwith radiation,convection,or condition;or
some combinationof these processesmay be very complicated. (Ref. 268, pg. 7)
J. H. Kimzey in Reference268, page 6, indicates: "The conditionsto
initiatecombustionare far more complexthan are generallybelieved. For
example,it is misleadingto refer to the ignitiontemperatureof a material
as if it _¢erea chemicalproperty. The followingfactorsmust all be
consideredin determiningwhether ignitionwill occur:
I. Compositionand physicalstate of fuel
2. Compositionand physicalstateof the oxidizer
3. Pressure,stress,or other internalforces
4. Gravitationalforce field
5. Temperatureand entilalpyof container,fuel, and oxidizer
6. Energymedia
7. System restraints
8. Surfacearea, texture,and particlesize
9. Degree of mixing or stratification
lO. Stabilityor degressof self-degradation
II. Catalyst
12. Thermalconductivity
13. Time
The above items shouldbe consideredin terms of changingconditionsas
well as the rate of change. This list is not intendedto imply that all of
the factorsare separateeffects,nor that all of the factorscan even occur,
to a greateror lesserdegree,at the same time. In some cases, many of these
factorsare negligibleto the extent that their values are not measurable."
CatalyticReactions
One subjectthat is quite often overlooked,as design solutionsare
considered,is the consequenceof chemicaland/or catalyticreactions. One of
the areas with which safety engineeringis very much concernedis the number
of high-energyfluidsthat may be used, sucllas hydrazine,which may impinge
upon a metallicor other surfacethat can cause an increasein temperature.
If this surfacecontinuesto be exposedto the hypergolics,such as hydrazine
as an example,the materialwill continueto increasein temperatureuntil a
thermalrunawayoccurs. (Ref. A, B, & C). This thermalphenomenonhas been
named "ThermalRegenerationTemperature"and is describedbelow for hydrazine.
Hydrazineis a simplechemicalconsistingof two atoms of nitrogenand
four atoms of hydrogen. This material is a clear colorlesshygroscopicliquid
which at standardtemperatureand pressureis very stable. However,it is
both toxic and flammable. Hydrazineis often used as a monopropellantin
space operationssince it does not requirean oxidizerto releaseits energy.
The hazardsassociatedwith hydrazineare empilasizedby its extremelywide
flammabilityrange of 4.7 to IO0 percentwith a flash point of lOO°F.
However,its catalyticaction is such that the NationalFire Protection
Association,(Ref. Std. 49), indicatesspontaneousignitiontemperaturevaries
from 75°F (ironrust surface)to 518°F (fora Pyrex glass surface). Hydrazine
may ignitespontaneouslyin air when in contactwith porousmaterialssuch as
cloth. Spontaneousignitioncan occur with oxidantslike hydrogenperoxide
and nitricacid. Contactwith many metallicoxide surfacesmay lead to
flamingdecomposition. (316, 317, 318)
Decomposition- The decompositionreactionof hydrazineis different
from the oxidationreaction. This reactioncan occur in eitherthe gas or
liquid phase. The productsof the reaction,and, thereforethe energy
released,vary with the catalystdesign. The maximum energy is obtainedwhen
the productsare ammoniaand nitrogen,althougha possiblereactioncontains
no ammonia.
Oxidation - The reaction of |_drazine and oxygen also occurs in either
the gas or liquid phase. In air, hydrazine is easily ignited and burns with a
blue flame. Again, there are two extremes to consider, depending on whether
or not ammonia is a final product. Combinations of the oxidation reactions
are typical and are considered rapid as compared to the decomposition
reaction, although detonation may occur in both decomposition and oxidation.
Under the direction of Mr. J. H. Kimzey of JSC, a series of tests at
WSTFwere performed to characterize some of these high-energy fluids for
shuttle applications. These test results provide perhaps the best collection
of data on the catalytic effects of materials to date. A Minimum Reaction
Temperature (MRT), where a specimen showed a 5°F temperature rise when small
quantities of hydrazine was injected at rates of 50 microliters each 30
seconds and a Thermal Regeneration Temperature (TRT) where the temperature did
not stabilizebut continuedto rise beyond the autoignitiontemperatureof
hydrazine,were defined. Of interestis that all metallicstested exhibited
FIRTand TRT characteristics,while non-metallicsexhibitedonly a 14RT. (Ref.
C). See Figures2-I, 2-2, & 2-3 which characterizethe TRT plots of metals.
F1aximumtemperaturerises variedwith the metal and air flow.
During testingat WSTF per the test plan TP-WSTF-025dated 5-I-75,the
autoignitiontemperatureof hydrazinein air increasedfrom approximately
320°F at 14.7 psia to 550°F at 2.0 psia. (See Figure 2-4). The reactions
were generallycharacterizedby a slow start which elevatedtemperatureand
pressureso that as a result,it becamea rapid detonation. Catalyticeffects
of the 304 stainlesssteel test vesselmay be a factor in resultsobtained.
Time delays varied from 0.5 to 27 secondsafter injectionof the fuel that
autoignitionwas detected. All testingat l psia was negative. At 2 psia
only four of 37 attemptsigniteddespitevaryingtemperaturesand fuel
ratios. It was thereforeconcludedthat the lowestpressureat which
hydrazinecan ignite in air is 2 psia using a 2.8 liter vesselof 304 SS.
The F_4Hresultswere comparablebut the autoignitiontemperatureswere
lower. Autoignitiontemperatureof NMH in air increasedfrom approximately
260°F at 14.7 psia to 420°F at 3.0 psia as in Figure 2-5 (See WSTF Test
Reports,TR 205-001to 005). The rate was similar,startingslowly and
evolvinginto a detonationas the reactionproceeded. Time delays from
injectionof the fuel to auto- ignitionvariedfrom two to 82 seconds.
Limitingtestingin nitrogenratherthan air showed "no indicationof any
significantdecompositionas measuredby the test systeminstrumentation."
The lowest pressureat which _I_Hcan ignite in air was found to be 3 psia
using a 2.8 liter vesselof 304 SS.
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ChemicalReactions
Two major categoriesof reactionsare of concern;decompositionand
oxidation. In the hydrazineand MMH examplesdiscussedearlier,it was noted
that both of these mechanismswere of significance. In Table 2-2 below fluids
and solidsare shown as either oxidizingor reducingagents.
Table 2-2 Oxidizing/ReducingAgents
FLUIDS i MATERIALS
OXIDIZING REDUCING OXIDIZING REDUCING
AGENTS AGENTS AGENTS AGENTS
N204 HYDRAULICFLUIDS NONE Al ALLOYS
LOX MMH STEELS
GOX N2H4 Ni ALLOYS
AIR LH2 Co ALLOYS
F-21 Ti ALLOYS
FC-40 ADHESIVES
NH3 FINISHES
LUBE OIL PLASTICS
POTTING COMPOUNDS
Supportingdata for Table 2-2:
I. Rate of reactionsis a functionof the stabilityof the agents.
Very unstablehighly reactiveoxidizingand reducingagentswill
react in a rapid and violentmanner, such as N204 and MMH or
N2H4. However,stableoxidizingand reducingagentsproduce
slow reaction,such as oxygen and iron.
2. Solidsare more stablethan liquids,and liquidsare more stable
than gases.
3. The rate of reactionbetweensolid and either a liquidor a gas is
quite slow due to the limitedexposedsurfacesof the solid.
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STRATEGYOPTIONS
Some of the strategiesthat were used on the Shuttle as methods of
counteractingthe particularthreat of fire are shown in Tables 2-3 and 2-4.
The first line of defenseshouldbe "designto preclude"as illustrated
in Table 2-3. Recognizethat there are two types of threats (simpleand
complex)based on the physicsof causitivefactors. It should be noted that
for a complex threat,the solutionis generallycomplex. The strategyissue
is not the fire itselfbut rather dealingwith the causitivefactors,such as
the ignitionsources,fuels and oxidizers. Anotherpoint of significanceis
that there is not one simple solutionbut rather a familyof solutions. Some
of the things that are done to precludefire may be very helpful in precluding
some of the other threats as shown in Table 2-3. Considertoxicityand
explosion,since some of the measuresto lessen the risk of fire will lessen
these other threats. However,in some cases the solutionsfor controlling
threatshave just the oppositeeffect. In these cases,wheneverone takes
certain steps to controla given threat,the consequencemay be an adverse
responseto anotherthreat,creatinga worse situation,and some of these will
be examinedin later sections.
The secondline of defensehere is "designto control" (See Table 2-4).
In essencewhat this defensepresumesis that tiledesign to precludeworked
but was not I00% effective. If one assumesthat a fire will occur, some of
the thingsone could do are shown in this figure,such as building
compartments. Some of the compartmentson the shuttleorbiterare there
solely to deal with the issue of fire and/ortoxicity. Table 2-5 shows the
compartmentsor zones of the orbitervehicleand some of the data providedto
designersto precludefire generation/propagation.The Table 2-5 compartments
were assessedand the highest allowabletemperature,for the volatiles
involved,were stated.
In the area of strategiesit is of paramountimportanceto fully
understandthe characteristicsof the materials,fluids and gases present
within the design solutions. This philosophyis particularlycriticalwhen
dealingwith hydrazine,MMH, Aerozine50 and other propellants. Designsmust
considernormalcharacteristicsas well as out-of-toleranceconditionsand
assure that the configurationsselectedare tolerantof and forgivingin all
postulatedevents. These are the kinds of issues that requirestrategiesto
be consideredin the early designportion of the program so that safeguards,
such as protectivecoatings,inert environments,etc., may be created and
steps taken to assure that surfacetemperaturesremain sufficientlylow that
the vehiclewill be tolerantof this type of problem.
One of the best summariesdiscoveredby this authorwas an internalJSC
memo preparedby J.H. Kimzey. His eight conclusionsare listedverbatim.
Testingis difficultbecauseof the hazardsin workingwith hydrazine.
Therefore,there are few places qualifiedto do the high quality,fully
instrumented,tasks as the NASA White Sands Test Facilityin New 14exico.
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TABLE2-3 STRATEGIESTO COUNTERACTTHREATS- DESIGNTO PRECLUDE
DESIGNTOPRECLUDE
LOSSOFTHREAT CRITICAL
THATPRECLUDE _ FIRE TOXICITYEXPLOSIONFUNCTION
2-GAS YSTEM •
-14,7 PSl
MATERIALS/WIRING • • •
CONTROL
FLUIDLINE • • •
CONSTRUCTION
BONDINGIGROUNDING • •
IGNITIONSOURCE • • •
CONTROL
FAIL-SAFED SIGN& • • • •
SAFETYFACTORS
INTERLOCK/INHIBIT •
CRITICALFUNCTIONS
PRESSUREV SSELS
•FILAMENTWOUND • • •
•HIGHSAFETYFACTOR
TABLE 2-4 STRATEGIESTO COUNTERACTTHREATS- DESIGNTO CONTROL
DESIGNTOCONTROL
THREAT STRUCTUP,AL
FIRE TOXICITY EXPLOSION FAILURE
COMPARTMENTATIOF] • • •
PURGE& HAZARDOUS • • •
GASDETECTION
ACTIVEVENT •
SYSTEM
CABINSMOKE •
DETECTION
REMOTE&
PORTABLEFIRE • •
EXTINGUISHERS
DAMAGECONTROL
IIJSTRUMENTATION • • •
& ANNUNCIATORS
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TABLE 2-5 ORBITER COMPARTMENTS/ZONES
(FROM MF0004-014 &SD74-SH-0223B)
MAX ALLOW SURFACE
IGNITION TEMP TO PREVENT AN
OPERATIONAL PREVENTION AUTO IGNITION
COMPARTMENT (1) FLUIDS NORMALLY PRESENT ZONE (2) ZONE (6) -DEGREES F (6)
NOSE SPHERE (NONE) I NO --
-I- IUJl.lllU Res N~U4. MMH He II YFS -:lC:::?
NOSE GEAR WELL HYD FL (83282&56061
TWO MODULE PLENUM HYD FL (83282). H2O III (4) YES 352WINDOW CAVITIES (NONE)
SI Af{ I U 'I( ~ U CAV 1lY (NONE)
MID-FUSELAGE LH2, L02, HYD FL (8j~~~),
MMH, He, N204, F21, H2O,
N2,FC40(3)
CREW MODULE N2/02, G02. 1301. H2O IV NO
--WING LEADING EDGE (L&R) (NUNtJ V VI NO
--WING BOX (L&R) (NONtJ
MAIN GEAR WELL (L&R) HYD FL (83282&5606) VII, VIII YES 423
WING/ELEVON lNltKCAVlTY HYlJ FL (83282)(L&R)
AFT FUSELAGE LH2, L02, HYD FL (83282),
MMH, NH3, LUBE OIL, N2H4,
F21, He H20, N204
VERT. STABILIZER FWD OF (NONE) IX (4) YES 352
REAR SPAR
. VERT. STABILIZER AFT OF HYD FL (83282) X YES 432
SPAR (REAR)
--ol"lS/RCS POD (L&R) N204. MMH He N2 XI. XII YES ,
ME L02 DISCONNECT L02 XI II YES (5 \
BODY FLAP HYD FL (83282) XV YES I
TH2--uMBIL CAVITY LH2, HYD FL (83282), F21, XVI YES 432
I-lf> Nil
L02 UMBIL CAVITY L02. He N2 XVII YES (5) (5)
It is concludedthat the:
I. Ignitiontemperatureof hydrazinevarieswith:
a. Materials,clean (in the absenceof air)
l) Aluminum,2024T-4: 452°Fat 350 psia
2) Stainlesssteel,17-7PH: 449°F at 350 psia
3) Tool steel,M-2: Between300° and 350° at 350 psia
Values are lower in air.
b. Materials,oxidized- The greater (thicker)the oxide the
lower the ignitiontemperature.
c. Pressure- The lower the pressure,the higher the ignition
temperature. Autoignitiontemperaturesof hydrazinein air
vary from approximately320°F at 14.7 psia to 580°F at 2.0
psia in 304 stainlesssteel. Hydrazinecould not be ignited
at l.O psia in air.
d. Time - Time delaysare typical. For hydrazineignitionin
air, values are from 0.5 to 27 seconds,with no apparent
relationshipto pressureor quantityof fuel injected.
Autodecompositiontime delayscan be very long: 71 to I04
minutes.
2. Adiabaticcompressionof hydrazinegreatlylowers the ignition
(autodecomposition)temperatureof hydrazine. This is not the case with I414H.
3. Ignitiontemperatureof 1414Hin air also varies. It was found to be
260°F at 14.7 psia increasingto 420°F at 3.0 psia using a 2.8 liter vessel of
304 SS.
4. Catalyticeffectsof many materialshave been observedwhen exposed
to vaporsof hydrazinein air. Both metals and non-metalsexhibita "Minimum
ReactionTemperature"(MRT) a temperatureat which the materialheated five
degrees fahrenheitand stabilized.
5. A secondcatalyticeffect,observedfrom materialsexposed to
vapors of hydrazinein air, is a "ThermalRegenerationTemperature"(TRT),a
temperatureat which the temperaturecontinuesto rise until ignitiontakes
place. Nonmetallicsdid not exhibita TRT value. Valuesfor metals were as
low as 314°F for 303 CRES, 318°F for 286 CRES, 322°F for 321 CRES, 343°F for
titaniumTI-3AI-2.SV,and 354°F for Inconel600.
6. Coatingscan retardcatalyticeffects,especiallySuper Koropon
primer. Paintscontainingiron oxide pigmentreducesafe temperaturesfor
hydrazinevapors in air, speciallyPyromarkand brown silicone/glassduct.
Also dry film lubricantscontaininggraphiteand FIOS2 act as catalysts.
7. The literaturecontainsboth correctand incorrectinformation.
8. The Orbiterhas properlydesignedhydrazinesystemsfrom a
Materialsstandpoint. Autodecompositionof hydrazinewill not occur in flight
if systemsare built and operatedaccordingto specifications.Leaks of
hydrazine(liquidor vapor)will not ignite in the aft compartmentif built as
designedbut may producedamage in electricalinsulation.
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3. BIOLOGICALOR TOXIC CONTamINATION
DEFINITION
Contaminationthreats are those associatedwith biologicalor toxic
contaminationof the atmosphere,food or water supply. All similarlypackaged
food stored in any one area (e.g.,all vacuum-packedfood stored in one
pantry)will be assumedunfit to eat. Similarly,all potablewater in
connectedtanks will also be assumedtoxic; the water, however,may be
reprocessedthroughthe water purificationsystemand the tanks decontaminated
to renderwater potable. This threat is associatedwith the releaseof toxic,
flammable,corrosive,condensible,or particulatematter. Contaminationis
caused by leakage,spillage,outgassing,looseobjects,abrasionand from the
growth of fungusor releaseof volatilecondensiblematerials. Leakageof or
outgassingof hazardousmaterialsshould be preventedby eliminatingsuspect
materialsthroughMATCO screening. Close looks at materialsinteractionsare
also required. Where hazardousmaterialsare broughton board, special
containmentconsiderationmust be given. All materialsbroughton board
should be screened,includingastronautper-sonaleffects.
BACKGROUND
AtmosphericContaminationof SpacecraftHabitableAreas is a concernfor
which proceduresmust be developed& implementedto determinethe identities&
quantitiesof contaminants. Methods& criteriamust also be developedto
determineexternalcontaminationfrom space debris particles& spacecraft
residue.
History: More than lO0 contaminantgases have been detectedin the Space
Shuttlecabin,with most of these concentrationsof gases being
below a toxicityhazardlevel.
MATERIALSAND METHODS
Early in the planningof toxicologicalsupportfor the ShuttleProgram,
five toxicityareaswere identifiedas of major importance:
I. Establishmentof space flight atmospheretoxicitystandards:
2. Establishmentof a materialsselectionprogram.
3. Developmentof methods for removingspacecraftcabin atmospheric
contaminants.
4. Developmentof proceduresand methods for measuringspacecraft
cabin atmosphericcontaminants.
5. Establishmentof proceduresand guidelinesfor conducting
toxicologicalassessmentsof the spacecraftcrew environments.
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Establishmentof Space FlightAtmosphereToxicityStandards(312)
A new set of criteriahad to be establisiledfor space flightwhich
definedthe maximum amount of any given contaminantgas or mixtures of gases
that could be toleratedin the spacecraftcabin without creatinga toxic
hazard for the crew. Since the safetyof the crew and the successof a
missiondepends highlyon crew performance,tilebasis for spacecrafttoxicity
standardswere often based upon behavioraltoxicitycriteriarather than on
classicaltime-weightedaverages (TWA)or thresholdlimit values (TLV).
New inhalationtoxicitydata were requiredfor space flight,since most
existinginhalationtoxicityinformationconcerns40-hr work-weekexposures.
Since both spacecraftand submarinecrews operate in closed environmentsfor
long periodsof uninterruptedactivity,similaratmosphericproblemsoften are
experienced. For this reason,the maximumallowableconcentration(MAC)value
for many atmosphericcontaminantsfor spacecraftand submarineenvironments
are often the same.
Since there was no significantdata availablefor dealingwith several
days of continuousexposuresto trace quantitiesof many atmospheric
contaminants,the NationalAcademy of Scienceswas asked for assistance. A
list of known spacecraftcontaminantgases was submittedto an ad hoc
committeecomposedof governmental,institutional,and industrial
toxicologists. The values they recommendedwere, in most cases, from one-half
to one-tenththe valuesestablishfor the standardindustrial40-h work-week.
These valueswere designatedas spacecraftmaximumallowableconcentrations
(S_C).
Establishmentof a MaterialsSelectionProgram (312)
The second area of toxicologicalconsiderationinvolvedestablishinga
program to control the selectionof spacecraftmaterialson the basis of
outgassingcharacteristics.A set of criteriawas developedfor establishing
the means and conditionswith which the candidatematerialswere to be
tested. From the toxicitystandpoint,the most importantinformationobtained
from these tests was to identifyand measureoutgassedcompoundsfrom each
material. Further analysesdeterminedthe outgassingratesof each identified
compound. The criteriafor acceptanceor rejectionof the candidatematerials
were based upon outgassingcharacteristics,spacecraftcabin volume,mission
duration. SMAC values, and trace contaminantremovalcapabilitiesof tile
spacecraftatmosphericrevitalizationsystem (ARS).
Developmentof Methods For Removalof SpacecraftCabin AtmosphericContaminants
The thirdarea of toxicologicalconsiderationwas to ensure that proper
proceduresand hardwarewere incorporatedinto the spacecraftARS for the
removaland controlof outgassedcontaminantcompounds. This effort required
establishinga close working relationshipbetweenNASA toxicologistsand ARS
design and test engineers. As a resultof their work, the ShuttleOrbiterARS
removescontaminantgases by three differentmethods. (312)
The primarymethod for removalof contaminantgases is by activated
carbon adsorptionin the ARS carbon dioxide removalbed (lithiumhydroxide).
Some acid gases are a]so removedfrom the cabin air by the lithium hydroxide
bed. The secondmethod for contaminantgas removalis in a speciallydesigned
cartridgekno_n as the ambienttemperaturecatalyticoxidizer(ATCO), composed
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of platinumdepositedon an activatedcarbon bed preceededby another
activatedcarbon bed. The platinum-coatedcarbon acts as an ambient
temperaturecatalystto convert cabin carbonmonoxide into CO2. The CO2
is scrubbedout of the airstreamby tilelithiumhydroxidebed. Some trace
contaminantgases are also removedin the activatedcarbon bed of the ATCO.
The third means of trace contaminantgas removalis by the spacecraftARS
dehumidifiersystem. The relativehumidityof the spacecraftcabin is
controlledby passingthe cabin atmosphereover a cold surface. Water is
condensedand eventuallyremovedat this surface. As the cabin trace
contaminantgases pass over the same surface,the water-solublecontaminants
are carriedout of the dehumidifierin the condensereffluentwater stream.
(312)
Developmentof Proceduresand _lethodsFor SpacecraftCabin Atmospheric
Contaminant i4easurements(312)
The fourtharea of toxicologicalconsiderationconcernsthe procedures
and methods used for conductinganalyticalmeasurementsof contaminantgases
containedin the spacecraftcabin. From previousexperienceswith analysesof
closed environmentsin ground-basedmanned chambertests and in earlier
analysesof spacecraftcabin atmospheres,two methodswere found to obtain
completequalitative and quantitative informationabout the spacecraftcabin
atmosphere. These two methods have come to be known as the whole-gasand
adsorbed-gassamplingmethods. Both of these methodsare used for
ground-basedand inflightsamplingof Shuttlecrew cabin atmospheres.
Whole-gassampling takes instantaneousair samples,while absorbed-gas
samplingtakes atmosphericsampleson a continuousbasis.
The ground-basedsamplingprocedure,using the whole-gasmethod,
requiresa pressurepump to transferatmosphericsamplesinto a stainless
steelcylinder. The inflightsamplingprocedure,using the whole-gasmethod,
requiresthe use of an evacuatedstainlesssteelcylinder. When a sample is
to be taken, a valve on the cylinderis momentarilyopenedand an atmospheric
sample is drawn into the cylinder.
The ground-basedsamplingprocedureusing tileadsorbed-gassampling
method requirespumpingcabin atmospheresamplesthroughtubes containinga
substrateknown as Tenax . This materialhas a relativelyhigh affinityfor
most atmosphericcontaminantgases, but has the unique propertyof permitting
water vapor to pass through. In flight,space vacuum is used to draw the
cabin atmospherethroughthe Tenax adsorptionsubstrate,which is containedill
a tube.
Both the whole-gasand adsorbed-gassamplesfor the ground-basedas well
as the inflightsamplesare returnedto the laboratoryfor chemicalanalyses
by gas chromatography(GC) and gas chromatography-masspectrometry(GC-FIS).
Quantitativeanalysesmainly use standardGC-HS procedures,while qualitative
determinationsuse standardGC procedures. Becauseof the concentrating
effect of the adsorbed-gassamplingmethod,this techniqueis mainly used for
qualitativeanalyses. The whole-gassamplesare the most accuratemeans of
determiningquantitativevalues for the atmosphericcontaminantssince
cylindersamplescontainconcentrationsexactlyas they existedin the
atmosphereat the time of sampling.
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Establishmentof Proceduresand GuidelinesFor ConductingToxicological
Assessmentsof SpacecraftCrew Environments(312)
In most toxicityevaluationsinvolvingcontaminantgases, only one gas
is normallyconsideredat a time. As many as lO0 contaminantgases may be
present duringa missionwhich, for the ShuttleOrbiter,may last up to 7
days. The SMAC values establishedfor space flightwere based upon the
followingset of criteria.
I. Continuousexposuresfor 24 ll/dfor periodsup to 7 days.
2. Exposureto a singlecontaminantgas.
3. No other physiologicalstressors,e.g. heat, cold, illness,injury,
etc.
4. Where toxicitydata is not availablefor a given compound,a S_._C
valuemay be assignedfor the compoundat a level equal to the
toxicityfor the most toxic compoundin the compoundfamily.
In order to conduct toxicityassessmentsof data obtainedfrom outgassed
samplestaken from the Shuttle spacecraft,contaminantgaseswere categorized
into groupsaccordingto their relevanttoxicologicaleffects on humans.
These groupingswere:
I. Irritants: e.g. aldehydesand ammonia.
2. Asphyxiants: e.g. carbonmonoxideand methane.
3. CentralNervousSystemDepressants(anestheticsand narcotics):
e.g. ethers,ketones,alcohols,and halogenatedhydrocarbons.
4. System Poisons: e.g. benzenes,phenalsand napthalenes.
5. Particulates: e.g. siliconand asbestos.
Dependingupon concentration,the examplesshown above in these
categoriescan change from on groupingto anotheror even exhibit
physiologicaleffectsin more than one categoryat the same time.
Furthermore,the physiologicaleffectscan be additive,synergistic,or
subtractivewithin a given category. Scientificinformationdoes not exist
for dealingwith the possiblesynergisticeffectsof the some lO0 gases
detectedin the Shuttle spacecraftcabin.
However,in order to arrive at an overallassessmentof the Shuttle
cabin atmosphere,only the additiveeffectsin a given physiologicalcategory
have been considered. Since the ShuttleARS containsa particulatefilter for
removingmicron-sizedmaterials,particulatematter is not monitoredduring a
mission. For this reason,this categoryis not addressedin crew cabin
toxicityassessments.
Table 3-I lists the contaminantsfound in the Shuttle Orbiterin the
first five STS flights.
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Table 3-I CONTAJ,IINANTSFOUND IN SHUTTLEORBITER
AII:IOSPHERICSAJ_PLES(370)
SYS-i_-S_ib-n--_b-e-r................
CompoundIdentity l 2 3 4 5
Acetic Acid, n-ButrylEster X
Acetic Acid, 2-Ethoxyethlyester X
Benzaldehyde X
Benzene X X X X
Bromotrifluoromethane X X
l-Butanal X X X
l-Butanol X X
2-Butanone X X X X
Butene X
n-Butylbenzene X
CarbonDisulfide X
CarbonI_4onoxide X X X X
Cyclohexane X
Decane X
Dichlorodifluoromethane X
l,l-Dichloroethene X
Dichloromethane X X X X
l,2-Dimethylbenzene X X X
l,3-Dimethylbenzene X X X X
I,4-Dimethylbenzene X X
l,l-Dimethylethanol X
Ethanal X X X X
Ethanol X X X X X
Ethylbenzene X X X
2-Ethylhexanal X
1-Heptanal X
Heptane X X
2-Heptanone X
3-Heptanone X
Hexamethylcyclopentane X
Hexamethylcyclotrisiloxane X
l-Hexanal X
Hexane X X
Indian X
f4ethane X X X X X
Methanol X X
2-F1ethyl- ,3-Butadiene X
t4ethylcyclopentane X X
Methylethylcyclopentane X
6-Methyl-2-Heptanone X
2-_,lethylpentane X
2-Methyl-I-Propanol X
2-t_ethy1-2-Propanol X X
4-t4ethy1-2-Propantanone X X
Napthalerie X
Nonane X
Octane X
l-Pentanal X X X
Pentane X X
1-Propanal X X X
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Table 3-I (Continued)
CONTAMINANTSFOUND IN SHUTTLEORBITER
ATMOSPHERICSAMPLES
........ -STS-I,tTS-S-ibh-N-u_b_-r_ ............
Compound Identity l 2 3 4 5
2-Propanol X x x
2-Propanone X X X X X
Propylbenzene X X
Toluene X X X X
l,1,l-Trichloroethane X X X
Trichloroethane X X
Triochlorofluoromethane X X X
l,l,2-Trichloro-I,2,2-
Trifluoroethane X X X X X
TrimethylSilanol X
C ,-AliphaticHydrocarbons(l)* X
C -AliphaticHydrocarbons(7) X
C -AliphaticHydrocarbons(9) X
C:o-AliphaticHydrocarbons(8) X
C"l-AliphaticHydrocarbons(8) X
C-2-AliphaticHydrocarbons(8) X
C-3-AliphaticHydrocarbons(1) X
C"4-AliphaticHydrocarbons(l3) X
C8-AIkane (l) X
C9-AIkane (4) X
Clo-Alkane (6) X X
ClI-Alkane (5) X X
Cl2-Alkane (4) X X
C8-OlefinicHydrocarbon(1) X
Cg-OlefinicHydrocarbon(2) X
Siloxane(3) X
C3-SubstitutedBenzene (ll) X
C4-Substituted Benzene (6) X .....................................
*Denotes numberof differentcompoundsidentifiedfor each given category.
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{4ATERIALS& PROCESSCONTROL
FIaterialsand processcontrolappliesto the proper selection,usage
evaluation,documentationand the trackingof materialsand processesto avoid
or reduce the risks of system perfon_lancefailuresfrom Flammability,
toxicity, thennal/vacuumstabiIity, corrosion, fluid incompatbiIities,
fatigue,oxygen impact sensitivities,contaminationcontrol,etc.
i.laterialswill also be compatible,in that electricalcurrents (induced
or other)will not create electrolysisthat will degrade&/or erode structures.
A total materialand processcontrolsystemconsistsof tv1oelements:
I. An EngineeringReview/EvaluationSystem
ProgramRequirements
Design Review/Approval
Materials/ContaminationTest Programs
Specifications
Hazard Removals
Failure Analysis
2. An EngineeringData _lanagementAnd TrackingSystem
14aterials Selection Lists
Properties14anual
F1aterial/Contamination Identification & Tracking
As/BuiltControls"Builtper Specification"Controls
CompletenessVerification
A comparisonof presenttechnologywith new requirementsis sho\m in Tables
3-2 and 3-3. Columnstwo and three relateto capabilitiesof equipmentto
handle the contaminationproblem.
TABLE 3-2 CONTAFIINATIONCONTROL ISSUES*
Current Control
Data Base Vl/Current l_ew
Issues To Resolve Technology Technology
o InherentHardwareContaminationLevels 60% X
o Ascent/LaunchDrag Along/Induced 20% X
o Orbital Debris ? X
o Operations/CrossContamination ? X X
o F1aterialsDegradation 20% X X
o F1aintenanceProcedures 30% X X
o ProblemAnticipation/TrackingF1onitoring 30% X
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TABLE3-3 MATERIALSANDPROCESSESI SUES*
Current Control
Data Base W/Current New
Issue To Resolve Technology Technology
o AdvancedEngineering 70% X -
HaterialsTrackingData Base System
o ImprovedMaterialsAge Life Data Base 40% X X
o EffectsOf RadiationOn MaterialProperties30% X X
o IntegratedLogisticalData Bases ? X -
o Material/ConfigurationMapping (Locator) ? X X
* Based On Apollo/ShuttleProgramExperience1960-1984
IiATERIALCONTROLAND VERIFICATIONPLANNING
MaterialSelectionand ControlRequirements
Materialsused in the designand fabricationof space hardwareshould be
selectedwith considerationof the environmentaland operationalrequiremenLs
for tileparticularapplicationand tiledesignengineeringpropertiesof tile
candidatematerials.
Presentlythe ShuttleOrbitermaterialsare rated and are listed on
materialselectionlists. These listsserve as the basis for all material
selections.
F1inimuminformationcontainedon these lists include:
A. MetalIic/Non-l,letalIic Materials
(1) MaterialCode (assigned)
(2) MaterialDescription
(3) MaterialSpecification
(4) Minimum OperatingTemperature
(5) MaterialRating
(6) ... (264)
A descriptionof materialrating is necessaryas there are several
levels of acceptance:
(A) Acceptable;(B) AcceptableWith SpecificControls;(C) Acceptabilitytiust
be Demonstrated;(D) Not Rated; (X) Unacceptable: Materialswith this rating
have failedthe materialscreeningrequirementand may be used only if they
can be acceptedat the configurationlevel as meeting a programrequirement.
(264)
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See Table 3-4 for Materials for Orbiter, to date, that have X-rating in
toxicity.
See Table 3-5 for Materials for Orbiter, to date, that have X-rating in
stress, corrosion, cracking susceptibility.
_TERIAL SELECTION
Materials should be selected from a list of materials where the key
properties are:
Toxicity Precedents Have Been
Flammability Established for Test
Total Volatile Solids Procedures & Acceptance
Stress Corrosion Cracking Environment & Habitable Areas
Etc.
This list should be available during detail design and supplemented as
new materials become identified for new applications.
Good/Bad Materials
In general, certain guidelines have been established such that materials
that are unacceptable when tested as ran may be retested in configuration and
pass.
Material Classification Habitable Areas Non-Habitable Areas
Epoxy Laminates( 0.080 in.) Fails Flam. ---
Silicones(Lubricants,etc.) Pass Tox, Flam. Fails TVS
Metals Pass Pass
Ceramics,Glass Pass Pass
Non-TeflonFabrics& Films Fails Flam. ---
Teflons Pass Pass
Polyurethane(Insulation) Pass Tox, Flam. FaiIs
Polyurethane(Coatings) Pass Tox, Pass Flam. Fails
Rubbers Fails Fails
Paints/Primers Fails Fails
Tox - Toxicity (includestotal organics,outgassing,odor)
Flam - Flammability
TVS - Total VolatileSolids
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TABLE 3-4 MATERIAL CODES RATED X IN TOX.
U719-10-203 TDX RATINGS FOR NON-METALS BY MATERIAL CODE 03:44 AM PAGE 1
00010 X INK 73X * 05483 X TAPE SCOTCHLITE 3270 VINYL/PS * 06370 X INK $66-13 ROCKET RED
00013 X PRIMER M602 EPOXY-PHENOLIC * 05490 X INK 977-9 * 06391 X TAPE SCOTCHCAL 3652 VINYL YEL
00140 ........X........DE[RINACETAL ...........................................;"05499 ....... X....... RUBBERNITRILE ..................................... ; 06472 ........X .......POTTG-CPD PTKI6600:OOb2SIi ...........
00172 X PRIMER SS4004 SILANE * 05525 X ADHES STABOND T-190 NEOPRENE * 06489 X POTTG CPD RTV 3112 SIL/CAT F
00440 X PRIMER EC766 NITRILE/PHENOL * 05553 X POTTG CPD COX 28 EPOXY * 06523 X ADHES EPIBOND 1210A/CAT 1210B
00509 X ADHES FM-123-2 FILM EPOXY * 05556 X CTNG EPOXY AMINE * 06584 X CTNG SCOTCHGARD EC4101-C-16
........................................................ HYPALON X POTTG CPD C15-015 EPOXY00552 X CTNG 150-W-8 ............................. *05584 .......................................................................... ;06624 ....... X .....PRIMER-421303 _O_d__i_E__ .........
00591 X ADHES EASTMAN 910 CYANOACRYLAT* 05593 X INK 6811 FRS BLACK * 06647 X TAPE CW-3 POLYETHYLENE ACRL AD
00708 X ADHES FMIO00 EPOXY/NYLON * 05605 X ADHES P460 EPOXY * 06652 X INK 42-11FD MARKING BLACK
00895 X ADHES DC 281 SILICONE * 05616 X TAPE SCOTCHCAL 3651 RED * 06662 X ADHES CHEMLOCK 222
01336 X ...... GERMICIbEPHENY[PHE _0_'___ ...... X ....... LUBEDRY?RANsLUBE202O4 ............... ;20022 ....... X....... TUBING"RNF-iOOPOLY __ ..................
01843 X CTNG PRIMER WASH * 05656 X FOAM ABLEFOAM #1 EPOXY * 20026 X LAURIC ACID
02055 X CTNG A423/T252 EPOXY * 05662 X PRIMER E42GP22/V66KP46 EPOXY * 20027 X PARAFFIN WAX
02231 X AOHES CHEMLOCK 205/220 NEOPREN*05669 ..... X...... VARN!SH RED GLYpTALCAT, NQ9072* 20036 X CTNG ACRYLIC ENAMEL SW d5-5226
03374 ........X .......SEA[ANTLOCTITEAL[ GRADES..... *05698 X FOAM LUNAR F-20 A/B EPOXY * 20046 ........X ..... ROYALITERL54ABS ...................................
03398 X PRIMER DC Z6020 SILANE * 05715 X VARNISH INSULON 100 EPOXY * 20047 X INK TROJAN OPAQUE SILVER
03422 X LAMIN MYLAR/PROPYLENE * 05716 X CTNG XR 5133 EPOXY * 20070 X CTNG EPOX POLYAM RED (#21105)
05000 X PRIMER SS4155 SILANE * 05726 X INK WORNOWSERIES MN WHITE * 20095 X LUBE DRY ELECTROFILM 4306
.......................................................................................................... • "05741 ........X ..... ADHESSYAB6NDN:125NEOPRENE";20105 ........X PdYTG-CPDSYLGARD 182"SILICONE ......05002 X RUBBER NITRILE
05004 X PRIMER FM47 VINYL/PHENOLIC * 05778 X CTNG PLY TILE EPOXY _ 20115 X GREASE ANDOC C
05015 X PRIMER 515-700 SUPER KOROPON * 05788 X PRIMER CHEMLOCK 607 * 20120 X TAPE 76593 POLYESTER/GLASS
05019 X ADHES WS 1183 CB5 EPOXY * 05792 X ADHES TY-PLY S * 20128 X ADHES EPON B EPOXY
05034 .........X ....FILMAN 16,AL_TEDLARiNV[ON ...........;05805 ......X ....._TNG DEPTHANEG[OSS#IPOLVU ........; 20i43 ........X CTNGER4i"POLYURETHANE ......................
05071 X PRIMER A-934BX AMINO SILANE * 05809 X CTNG QR-4-3117/XYIT6 SILICONE * 20148 X POTTG CPD SCOTCHCAST 2BOA/B
05073 X VELCRO MID-TEMP NOMEX/METAL * 05814 X RUBBER 3177 EPR * 20169 X CTNG 463-6-5/463-3-8 EPOXY
05097 X ABHES PLASTILOCK 731/PL727EPQX* 05815 X POTTG CPD ABLECAST 402 * 20177 X CTNG PT-401/PT-402 EPOXY
6509_......._.........RUBBERTIREfREA617_9 ................;"65B3_ ....X .tAPEG46_Odid464262fFEiAGiS_L;"26i85........_ .GLVPfA[_20_'_LKY6...................................
05110 X FOAM STEPANFOAM BX 249N POLYUR* 05850 X ADHES THIXON 806 (AP1442) NEOP* 20191 X CTNG ENAMEL ALKYD LUSTRLESS
05129 X ADHES M-BOND 610,EPOXY * 05862 X ADHES ABLEBOND 293-1FT * 20192 X SEALANT MICROSEAL
05135 X PRIMER EPOXY/POLYAMIDE * 05878 X SEALANT PR1750 POLYSULFIDE * 20198 X ADHES EC1357 NEOPRENE CEMENT
05i50 .......X ...... TAPE M_SfIK6_02 pRoPYLEiACRVL_0588§ ........× .... RUBBER RTV60SILICONE ............ _20203 .... X ...... iNK F':iO0 BLACK ....................................
05154 X PEN F30 d FELTED TIP BLACK * 05928 X POTTG CPD STYCAST 2741/15 EPOX* 20205 X VARNISH MOISTURE FUNGUS RESIST
05155 X ADHES DAPCOTAC 3001 * 05929 X POTTG CPD FMl132 PHENOLIC * 20214 X PRIMER WASH
05173 X TAPE 465/467/468 ACRYLIC FILM * 05955 X TAPE G401902 FEP/467 ACRYL PS * 20216 X SEALANT LIQUID SCREW LOCK
051_3 .........X........NAMEPLATEASSYACRYiIC"ADH/AL ;05961 .......X ...... CTNGSIiANEz6070 .................... ;20234 ........ X........ RUBBEREPRE798270 ....................................
05199 X SEALANT DC 94-002 FLUOROSILIC * 05963 X ADHES CYCLEWELD 55-9 * 20237 X RUBBER E740-75
05204 X RUBBER NITRILE (NRB) * 05971 X ADHES EAI9 EPOXY • * 20254 X CTNG PT750 POLYU/PT402 PRIMER
05216 X VARNISH PHENOLIC ELECTR INSUL * 05993 X CTNG EPOXY -GRAY COLOR#36118 * 20351 X SEALANT THREAD LOCK #271
65_4 ........_.........C_NG_ERMAi_bNfRoL PbLVUR_i_;bG614........_ ._bHE__HERMAsILTYPEiIiCAfS_20462 .....X ....sEALANTE__IOS..........................................
05226 X ADHES EC2214(HI FLEX)EPOXY/AL * 06026 X TISSUE MT5 DRY MOUNT * 20438 X FILM STABILENE DIAZO
05231 X INK WORNOW50-000 SERIES * 06069 X PRIMER A-4094 SILICONE * 20456 X TAPE P-910
05238 X PLATE ID AL FOIL/PS ADHES 467 * 06072 X CTNG CTL-15/C-15 CAT EPOXY BLK* 20485 X ADHES LOCTITE 242
b_29_........_........AD_ES__6_A_Y2I2E_b_V...................;66093........X .....C_NG tNSOLATiNG6_ii6_FLUiO;"265i4 ........X.......PRiMER"bOi_K_Sg_B....................................
05299 X ADHES METBA-SET BLUE LABEL * 06095 X TAPE POLYIMIDE CLEAR ACRYL ADH* 20515 X INK OUSTRITE INDELIBLE
05315 X SEALANT 71-Y-1 CORR INH EPOXY * 06096 X TAPE POLYIMIDE AU/AL PS ADHES * 20527 X SEALANT PR 1201-HT POLYSULFIDE
05357 X CTNG 683-3-3Y POLYURETHANE * 06104 X PRIMER PR-420 URETHANE * 20534 X FOAM MOLECULON FR302 POLYU
6535§ .........x .....dTNG_Pb_VEiYE§653EPbX9 ............;66223 .......x .....TAPE f:359_TEFLdNTAdRVLIcPS";26542 ........X ....CYhGEhOXVENAME'_66268WHiTE .......
05369 X MOLD CPD DIALL 52-01 DAP * 06307 X CTNG POLYU DEPTHANE NO.I GLOSS* 20543 X DEODORANT ALMAY CHEQ SOLID
05375 X VARNISH DC-997 SILICONE * 06321 X TAPE SCOTCH 853 POLYESTER * 20574 X FOAM ENSOLITE TYPEAH
05454 X LUBE DRY LUBRIBOND A * 06369 X INK $66-17 SATURN YELLOW * 20639 X RUBBER TA 96 SILICONE
TABLE 3-4 (CONT' D)
i
u71g-10-203 fOX RATINGS FOR NON-METALS BY MATERIALICOOE 03:44 AM PAGE 2
t
20703 X LACING TAPE TG-30 * *
20711 X ADHES 520 NEOPRENE * ........................ : .........? ...........................................................................................................
"26745..... X.......CTNG _btVb PLgNOM :6gTgiHk .......; ............................................................ *
20746 X CTNG CHEMGLAZE Z853/CAT 9986 * *
20747 X CTNG CHEMGLAZE Z752 POLYU BLUE • *
20748 X CTNG CHEMGLAZE Z651 POLYU GREN* *
20777 " "X ........ AbHESFLEXtCRAFT868 UREVINVL* •
20779 X AOHES ZIPGRIP t0 CYANO ACRYLIC* *
20794 X ADHES SR 529 SILICONE RUBBER * *
20795 X CTNG PT 805 SILICONE WHT GLOSS* .................. _.........................................................................................
TOTAL/REPORT (1611 * *
t.O ................................................................................ , ......... .............. *
e
, t
• I
TABLE 3-5 MATERIAL CODES RATED X IN SCC.
U719-I0-201 STRESS CORR RATINGS FOR METALS BY MATERIAL CODE 03:44 AM PAGE I
10368 X AL 2024-T4 SUNSTRAND LEE PLUG * *
10521 X AL 2014-T6/T62 CLAD SHT & PLT * *
36ggg........_.........Ag20_:_Sgi_AY_"__6i'"gT_F'"; ......................................................................................................................;.............................................................................................................................
30071 X AL 2024-T4/T3511 * *
30091 X CRES tT-TPH THI050 BAR&FORGING* *
30099 X AL 2017 ALL TEMPERS * *
30122 X AL 7075-T6XX BAR,EXTR,PLATE * *
30123 X CRES 17-4 H9XX BAR CST * *
30124 X CRES 17-4PH Hgoo/15-7MO THtO50* *
30156 X SOLDER EUTEC 157 * *
30158 X AL 7178-T6 * *
30159 X CRES 17-4PH Hgo0 * *
30173 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 2124 * *
30174 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 2219 * *
30175 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 6061 * *
30177 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 7075 * *
30178 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 7075 * *
30179 • X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 2219 * *
30181 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 2024 * *
30182 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 2014 * *
30183 X REYNOLDS SUSPECT AL PLT 2219 * *
5__s_........_........__oLBg_gPEgY_g¢_262X; ...............................................................................................................; ..........................................................................................
99012 X DELINQUENCY CHECK * *
TOTAL/REPORT (28) * *
MATERIALEXCEPTIONS
Certain exceptions break the general guidelines such that all materials
should be tested and subsequently be approved or rejected. Somematerials may
be fail-tested, but approved based on configuration or small volume/surface
area.
Metals: Do not use magnesium, beryllium or titanium over 165 Ksi,
ultimate strength in structural applications.
Do not usezinc or cadmium.
Non-Metal: Do not use ceramicsin structuralapplications.
MaterialsProgrammaticRequirements
The complex and sophisticatedtechnologyof manned spaceflightrequries
strong and effectiveengineeringmanagement. The effectivenessof that
managementis relatedto the design of the engineeringdata management
system. The Space Stationtechnologywill requiremore sophisiticatedsystems
than currentlyin-place.
Materials& ProcessControl appliesto the proper selection,usage
evaluation,documentationand the trackingof materialsand processesto avoid
or reduce the risks of systemperformancefailuresfrom flammability,
toxicity,thermal/vacuumstability,corrosion,fluid incompabilitites,
fatigue,oxygen impactsensitivities,etc.
A unitizedmaterialand processescontrolreportingsystemwas developed
to supportthe Space Shuttleprogram and has servedto identifyand track all
materialsusageswith the flexibilityof discreetconfigurationcontrol. This
is accomplishedby a data base informationmana_lentsystemcalledMATCO.
A total Material& ProcessControl systemconsistsof two basic elements:
I. An engineeringreview/evaluationsystem
Programrequirements
Design review/approval
MaterialsTest programs
Specificatons
Hazard removals
FailureAnalysis
2. An engineeringdatamanagementand trackingsystem.
Materialselection Iists
PropertiesManuals
Materialidentificationand tracking
As/buiIt controls
Completenessverification
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Materials& ProcessControl (MATCO)
A centralcomputersystem is used for the identification,tracking,
retrieval,control,documentingand reportingof all materialusages,both
as-designedand as-builtconfigurations,for the space shuttleprogram.
As-Designed- Originalengineeringdesignreleasesand any engineering
change documentation(EngineeringOrders,etc.)
As-Built - Materialchanges resultingfrom,material reviews (MR's),
discrepancyreports (DR's),test and checkoutprocedures,etc.
AdvancedMaterials& ProcessControlAreas:
o Age Life - Currentdata base's are limitedand detailedengineeringanalysis
is requiredfor futurelong durationapplications.
o Maintainability- Space environmentaleffectsare showingnew perspectives
needed in materialsusage evaluation/analysis.
o Radiation- Effectsof materialexposureto radiationis currentlya limiteddata base.
o Material/ConfigurationLocator - Computeraided locatorsystem for tracking
materialusages is requiredfor more complex space systems.
o IntegratedLogistics- Hardwarelogisticscontroldata bases need to be
integratedwith engineeringmaterialsdata bases.
AdvancedContaminationControlSystem Requirements:
o Real time monitoringand data aquisition/managementsystem.
o Computeraided contaminationmodeling system.
o Integratedcontaminationcontroltrackingsystem.
o Contaminationcontroldesign standardmanual.
Suggestedmaterialcontrolrequirementsfor the space stationare shown
in Figure 3-I. For clarity,the followingacronymsare defined:
SCC - StressCorrosion/Cracking
VCM - VolatileCondensableMaterial
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SUGGESTEDMATERIALCONTROLREQUIREMENTS
MATERIAL CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
NONMETALLI C METALL I C
£SS I) BASIC CONFIGURATION
_SS II ) LRU 9
_SS III) CONSUMABLES, MOVABLE >- " '_ >" "_
- _ >__ -_ ...J _ -- _ L..I, Z
- _ _. o × = ,-, - o
APPLICATION LOCATION .J o< ___ _ (_ -- o o_ ._:_ >- o _ x (_ _- o --Li- I'-_ i _ _ :I: L} 113 .-I "r- L) (__ .J L=- ..I ::I::
CABIN INTERIOR • • • • • • • •
CREW WINDOW • • • • • •
MODULES EXTERIOR CAVITY
ALL OTHER • • • • • •
AREAS
TRANSFER AIRLOCK/TUNNEL • • • • • • • •
MODULE OTHER AREA_ • • • • • •
EXTERNAL • • • • • •
c_ MODULESuJ • • • • •
CONSUMABLE INTERIOR • (2) • • • • • • •
STORAGE EXTERIOR • • • • • • •
OTV • • • • •
UPPER SURFACE • • • • • •
PLATFORM
REMAINDER • • • • •
SOLAR INTERNAL SUR'FACE • • • • • •
PANELS EXTERNAL SURFACE • • • • • • •
LOX FLUID SYSTEMS • • • • • •
>20 PSIA 0 2 • • • • •
WATER • • • • • • •
H-, • • • • •
hYDRAULI C
FLUID FLUID SYSTEMS • • • •
INERT ALL LOCATIONS • • •CON'IAI NERS
(2) VCM REQUIREMENT IN WINDOW CAVITY IS 0.01 PERCENT
Figure 3-I
OXYGENBOMBARDMENT
During flight in low Earth orbit, a space vehicle experiences
bombardment with highly energetic atmospheric species, the principal of which
has been determined to be atomic oxygen. This constituent is known to be
chemically reactive with many materials. For sufficiently high fluxes of
atomic oxygen, chemical changes can be expected for spacecraft surfaces
oriented in the "wind ward" direction.
Opportunities to examine surfaces that have been exposed to space
conditions, but protected during reentry heating, have been few. Those
samples that were returned from low Earth orbital conditions were contaminated
by spacecraft sources during exposure and, therefore, slight changes in these
surfaces were not observable. Surfaces returned from lunar exposure were also
affected by contaminating lunar dust agitated by the nearby landing of the
Apollo lunar module. With the flight of Space Shuttle, uncontaminated
surfaces have provided an opportunity for examination.
The current knowledge of high energy 0 atoms surface chemistry and
physics is severely limited. One of the reasons for this is the difficulty of
producing a fast oxygen atom beam in the laboratory.
As a vehicle travels through space in relatively low orbit, it
experiences bombardment by fast (8 km/sec) oxygen atoms by virtue of its
orbital velocity. As the period for which space missions are required to
function increases, so also the importance of the long term/effects of
exposure of spacecraft materials to the upper atmosphere increases. The
advent of the shuttle orbiter, operating at relatively low altitudes, places
further importance upon the action of atmospheric species because of the
higher atmospheric density encountered in low Earth orbit. The composition
and density of the atmosphere above 120 km are functions of several
variables: local time, day of the year, geographic latitude, sunspot
activity,radio solar flux and magnetic index. Neutralatmosphericspecies
above 120 km includeO, N2, He, 02, Ar, and H atoms. Molecularnitrogen
dominatesbelow about 200 km, while atomicoxygen dominatesabove this
altitude.
Tileatmospherebombardinga spacecraftmay interactwith the surfacesof
the spacecraftin a numberof ways which effect the surfaceproperties. Among
these effectsare: condensation,luminescence,sputtering,volatilizationof
weaklybound surfacedepositsand chemicalreactionswith the surfaceor with
impuritiesdepositedthereon.
Evidencefor atomic oxygen interactionswith variousmaterialswas
apparentduring shuttleflights2 through4. (See Table 3-6). Postflight
inspectionof orbiterpayloadbay surfacesand spaceflighthardwareindicated
that significantchangeshad occurredfor thermalcontrol paintsused on
noninsulatedsurfacesand handrailsand thermalblanketsused to insulate
payloadbay televisioncameras. The normalglossy appearanceof Kapton films
used to insulatethese cameraswas convertedto a flat, lightyellow hue.
Strong shadow patterns,indicatingthe directionof atomic oxygenbombardment,
were evidenton these film surfaces. Both A-276 thermalcontrolpaint and
A-971 identificationpaint lost their gloss and became dull in appearance,an
indicationthat rapid "aging"had resultedfrom atomicoxygen bombardment.(261)
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More pronounced effects were observed on two metal spheres associated
witil a space sciences plasma experiment conducted during STS-3 mission.
Aerodag, a carbon suspension coating was completely removed from the tops of
these spheres, indicating prominent interactions with the atomic oxygen
environment. Material disc specimens flown on STS flight 4 silowed similar
degradation. Silver, osmium, and carbon specimens _ere similarily affected.( 261)
TABLE3-6 ATOMICINTERACTIONSWITHSHUTTLEMATERIALS
0 Significant effects of environment on payload bay materials
observed on all flights
0 STS-I
o Forward bulkhead kapton camera blanket was milky yellow after
fl i ght
o Yellow paint aged rapidly
0 STS-2
o Camera blankets - loss of 4.8% on kapton outer surface; all
cameras affected
o Paint similar to STS-I
0 STS-3
o Camera blankets - mass loss of 35% (0.I mil) on surfaces of
essentially all cameras
o Torlon thermal blanket button had white deposit on surface
o Paint similar to STS-I except white paint on sill longeron
also aging rapidly
o OSS-I kapton had loss of 22% (0.22 mil)
o PDP (Plasma Diognositc Package) spheres had complete loss of
aquadag on upper surfaces
o OSS-I (Office of Space Sciences Mission-l) paint surfaces also
affected
0 STS-4
o Kapton affects minor on both camera and payload surfaces
o Coated kapton had resistance changes
o Witness samples of four materials flown on IECM (induced
environment contamination monitor) had loss ranging from .033
mil for teflon to .07 mil for kapton and mylar
o Witness samples of carbon coating 2000A completely removed
(262)
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Flight tests were performed during the STS-5 misison to evaluate the
interactions of atomic oxygen with various spacecraft materials. (See Table
3-7 (261)). To achieve the desired exposure conditions, thin-film material
samples were attached to thermal plates mounted on a carrier within the
orbiter payload bay. This carrier placed the samples above the Orbiter
longerons to allo_ for direct impingement of oxygen atoms and limit
interactions with atomic oxygen reflected from interior surfaces. Orbital
attitudes and 44 hours of exposure time acquired during this mission produRgd
a fluence (integrated incident atomic oxygen flux) of approximately 1 x I0 _u
atoms/Fro2. Postflight laboratory tests revealed significant mass erosion
for Mylar, Tedlar, and Kapton films. Scanning Electron _licroscope (SEM)
examinations showed significant surface morphology changes after exposure to
the atomic oxygen environment. Materials such as Teflon were not as
susceptible to atomic oxygen reaction as nonflourinated materials such as
Kapton and Mylar. The reaction rates for these materials appear to be
nontemperature dependent over a temperature range of 24°C to 121°C, which is
most likely due to the high kinetic energy (5eV) of ti_e oxygen atoms (261).
TABLE3-7 STS FLIGHT 5 SAMPLEDESCRIPTION
ATOMICOXYGENINTERACTION
Temperature Controlled Trays
o Kapton (Clear and Black) o Graphite Epoxy
o Mylar o Graphite/Polymide
o Teflon - FEP/TFE o Aluminum
o Kevlar o Silver
o Epoxy o Overcoats(on Kapton or Mylar)
o Polysulfone o SiliconeBase Coatings
o Tedlar (Whiteand Clear) o Indium-TinOxide I
o Paints o Gold
o A276 o Aluminum
o 302
o 306 o Cables
o 401-ClO o Graphite
o Sl3-GLO o Kevlar
TemperatureUncontrolledAreas
o Germanium o MS74
o Zot o P1700
o SiIver FoiI o S-l3GLO
o RTV o Indium-TinOxide
o Alclad AL with AU/MO o Glassy Carbon
o Silicone Coating o RTV-560
o F1uorinated Polyurethane o V2000
o A-276 o Osmium
o Iridium o Candidate Antenna Materials
o Z306 o P1700
( 261)
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FindingsTo Date
A) Materialreactivity- is presentlybeingmeasuredin three
categories: reactive,minimallyreactiveand non-reactive.
B) Mecilanisms- To date, all data collectedand analyzedis consistent
with a mechanisminvolvingoxygenatom interactionwith surfaces.
C) Solar Activity - an assumptioncan be drawn; if tilemechanismis
based on atomic oxygen,then solar activitywill effect reactivity
very stronglysince oxygen densityis stronglydependenton solar
activity. Densityfrom solarminimum to solarmaximum can vary by
one to two ordersof magnitudedependingon altitude. Density is
also dependenton attitudeand flux is dependenton surface
attitude.
D) Temperaturedependence- lleasurementsfrom the STS-5 experiment
indicateno surfacetemperaturedependencewithin the measurement
errors.
E) Effectson Spacecraft- Impactson spacecraftsurfacescan be
predictedfrom oxygen atom influencedata (takesinto account
flightdate, altitude,attitude,and atmosphericdensity)and
reactionrates. Using reactionrates that have been measuredfor
Kapton and Mylar, considerationof oxygeneffectson such surfaces
shouldbe taken into account for long-lived,low altitudespace-
crafts,especially,if flightoccurs duringsolar maximum.
Spacecrafthardwarewith high sensitivityto surfacechangesshould
also be evaluated. Also impacton maintainabilityshould be
evaluated.
StrategyOptions
The oxygen nuclei bombardmentphenomenonseverityis inversely
proportionalto the altitudeand directlyproportionalto the ambientnuclei
count. Resolutionoptionsto minimizeoxygen nuclei bombardmentis to
maintainthe space stationin an orbit as high as possible,consideringother
threat trades (i.e.,radiation).
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INTERNALATMOSPHERECONT_IINATION
A space station internal atmosphere monitor will have to function in
real time. Off-the-shelf equipment for this purpose is not readily available
today. The Shuttle gas sampling approach is summarized in Table 3-8.
TABLE 3-8. SHUTTLE INTERIORA_IOSPHERE
SAMPLINGAPPROACH
o _hole gas samples.
o Three times duringmissionthe cylindervalve is opened to permit
the inflowof cabin atmosphereinto the evacuatedcylinder.
o The sampleis trapped upon closingthe cylindervalve.
o Toxicologylaboratoryperformsanalysisafter the flight.
o Gas chromatograp|_.
o Mass spectrometryfor compoundidentification.
o Gas chromatograp|_for quantification.
The problemwitilthe present Shuttlesamplingsystemis that contaminant
identificationdoes not take place until after landing. Sometimesit may
extend to days or weeks before the communityknows tilecontaminantair parcel
make-up. A summaryof the contaminationmonitoringissue follows:
Issue: No real-timemonitoringof cabin containments.
Hazard: Loss of crew capabilitiesdue to increasedtoxicitylevels
producingsilort/longten,1effects.
PresentSystem: See Table 3-8.
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Figure 3-2 shows a sketch of the Shuttle cabin air sampling system.
Table 3-9 summarizes the safety concerns of the present system.
TABLE 3-9 SAMPLINGCONCERNS
l) Insufficientsamplebottlesto providethe necessarydata to make
an adequateassessmentof the cabin atmospherethroughoutthe
mission.
2) Use of sample bottlesfor qualification/verificationfor new
equipmentor changes in operatingconditions.
3) If the crew capabilitywere to be degraded (physicallyor mentally
duringthe flight)adequatepost flight data would not be available
to make an assessmentof the cause and initiationof corrective
actionwould be difficult.
4) No controlon carry-onitems. First exposureto cabin environment
is during flightwithoutprior evaluationor real time monitoring.
5) Halon 1301 leak/dischargecould exceed SMAC level unrecognized.
6) Synergisticeffectsof cabin contentsis unknown.
7) Abuse of Lioh cannistersmay create a singlepoint failurewhich
could releasea corrosive/toxicmaterial.
8) Under current situations,missionsmust be abortedif the donning
of masks is required.
9) Cabin atmospherecannot readilybe altered,cannot vent to vacuum.
Safety Issues
Becausethere is no presentreal time air compositionmonitoringsystem
available,as state-of-the-artequipmentfor the space stationan analogous
issuemay be derivedfrom the Shuttle. These safety issuesare noted in Table
3-9 above.
Contaminantsfound in the ShuttleOrbiterto date are listed in Table
3-I.
Recon_nendation:
StrategyOption
Developand implementan on-boardreal time monitoringsystem for the
space stationusing, at least, the followingapproach:
I. Look at state of the art equipmentavailable
2. Assess for STS application
3. Design packageorbiterexperiment
4. ProcessthroughOrbit Experiment(OEX)acceptanceroute
5. Assess real-timetest data
6. Recommendprototypedesign
7. Prepareequipmentspecifications
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Figure 3-2 SilurrleCabin Air Sa_mplingSystem
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An optimum unit/systemwould have the followingcharacteristics:
o Small Size
o Light Weight
o Passesstoxicity,odor, flammability
o Passes qual test
- Vibroacoustic
- G Force/ZeroG
- Calibration/Performance
o Real time data readoutand telemetry
o Storage
Some candidatescould include,if size/weightoptimized:
* H-P Hodel 5992, 3 pieces,24ft3
* FinniganOWA
* ShimadzuGC + Data system,l ft3
* Finniganion trap detector,8 ft3
DEBRIS CONT_IINATIONIN CREW CABIN
Background
Considerableamount of debris has been collectedfrom subsystemscreens
and filtersduringpost flight cleaningsand inspectionsof both OV-102 &
0V-099 vehicles. The quantityof debris has causedconcern based on the
possibilityof filtercloggingwith resultantair flow restrictionand/or
migrationof debrismatter throughsystemsvulnerableto particulatematter
inducedmalfunctions.
ProblemHistory
STS-5 (OV-102)ECLSS H20 water separator"B" operatedat reduced
efficiency,post flightexaminationrevealeda high level of contamination
throughoutthe unit with pluggedwater drain and transferholes. Separator
"A" was also contaminatedbut still met tileAcceptanceTest Procedure(ATP).
During the flightof STS-7, the urinal filterhad to be replaced
numeroustimes; a prior failureof the Waste ControlSystem (WCS)urine-air
separatorhad been attributedto this excessivecontamination.
Duringground checkoutof OV-102cabin positiverelief valves,both
valves failed to reseat properlydue to contaminatesentrappedon the valve
seats by the reseatingvalves.
Black box debris screens,in many cases, have been completelycovered
with lint like materials.
o No significantreductionin air flo_ coolinghas thus far been
noted.
o Cooling effectsunder I0.2/8.0PSI cabin unknown.
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CurrentAction Being Taken
H20 separator - I_CR10308 authorizesredesignof filter for air entering
the cabin fan and debris trap assembly.
PositivePressure- Awaitingauthorizationfor designof filtersto replace
Relief Valves presentdebris screens.
AvionicsScreens- Of41 6018 requirementschangedto requirescreenscleaning
every lO00 hours or betweenfligiltswhicheveroccurs first.
Open Concerns
Contaminationcould worsen to a point where positivepreventativeaction
must be taken. Some of these concernsare:
l) Non,lalwear/deteriorationof cloth materialscould generatean
increasingamount of lint.
2) Laxityin controlof ground supportpersonnelcleanliness
procedurescould introduceundesired debris/contamination into crew
compartment.
3) F1anufacturingand modificationrev_orkactivitiesat all sitesmay
be a significantcontributorto the overallcontaminationproblem.
Analysisof Debris
I_aterialsgatheredfrom OV-IO2 & 0V-099 have been identifiedand
itemizedto facilitatedeterminationof origin.
A basic categorizationof the materialscollectedappear to be as follows:
l) Lint-AstronautsGarment,SleepingBags, ETC.
2) I1anufacturingDebris - Rivets,Washers,Wire, Paint Chips,ETC.
3) CarriedOnboardDebris - Popcorn,Apple Stem, Dog Hairs,Small
ParticulateI_atter,Sand, ETC.
The above categorizationcan be utilizedto formulatepracticalcontrol
measuresand to monitor their effectiveness.
StrategyOptions
Using historicaldata, screenout the debrisgeneratorswhere possible
(clothing,filter cleaning,etc.). Also, a concertedhouse-keepingplan for
the space stationsilouldbe devised.
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SPACE STATIONCONTAHINATION
This new technologyinvolving"Micro-G"and the relatedpollutants,
shouldbe investigatedand assessed. Use of previousmeasurementsand
existingreportsshould be consideredto establishbaselineparametersand
identifyany similarpossiblecontamination. Investigateall materials,both
new and existing,hardware,softwareand orbitingterms tilatmay impact
personnellivingconditionsor degradespace stationsystems.
There shouldbe a completeanalysisof the dispersionrate,
concentrationsand other factors,which may establisha criterionto identify
necessarycontrolsof contaminantsand pollutants. This analysis shouldalso
encompasshardware/softwareand avionicsareas of reliability,should the
effectsof contaminationnot readilybe controlledor dispersed.
The flow chart (Figure3-3) is an exampleof the methologyneeded to
control, reduceor eliminatecontaminationof orbitalspace.
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Figure3-3 ContaminationImpact
Analysis
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StrategyOptions
As indicatedin Figure 3-3 a contaminationimpact assessmentshould be
made. Design of a "clean"stationwould be most helpful. But the problemof
"no g assist"to settle dust and allow convenientclean may not have been
addressedin the detail necessaryto postulatethe problemin sufficient
detail. The cleaningissue is discussedperipherallyin Volume III of this
report.
TOXIC CONTN_INATIONOF FOOD
BackgroundPrecedent(371)
BritishAirwayswarned its flight crews about hazardsof food
contaminationafter more than 75 crew-memberswere strickenwith suspected
Salmonellapoinsoningover a four or five-dayperiod in mid-Marchof 1984.
The airlinebelievesabout 120-130passengers,all of whom had ridden in
the first-classsectionsof at least 13 differentBritishAirways flights
betweenMarch 12 and March 14 or 15 were also affected.
The contaminationiladbeen tentativelytraced to the aspic glaze on hors
d'oeuvrespreparedin the BritishAirwaysflightkitchen at HeathrowAirporthere.
The airline said that all suspectedstocksof the foodstuffwere
immediatelyremovedfrom the kitchenand destroyed,and the kitchenhas been
inspectedand approvedboth by the airline'sown safety and medical
departmentsand by the BritishDept. of the Environment.
In at least two cases both the pilot and first officierscheduledto fly
the same flight became ill. The airlinehas a standingrule that the two
pilots must eat separatemeals in flight,and these meals are prepared
specificallyfor the flightcrew. They are not drawn from meals preparedfor
the first-classpassengers.
Most of the 75 crew who were strickenwere cabin attendantswho eat the
same meal served to passengersand would normallybe expectedto be affected
by any contaminationin the passengerfood.
At least two flights,however,includinga Washington-to-LondonConcorde
service,had to be canceledafter illnesshit more members of the flightcrew
than could be replacedon short notice. Anotherflightwas a LockheedL-lOll
TriStarflight from Nairobito London.
BritishAirways officialssaid there is no record of both pilots on one
aircraftlater becomingill.
The airlineis uncertainwhetherone member of some flight deck crews
ate snackspreparedfor passengers,or whether some of the meals preparedfor
the crews might have been contaminated.
The high incidenceof flightand crew illnesswas the first indication
that the airline had of a problemwith the food being served. "Normally,
symptomsof the illnessdo not appear for about 24 hours after the food is
eaten,"an airlineofficialsaid. "In some cases, it may ilavebeen longer."
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Safety Issue
Will space stationpersonnelbe suppliedwitlltwo independentlyprepared
meal lockers?
StrategyOptions
Severalapproachescould be considered. One could includethe obvious:
have two crew elements,each fed from differentgalleys. A more subtle
alternativewould be to select foodswith the least probabilityof pathogic
development.
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4. INJURY/ILLNESS
DEFINITION
Physicalinjuriesmay be caused by impactor collisionwith stationary
objects havingsharp edges or protrudingparts or with shrapnelor projectiles
from explodingtanks or acceleratedloose objects. Physicalinjuriesmay also
be caused by ingestingparticulatematter, touchinghot or cold surfaces,and
by breathingoxygen deficientair. Care and controlto preventsharpand
abradingprotrusionsand the inclusionof hand holds and other convenient
restraintsfor astronautsminimizedexposureto injury. Crew illessescould
result from exposureto pathogenicbacteria,toxicmaterials,or to excessive
radiationlevels. The physiological/behavioralimpactof microgravityon the
crew for long time exposureis not clearlyunderstood. Personalhygieneand
close controlof food prepartionminimizeexposureto illness. Crew illness
and injurymust be treatablewithin the Space Station. The sophisticationof
medical facilitiesis yet to be detemined. Death of an astronautcannot be
ruled out, raisingthe questionof what procedureis to be followedfor tile
dispositionof the remains,i.e., return to earth or burial in space - burial
at sea precedence.
HISTORICAL
Healthof space crewmembershas been closelymonitoredsince the
beginningof the manned space flight. Treatiseshave been writtenon man's
capabilityto adapt to the space environment. That will not be discussedhere
exceptwhere it relatesdirectlyto the threat of injury/illness.Essentially
man, physiologically,has shown a degree of adaptabilityto the space
environmentfor periodsof time,plannedfor the space stationmissions;
namely,90-days. Impactingman s orientationin space are the phenomenaof:
Weightlessness
IonizingRadiation
Temperatureand Humidity
Accelerations
CircadiacRhythm Disruption
Noise and Vibration
AtmosphericComposition
Of these phenomena,weightlessnessappearsto be uniqueto space.
Ionizingradiationat specificaltitudesand sectors,as well as solar flares,
are more intensifiedin the space environment,however,experiencehas been
gainedon Earth in their handlingand study. Similarly,circadianrhythm
disruption,althoughmore intensifiedin space, has been and is being
experiencedin the Antarcticscientificstationsas well as with a sizeable
populationinvolvedwith commercialtransportaton.
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Predictedand known effectsof tilespace environmentinclude (308):
Amphoria Demineralizationof Bones
Nausea Motion Sickness
Disorientation PulmonaryAtelectasis
Sleepliness Tachycardia
Sleeplessness Hypertension
Fatigue F_potension
Restlessness CaridacArrhythmia
Euphoria PostflightSyncope
Hallucinations DecreasedExerciseCapacity
DecreasedG Tolerance ReducedBlood Volume
GastrointestinalDisturbance ReducedPlasma Volume
UrinaryRetention Dehydration
Diuresis Weight Loss
MuscularIncoordination InfectiousIllness
Muscle Atrophy Agonal Calculi
The Life Sciencesprogram in Skylabrevealedthat tilezero-gravity
environmentof space inducesa wide range of adaptivechangesextending
throughoutthe biologicalsystemsof the body. The detailedphysiologybehind
some of thesechanges has been definedby experiments. However,takingan
overviewof the programas a whole, two featureshave emerged. First,Man can
adapt to, and live in, the zero-gravityspace environmentfor extendedperiods
of time. But second,and thereforeabove all, none of the measuredchangesso
far seen in missionsextendingup to 84 days have proved irreversibleafter
return to Earth. Theremay be conjecturalindicationsthat the 211-day
Russianstay in space could have had some irreversibleeffectson the
cosmonauts.
THE SPACE PHYSIOLOGICALISSUES
Data today appearsto supportthe beliefthat man in his space
environmentis pI_siologicallydifferentfrom man in his Earth environment.
Weightlessnessimpactsthe cardiovascularsystemand the skeletalsystem
directly. Figure 4-I summarizesthe weightlessnesseffect on the body while
in space and also post landing. Additionally,without constantisometricor
simulatedphysicalstress,the skeletalsystemwould tend to atrophy. The
motion sicknessissue is not a safetymatter as it can be accommodatedand
when evident,lasts only a few days into the mission.
At an early stage of orbital flight,the cosmonautsconsistently
developeda number of changesthat manifestedas unusualand sometimes
unpleasantsensations,such as autonomicand motor disorders. A state similar
to motion sicknessusually developedduringmission day l and gradually
diminishedduringmission days 3-7. Motion sicknesssymptoms (vertigo,
deteriorationof health condition,hypersalivation,nausea,and sometimes
vomiting,etc.) of variousdegreesoccurredin one-thirdof the cosmonauts.
Frank motion sicknessalso developedin some cosmonauts. Out of the lO crew
members who participatedin Salyut-6/Soyuzflights,four showedautonomic
disordersboth during the first days and after the flight.
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Symptomsof cranial blood redistributionwere subjectivelynoted by
nearlyall cosmonauts. They emergedduringthe first day in orbit and then
graduallydisappeared,but sometimesincompletelyat differenttime intervals,
usuallyduring the first week. During this period,the cosmonautsreported
increasedblood flow to the head and head fullness;nasal congestion;wrinkle
relaxationand face puffiness;scleralhyperemia;increasedblood fillingand
pressurein neck veins and increasedhead blood filling;decreasedleg volume
and, in most cases, reducedbody mass; pastinessof above-the-heart-tissues.
Postflighteye examinationsdemonstratedresidualsignsof blood
redistributionin the form of enlargementof eyegroundvessels (engorgementin
the papillaarea). In addition,there was a decreasein hemodynamicchanges
duringhead-downtilting.
Changes in the motor functionduringthe firstmission days manifested
as a mismatchof the motor stereotypeevolvedon Earth comparedto the
weightlessenvironment. Due to this, it was difficultto estimatethe
muscularefforts requiredfor motor acts (e.g.movementin the cabin) and to
performaccuratelythe necessarymuscle movements. All this led to disorders
in movementcoordinationand requireda longertime to performcertain
preparatoryand working operationsin the weightlessstate. However,during
the first flightdays, movementsbecame adequatelyprecise,effortsassociated
with them decreased,and efficiencyof motor performanceincreased. (308)
Once acclimatedto space, the remainingbody systemissues are as those
summarizedin Figure 4-I and the skeletalmaintenanceissue (ADH refers to
plasma vasopressin).
Strategies
The Russianshave developeda preventiveprogramto promotegood
health. In order to maintaingood healthinflightand to facilitate
readaptationpostflight,it was necessaryto providea normalenvironment,
adequatenutrition,a rationalwork-restcycle,and differentcounter-
measures. The environmentalparametersof the crew module approximatedthe
Earth'satmosphere. The contaminantconcentrationswere within the limits
allowedfor long-termflights. Meals were selectedfrom a 6-daymenu
containing70 food items. The caloricvalue of a daily diet was 3150 kcal on
Salyut-6comparedto 2800 kcal in Salyut-4flights. The daily diet was
composedof the followingnutritionaland mineral ingredients: protiens,125
g; fats, llO g; carboJ_drates,380g; calcium,800 mg; potassium,3.0 g;
phosphorus,1.7g (normal1.2-I.5);sodium4.5-5.0g (normal4.0-6.0);
magnesium,0.4 (normal0.3 g); iron, 50 mg (normal15 mg). Among the various
food items therewere 25 meat dishes,5 dairy products,5 bread and bakery
products,lO varietiesof sweets,12 fruitsand juices,4 warm beverages,2
dressings,and 6 kinds of soups. The daily diet was supplementedwith
multiplevitamins. (372)
On requestof the crew members,the cargo vehicle,"Progress,"as well
as the transportationspacecraftsuppliedfresh fruitsand vegetables,spicy
dressings,confectionery,and other items. The freshwater supplywas
obtainedfrom storedsilver-treatedwater and from water reclaimedfrom
atmosphericcondensate. The crew memberscould obtain hot water.
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Figure 4-1 Impact of Micro-G on Body Systems (174)
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Accordingto the time-schedule,the crewmemberswere allowed9 hours of
sleep from 2300-0800,Moscow time, 2.5 hours for exercise,2.5 hours to take
four meals a day, 8 hours to performvariousexperimentsand other activities,
and 2 hours of privatetime, of which an hour was normallyspent as a
after-lunchnap. Saturdaysand Sundayswere days off.
Beginningwith mission days 4-7, the crew memberswere scheduledto
exerciseevery morningand eveningusing a bicycleergometerand a treadmill
equippedwith a pullingsystem that provideda load of approximately50 kg
directedparallelto the long axis of the body. The exerciseswere performed
on a cyclic basis, i.e., for 3 days accordingto a speciallydevelopedprogram
and the fourthday as ad lib.
Each day, the crew membersdonned Penguinsuits that providedan axial
load upon the musculo-skeletalsystem. These suitswere removedbefore going
to bed. Two days before recovery,the crew membersused a chibis vacuumsuit
to apply lowerbody negativepressure(LBNP). On the day of recovery,they
ingestedthree doses of a water-saltsupplementcomposedof 3.0 g NaCl in
300-400mg water. Immediatelybefore reentry,the cosmonautsdonned a
pneumaticanti-G suit whose bladderswere inflatedupon landing. The suit was
used both to improvevenous return of blood and to enhanceorthostatis
tolerancein the uprightposition.
During flight,many measureswere taken to fill leisuretime, including
conversationswith familymembers,scientists,actors,sportsmenand other
celebrities. In addition,therewere broadcastsof movies,concerts,variety
sllows,the daily news, press reviews,and consultationsby prinicpal
investigators,using the televisionand radio Earth-station-Earth
communicationchannels. This would tend to put off fatigueresultingfrom
boredom. (308)
Medical Investigationsincluded(308):
o Heasurementsof variationsin body mass and leg volume;
o Electrocardiographicexaminationat rest using the standard12-1ead
system;
o Centraland regionalhemodynamicsat rest and duringprovocative
tests using rheography;of blood pressure(includingmean pressure)
using tachyoscillography;of arterialpulse using sphygmography;
and systolicand diastolictime intervalsusing kinetocardiograpJ_;
o Measurementsof venouspressurein the juglularvein (phlebography
in combinationwith lower body negativepressure)and in leg and
forearmvessels (plethysmography);
o Dynamicelectrocardiographicexaminaton;
o Hematologicalexamination(bloodwithdrawnfrom the finger)and
biochemicalexaminationof the urine (usingindicatorpaper strips);
o Study of fluid-electrolytemetabolismand renal function(analysis
of urine samplesstoredinflight);
o Hearingtests using sudiometry;
o Microbiologicalinvestigations(skin smears,or nasal smears and
smears from the cabin interiorsurface).
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Postflightexaminationincludedthe following:
o Clinicalexamination;
o Investigationof the cardiorespiratorysystem and hemodynamicsat
rest and during provocativetests;
o Evaluationof motor activity,motor control system,and vestibular
function
o Investigationof fluid-electrolytemetabolism,renal function,and
bone density
o Biochemicalinvestigations(bloodenzymes,and blood and urine
lipids,carbohydrates,nitrogens,vitamins,and hormones);indices
of the sympathoadrenaland cholinergicsystemof blood);
o Hematologicalinvestigation;
o I_munologicalinvestigation;
o Microbiologicalinvestigations.
SPACE PSYCHOLOGICALISSUES
Althoughpsychologicalissuesimpact healthmaintenance,they are not
discussedhere. Volume III of this report, "The Safety Impactsof Human
Factors"addressesthese issues. In Section 2 of Volume III, NASA-ARC
presentsan interactionmodel whereas stressors,both physiologicaland
psychological,are addressed. Strategiesto addresspsychologicalissuesare
also covered in Volume III.
Strategies
Screeningand trainingof space crewmembersappearsto be the best
preventivemeans to avoid psychologicalillnesses. Once a psychological
aberranceis noted,depositioningthe problemmay requirechemicalor physical
restraint. The better strategyof the two would appear to be handlingthe
problemby screeningor trainingbefore the fact.
HEALTHI4AINTENANCESTRATEGY(368)
For the crew, a healthmaintenancefacility,somewhatanalogousto a
"clinic"in the usual work setting,will be required. It shouldcontain the
necessarycapabilitiesto maintaina sick or injuredcrewmanuntil he or she
can be returnedto duty or safelyto Earth. This capabilitymay evolveover
the course of the space stationprogram.
The overall space stationsystemmust providecertaincapabilitiesto
perform the work outlinedherein. The means by which these capabilitiesare
providedis not important;but in some cases, the method may be limited by
availabletechnology. Nonetheless,the capabilitiesshould include:
o On-boardcrew physicalfitnessprovisions
o Maintenanceof the psychologicalwell being of the crew
o Measurementof crew performance
o r4aintenanceof livingorganismsfrom 20 days to over a year in zero
gravitywith no health risk to crew
o Artificialgravityfor controlsand partialgravityexperiments
o Automaticoperationor visitationby the crew on a regularbasis to
the animal and plant habitatswith proper crew safeguards
o On-boardsampleanalysisfor certainsamples,tissues,and effluents
o On-boardstorageof and capabilityto update proceduresfor medical
and experimentalprotocols
o Data transmissionto the ground, (some of it in real time) of video
and other data streams
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Wllilenot inherentin the capabilitiesoutlinedabove nor in the needed
capabilitiesaboard the space station,there are some interfacerequirements
between the subsystemsand the facilitiesthat are key to successfullife
sciencesmissions.
For example, since we assume the station will be permanently in orbit,
there is a need for periodic resupply of food, water, and station laboratory
expendables. Similarly, moving expendables to the station and returning
samples or specimens to the ground laboratories requires special transfer and
STS equipment.
Since EVA is assumed to be a routine space station operation, facilities
for treating decompression sickness should be considered. A life support
system is required for all habitable areas of the station. The habitat design
should featuremaximumhabitability. Compartmentalizationof the habitat,
rescueand escape routes,havens,visable/audiblecaution/warningsystemswith
sensors,and habitatpurge and recompressioncapabilityshouldbe considered.
If the space stationis to be used as a way-stationfor longermissions
involvingreturnedcraft or samplesfrom other solar-systembodies,quarantine
facilitiesshouldbe considered. Similarly,if a crew member becomesill with
a communicabledisease,quarantinecould be required. A hazardanalysisof
stationoperationsshouldbe performedto allow medicalpersonnelto plan for
treatmentof any resultanttrauma. Tllussome of the requirementsfor health
maintenanceand treatmentmust be left open for now.
Key Personnel
Trained personnelwill be needed to providehealthand maintenanceto
the crew and to performlife sciencesand other experiments. Some tasks or
experimentswill requiresurgicalor other manipulationsor specimens,
collectionof samples,or performanceof specialprotocols/procedures.The
numberand types of skillswill be determinedby overallmissionobjectives
and stationarchitecture.
Some first-aidcan be performedby the crew. However,for a long-stay
with no chance of return for many days, some specializedmedical training
could be requiredfor selectedcre_mmmbers. Initialhealth care might require
littlemore than elaboratefirst-aidkits derived from presentshuttleor past
Skylab programs. Later in the space stationmissiona healthmaintenance
facility,and perhapseven a full-scaleclinic ("sickbay") includingtrained
medicalpersonnel,would be required.
OperationalConsiderations(368)
Operationalmedicineobjectivesfor the space stationare:
o To ensuremaintenanceof crew health
o To establishon-boardcapabilitiessfor trauma,and cardiac life
support,and medical care to the point of stabilization
o To broadentllehealth data base for an expandedpopulationgroup of
space stationpassengersincludingPrincipalInvestigatorsof
experiments
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A life scientist,preferablya physician,should be a team member aboard
the space stationwhen the crew size reachesabout eight individuals. He
would providemedical care for the crews, performbiomedicalobservations,and
test medicalprocedures.
The areas listedand discussedbelow shouldbe consideredin the initial
planning phases:
o Zero "g" physiologicalproblems
o Life sciences-medicalinformationsystem (medicalcomputer)
o Accidents/risks
o Diseaseprevention
o Diagnosis
o Medical/surgicaltreatments
o Heal th moni tori n_
o I'_edical crew dutles
o EVA crew rescue
o Crew patient transfer in orbits/Earth return
o Crew rotation cycle
o Psychological support
o Ground operational support, resource requirements and effectiveness
analysis
o Medical standards
o Medical trainingand certification
o Medicalcare technologyissues
o Operationalmedicine/medicalcare technologyexperiments
INJURY/ILLNESSRISK ISSUES
Accidents (368)
Many accidentsmay be possiblewith the projectedcomplexitiesand
increasedvarietiesof hazardousspace stationoperations. Operational
medicineconsiderationsdeal witllthe principlesof occupationalmedicineand
environmentalhealth (OMEH)which encompassprevention,monitoring,and
countermeasuresto ensure the safetyof the crew members. The statisticsfor
injury and medicalproblemssufferedin analogousterrestrialoperations
should be useful in projectingsimilarproblemsin Earth orbitingspace
station. Administeringa programof space stationhealthmaintenanceshould
remainwithin space stationprogramjurisdiction.
DiseasePrevention(368)
Tilespace station,as a closed or semi-closedecosystem,makes the crew
members a major source of the microbialload and distributionwithin the space
stationhabitat. Once a crew member developsa communicabledisease,its
rapid spread among the crew may occur. Diseasepreventioninvolvesproper
crew selection,pre-flightcrew healthstabilization,on-boardfood system,
personalhygiene,waste management,and possiblythe transferof disease
betweenanimal and man if experimentalanimalsare introducedinto the
station. Diseasepreventionalso concernsthe exposureto possibletoxic
materials,radioisotopes,and biologicallyactivematerial. In this context,
the bioisolationtechnologyincorporatedwith the space stationenvironmental
controland life supportsystem (ECLSS)is needed. Isolationof humans from
animals,and healthycrew members from thosewho have contactedcommunicable
disease,may be required.
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MEDICAL PLANNING
Diagnosis(368)
Medicaldiagnosisof a crew member who is ailing from trauma or disease
opens a new technologicalchallengewhich encompassesa range from basic
physicalexaminationto electronicand clinicalchemistrylaboratorytests.
As stated,we are dealingwith physiologicalbaselinechangesand
physiologicalnorms from those on Earth. Hence,intravenousfluid therapycan
be monitoredby measuringthe body mass or shifts in the body's center of mass.
Anotherconcernis a decisionto returnthe crew to Earth. There may be
cases involvingpatientswho cannot immediatelybe returnedto Earth due to
the seriousnessof the traumaor illness,and other cases in which the 14 to
21 day delay in rescue capabilitymay not be medicallyacceptable. The level
of onboardmedicalcapabilitiesversus the cost per rescuemission needs
further,careful tradeoffconsiderations.
Based on the currentestimateof STS turnaroundcapability,the minimum
arrivaltime for a rescue vehicleafter notice is now projectedat 21 days.
Since a patient'sconditionwill vary,medical criteriamust be determinedfor
committingthe patientto reentryand landingwithoutendangeringhis or her
condition.
Medical/SurgicalTreatment(368)
Medical and surgicaltreatmentcapabilityaboard a space stationis
enhancedby a betterunderstandingof pI_siological"space norms" (hence,a
need for experiments)and the feasibilitydemonstrationof therapeutic
equipmentand proceduresin weightlessness. Projectedmedical problems,or
the statisticscompiledon medical problems(traumaand illnesses)on Earth,
and benignmedicalproblemsencounteredon past manned space missions,are
rathermisleadingin definingfuturemedicalcare capabilityin the space
stationera.
Medical treabnentsincludepharmacokineticsaffectedby the space sation
environment,the concernsabout drug shelf-life,drug potency,on-board
processingcapabilityof intravenousfluid,and blood bank technology. It may
be useful to selectspace stationcrew members in pairs, based on their blood
types and titers,as the living blood banks for possibletransfusionto
anothercrew member and to abrogatethe need for a blood bank facility.
Autotransfusingand other techniquesshouldbe considered.
Medical Crew Duties
Nominalduties for the medical crew aboardthe space stationshould
encompass,but not be limitedto the followingfunctions:
o Routineout-patientcare, includingdental,x-ray and clinical
laboratory
o Surgerywith computerizedintravenousgeneralanaesthesia
o Medical traiingand educationalmaterials
o Communicablediseasepatientisolation
o Clinicallaboratorytests
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o Emergencymedical care
- Rescue,CPR, stabilization,and transfer
- Life sustenance,intravenous(IV) injection,electrolyte
balancing
- Orthopedictreatment
- Decompressionsicknesscare using the airlockmodule
- Burn care
o Vital signsmonitoringand treatmentof criticallyill patients
with direct communicationwith ground for consultationas required
o Crew operations/constructionperformancemonitoringand human
factor/man-machineinterfaceanalyses (timeand motion studies
includingpl_siologicalcost of work using videotape)
o Medicalcommunications
- Image transmissionof x-ray, microscopeslide,and patient's
appearance(such as skin lesions)for consultationas required
- Routinecrew health status reportto ground supportcenter
- Real-timemedical emergencycommunicationwith ground
o Monitoringof crew radiationexposureand EVA crew workload/
metabolicrates
o Potablewater and food testing
o Drug potency testingusing animalmodels
o Psychologicalcrew support
o Equipmentand medical facilitymaintenance
- Preventivemaintenance
- Checkoutand repair
- Cleaning
- Calibration
Inventory
- Automatedreadinessstatus display
o Microbiologicaland chemicalanalysis/monitoringof space station
environment
- Microbialsampling,culture
- Air sampling/toxicologicalanalysis
- Light, noise,and temperature
o ilumandeconditioningtrendsmeasurements
o Medical recordsand data managment/periodicrew health status
reportingto the Space Station Commanderand the Ground Space
StationOperationsSupportCenter
o Decontamination- radiological,chemical,and microbiological
contamination
o Biological,radiological,and chemicalwaste storage,processing
and disposal
o Zero-gmedical procedures/medicalequipmentperformance
verification(video)using human and/or animalsmodel
o Regenerativelife supportsystem (RLSS)research
ExtravehicularActivity (EVA)Crew Rescue (368)
Long term space stationoperationsmay expandEVA to the point of
routine and give rise to multi-crewEVA thus increasingthe possibilityof
hazardsto the EVA crew. Therefore,variousEVA tools, manned remotework
stations,manned maneuveringunits, extravehicularmobilityunits,and
personalrescue systemshave been assumedto be provided.
Possiblemedical problemsduring EVA, howeverremote,include
decompression,life supportsystem failure,vomiting,physicalfatigue,
myocardialinfarction,collisonwith subsequenttumblingand unconsciousness,
and cuts and breaks.
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On past missions,a skin-attachedhypodermicinjectionkit was devised
for medicationduring EVA. When an EVA crew works severalkilometersfrom the
mother station,a pressurizedremote-sizefirst-aidstationmay be requiredto
ensure their safety. There are a numberof past and current EVA rescue
systemsand concepts. These could be analyzedagainstpossiblecrew hazards
in variousplanned space stationoperations. Tileanalysiscan be used to
developstrategiesfor improvedEVA crew safetyand rescue.
Crew PatientTransferin 0rbit/EarthReturn
Medicaltreatmentand patienttransportationin space,or from space to
Earth, encompassmuch broaderand sometimesunusualproblemsnot encountered
on Earth. Patienthandlingunder such a system can be dividedinto three
categories: (1) illnessor injurytreatedand crewman is returnedto duty;
(2) first-aidcare given for injuryor illnessand care providedfor several
days,with return to Earth for more definitivetreatment;and (3) more
extensivetreatmentonly for conditionsthat do not permit reentry (e.g.,
crewman requiringimmediatemajor surgeryor more sophisticateddiagnosisand
treatmentwill be transferredto a space base stationthat has more
sophisticatedmedicalcare facilities). (368)
If patienttransferis required,modularequipmentfor monitoringand
treatmentcould be installedin the space shuttleor an orbital transfer
vehiclefor enroutemedicalcare. The acceleration/decelerationloads and
durations for the cre_ patient should not be harmful to his or her ailment.
(368)
Figures 4-2 and 4-3 indicate injury/illness drivers that may require
return to Earth. Those illnesses or injuries suggesting immediate return to
Earth indicate the need for a low-g rather than a higil-g rescue level. This
tends to support the recommendation to employ Orbiters or Hermes type vehicles.
Build-up Considerations for Medical Planning (372)
The space station developed and placed into orbit by the United States
will involve a sequential buildup with limited but increasing manning and
operational capabilities at each phase of the buildup. To be effective and
useful, the ilealth maintenance and medical care requirements for space
stations must take into account this buildup sequence.
Categories have been established for planning purposes in order to
define various levels of space station buildup. Each category defines a
manning level and operational capability that will require an increasing level
of medical support. It is believed that the categories presented will permit
various levels of medical operations to be established and provide for most
foreseeable space station buildup sequences. The medical operations
requirementsfor each categoryare presentedin this document. Table 4-I
summarizesthe medical facilitiesand operationsto be conductedduring space
stationbuildup.
Althoughthe timing of the buildupis not established,some preliminary
conceptshave indicatedthat CategoryI activitieswill last only a few months
and involvemainly activiationof the power,communications,and support
systems. Thus, there will be littletime and need for healthmaintenance
beyond that affordedby an enhanceddocked Orbiter. CategoryII activities
may last two or more years. During this period,there may be substantialtime
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EXJV4PLESOF SPECIALTREATMENT&
SEVERITY CONSEQUENCES POSSIBLEINJURY PROVISIONSREQUIRED
MAJOR BED REST FRACTUREOF BACK, X-RAY;TRACTIONDEVICES,BRACES,
INJURY LEG,OR CRANIUM; CASTS;CLINICALLABORATORY
CHESTWOUND; TESTS;GASTRICLAVAGE;ANTICON-
POISONING VULSANTS;SURGICALCLOSURE
PROVISIONS
RETURNTO FRACTUREOF NECK X-RAY;TRACTIONDEVICES,BRACES;
EARTH WITHPARALYSIS, BLADDERCATHETER;ANESTHESIA;
HEADINJURY,COMA, BLOODTRANSFUSION;CLINICAL
FOREIGNBODYIN LABORATORYTESTS;FLUOROSCOPE;
TRACHEA,THIRD- INTRAVENOUSFEEDING& FLUID
DEGREEBURNS REPLACEMENT
MINOR NO LOSTTIME ABRASION,BLISTER, CO/€40NFIRST-AID-KITPROVISIONS
INJURY MINORLACERATION
LIMITEDDUTY SIMPLEFRACTURE X-RAY,PRESSUREBANDAGES,COLD
OF WRISTOR ARM, PACKS,SPLINTS& CASTS,
JOINTSPRAIN, ANALGESICS,ANTIBIOTICS
MINORMUSCLE
STRAIN,MINOR
BURN
Figure 4-2 Possible Crew Injuries and Required
Treatment and Provisions
EXAMPLESOF SPECIALTREATMENT&
SEVERITY CONSEQUENCES POSSIBLEILLNESS PROVISIONSREQUIRED
MAJOR BED REST& APPENDICITIS,BRONCHIAL ANTIBIOTICS,INTRAVENOUSFLUIDS,
ILLNESS LOSTTIME PNEUMONIA;INFECTIOUS SURGERY,X-RAY,EXPECTORANTS,
(>I WEEK)* HEPATITIS,MENINGITIS- CLINICALLABORATORYTESTS,
EPIDEMIC,PROSTATITIS, STEROIDTHERAPY,ANALGESICS,
THROMBOPHLEBITIS CATHETERIZATION,INTENSIVECARE,
ISOLATION;ANTICOAGULANT
RETURNTO ENCEPHALITIS, INTRAVENOUSFLUIDS,TRACHEOTOMY,
EARTH MYOCARDIALINFARCTION, SEDATIVES,OXYGEN,ANTICOAGULANT,
ILEITIS CLINICALLABORATORYTESTS,
ANTISPASMODICS,PECIALDIET
*SERIOUSNESS& EXTENDOF THESEILLNESSESMAY REQUIRERETURNOF CREWMENTO EARTH
MINOR NO LOSTTIME ATHLETESFOOT, FUNGICIDES,STEROIDS,ANTI-
ILLNESS DERMATITIS, BIOTICS,ANTIHISTAMINES,NOSE
CONJUNCTIVITIS, DROPS,DECONGESTANTS,ANALGESICS,
RHINITIS,URETHRITIS, ANESTHETICLOZENGES,IMPROVED
PHARYNGITIS,ABSCESSOF HYGIENEPRACTICES
MOUTH& GUM
LIMITEDDUTY BRONCHITIS,CYSTITIS, ANTIBIOTICS,DECONGESTANTS,
OR MINIMUM DIARRHEA,DYSENTERY, ANTITUSSIVES,ANALGESICS,
LOSTTIME FEVER,COte4ONCOLDOR CATHARTICS,ANTISPASMODICS,
(<I-WEEK) INFLUENZA,GASTRITIS ANTIPYRETICS,ISOLATION,
ANTIEMITICS,SPECIALDIET
Figure 4-3 Possible Crew Illnesses and Required
Treatment and Provisions
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for medical research. The medical equipment in the first aid station can be
used for human research but will have to be always ready for operational
medical treatment. Dedicated laboratory space for medical research with
animals would be available when the Life Sciences Research Module is added.
Category I - A single habitable work area is assumed with an airlock and
living facilities for two persons. Whenthis phase is in orbit, the Orbiter
crew may be able to be increased to eight. Tilis station would be utilized for
silort duration missions and require the Orbiter to be docked or in orbit
nearby to provide for crew safety during crew occupancy. Medical equipment
would consist of that avilable on the Orbiter with additional supplies and
equipment necessary to support the habitat development. At least one
cre_ember would be trained as an emergency medical technician (EMT) and would
have this task as one duty. The EMTwill have sufficient training to use a
portion of the prescription medical supplies prior to consultation with a
mission control center surgeon. Depending upon training and experience,
various prescription drugs and surgical supplies could not be used by the EMT
until after consultation with a mission control center surgeon. Depending
upon training and experience, various prescription drugs and surgical supplies
could not be used by the EMTuntil after consultation with a mission control
center surgeon. The entire crew will be trained in first aid techniques. The
EMTwill be able to draw blood specimens for later analysis in ground-based
laboratories.
Category II - Additional work areas and airlocks would be added to increase
facility size and provide redundancy. A four-person crew is assumed which
would occupy this configuration for stay times to 90 days. A docked Orbiter
would not be needed, and the remaining Orbiter crewmemberswould return to
Earth. Emergency rescue capability would be fairly slow, probably 14 to 21
days. Assembly tasks would be included during EVA. Simple satellite
preparation, refueling, repairing; materials processing and observational
activities would occur. A dedicated exercise and first aid area would be
available. Medical equipment would include a duplication of that in the
Orbiter as in Category I plus tile equipment and supplies necessary to care for
tile well-being and medical problems of the crew over a three-month period.
Routine simple diagnostic equipment would be available to process specimens.
One crewmemberwould be a trained EMTwith long experience as a medical
assistant. Medical care and crew health maintenance would be his primary
duty, but not his only duty. The remainder of the crew will be trained in
first aid techniques.
Category III - Work and habitation areas would be added to Categories I and
II. It is assumed that Category III will provide for an eight or more person
crew with prolonged stay times as a standard. Four or all eight cre_members
could be changed with each Orbiter visit. EVAactivities could include
satellite servicing and construction projects. Complex satellite repair and
materials processing would be a regular activity. Emergency rescue capability
would remain at 21 days. Total emergency evacuation of the facility would be
a planned option. For adequate health maintenance, dedicated medical
facilities would resemble those available in a physician's office clinic or in
a two-bed field hospital. The sophisticated medical care facilities would
then be available to be cross utilized in medical research and would be
designed to solve the medical care problems caused by tile interaction o_
industrial activities with the physiologial changes of microgravity. A
research trained physician would be included to take advantage of the medical
operational research and have as a primary duty, the health care of the crew.
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llewill have surgicaltrainingbecauseof the industrialactivities. He would
have other duties. When a physicianis not available,a medicaltechnician
with extensiveexperiencein medical care, e.g., physicianassistant,would
operatethe medical facilities.
Healthr4aintenanceFacilities(372)
Category I - AugmentedShuttleOrbiterMedicalSystem, (SOFIS),kit both in the
Orbiterand the Station plus exercisefacilities. Equipmentto obtainbiologicspecimens.
CategoryII
I. First Aid Station - A locationin the module_here a sick/injured
crewman can be restrainedand treated. The stationwill have ready
access to essentialequipmentsuch as physiologicalmonitors,
intravenousfluids,oxygen, suction,defibrillator,etc. Capabilityto
performsimple diagnosticproceduresand obtain routinebiologic
specimens.
2. Space Stationr4edicalKit (SSFIK)- An expandedversionof the SOI4Swith
additionaldrug suppliesand some additionalsurgicalsupplies.
3. HyperbaricTreatmentFacility- A facilitydesignedto withstanda
minimumof 3 atmospheres(absolutepressure)for treatmentof most cases
of decompressionsicknessand able to accommodatetwo individuals,i.e.patientand attendant.
4. ExerciseFacility- An integralpart of the recreationalarea consisting
of a treadmill,frictionbased exerciser,and/or bicycleergometer,etc.
CategoryIII- HealthMaintenanceand TreatmentFacility (HI,ITF)
DedicatedH_.ITFarea increasedin size. All featureslisted under
CategoriesI & II will be availableand expandedto accommodateadditional
crewmen. Table 4-I shows possiblehealthmaintenancefacilitydevelopment.
PreventiveI1edicine
To protect the health of the crew, both physiologicaland psychological
problemsthat are caused by isolationin spacemust be anticipatedand
countered. Methods for maintainingboth physicaland mental healthare often
intertwined. Some of these proceduresare:
a. Recreation- This shouldincludea large library(perhapscomputer
contained),exerciseequipment,videotapeand music libraries,and
games to be played alone or with others
b. Work - All on board shouldhave sufficienttasks to make their stay
a challenge,yet not so much work that their tasks are burdensome
and thus counterproductive
c. Architectureand Engineering- At least two roles are evident:
First, to avoid injuryand discomfort,safety and ease of operation
should be consideredin the layoutof the stationand station
systems. Second, the creationof a pleasantplace to live and work
which would includea privatespace for each crewmember. Space for
personaluse would add to the well-beingof the crew.
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d. Communication- Privatetwo-wayvideo communicationwith friends
and familyon Earth and open communicationbetweencre_memberson
board could boostmorale. Noise level should not be so high that
shoutingis necessary.
e. Stress Mangement- Cre_membersshould be trainedto deal witilthe
stressof the long stay in the isolationand close quartersof a
space station (e.g.trainingin socialsupporttechniques).
f. Clothing- Shouldbe comfortable,abundant,and not monotonous.
Keepingclothingclean shouldbe simple and not requirelarge
amountsof water. The designof both clothingand equipmentshould
take into account the possibilitiesof l) preventingtrauma (e.g.,
flak jacket),and 2) causing trauma (sharpcorners,tight fit).
These includeall designswithin and without the space station.
g. Sleeping- Facilitiesshould be comfortable,with low level noise
background,and also darkened.
ii. Healtht4onitoring- Privatemedicalconferences,biomedicaland
physicaltesting,and self-assessmentshouldbe part of an
operationalschedule. The macho imagemust be replacedby
intelligentregard to individualhealth.
i. Nutrition- The food shouldbe high in nutritivevalue as well as
appetizing. The diet should be variedenough to make the crew look
forwardto mealtimes. Vitaminsmay be neededas supplements. Food
flavormay have to be enhanced. Appetitestimulationmay be needed
early in flight. Recreationaltype food may be required. It is
unknownwhether high or low fiber is necessaryfor crew health.
j. Normal rangesof all physiologicalparametersfor individuals
living in microgravitymust be establishedto aid medical personnel
in the determinationwhen diseaseis actuallypresent.
Table 4-2 shows the preventivemedicineimplicationsin space station
development.
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TABLE4-I PROGRESSIVEMEDICALSUPPORTAS
SPACESTATIONDEVELOPS
CATEGORY MEDICAL FACILITIES1 MEDICAL OPERATIONS1
I - Singlemodule AugmentedSOMS (firstaid kit), Observingand monitoringthe
with docked Orbiter. and exercisefacility, crew, collecting,and
storingof blood,excreta,
and toxicologyspecimensto
establishnormal ranges of
biochemicaltests.
II - Secondmodule on core Equippedfirst aid stationarea, Initialutilizationof
space station. No docked ilyperbarictreatmentfacility, onboarddiognosticinstru-
Orbiter. expandedhealthmaintenance,and mentationwhich has preven-
exercisefacilities, tive medical care as its
primaryfunction.
III- All-upcore space First aid stationexpandedto Medical documentationnot
station, dedicatedmedicalarea with requiringanimal specimens
expandedtreatmentcapabiIity, but including invasive
e.g., anaesthesia,minor surgery, studiesto solvemedical
and biochemicalanalysis, care problemsof micro-
gravity.
AUGMENTEDIII Expansionof the medicaltreatment Sophisticatedclinical
area and its laboratoryequipment testingand medical
making it similarto a small research.
hospitalwith an enclosedemergency
room.
ADD-ON DEDICATEDLIFE A dedicatedseparatestructureof Biologicalresearchusing
SCIENCESMODULE (Added laboratoryspace, primarilyfor animalsand plants in a
during any of the above biologic research, separatededicatedlabora-
categories.) tory area, not part of the
medical treatmentfacility.
l Each categoryincludes
all previous features.
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TABLE 4-2 SPACE STATIONSYSTEMSWITH PREVENTIVE
MEDICINE IMPLICATIONS
LIFE SUPPORT
Structure, Power and General Con_unications
Environmental Control Life Support Systems, ECLSS(air, water, temperature
control, etc.)
Food and Nutrition(inludes storage, food preparation, galley, consumption,
taste enhancement, cleanup, etc.)
_laste F1anagement(wet and dry, excreta and packaging materials, etc.)
Hygiene (hands and body washing, shaving, toothbrushing, etc.)
Sleep Stations
Environmental Status Monitoring (could be in HMFor in separate command
stati on)
Atmospheric quality (CO2, 02, N2)
Trace gas analysis
Toxic compounds
Water Quality
Ambientmicrobialload (air,water, surfaces)
Temperature
Humidity
Noise Level
Accelerationand vibration
Radiation
Odor
LIVINGAND WORKINGSUPPORT
"Housekeeping"(environmentalcleaning,clotheswashing,etc.)
Clothing
EVA Equipment
Safety Provisions(equipmentand procedures)
Hold Hand, IntravehicularActivityMobilityAids, Foot and Body Restraints
Crew Stations
Man-._.lachineI tegration(includestools to match the job)
Work Planning
QualityControl
Communications
HygenicNeeds
HEALTH MAINTENANCEFACILITY(preventivemedicine)
Exercise(fitness-legs, arms, back)
Pl_ysiologicalStatus Monitoring
Cardiovascularcondition(heartrate, blood pressure,EKG,
echocardiography,etc.)
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TABLE 4-2 (Continued)
Metabolism
Pulmonaryfunction
Immune_ompetence
Blood chemistryrecordsand evaluations
Urinalysis
Microbialload
Anthropometryand mass
Bone density
TI1ermometry
Radiologic, ultrasonic, and nuclear imaging
Visible Light Imaging Device (high resolution color TV or equivalent)
Tonometry (fluid shift)
Audiometry (noise and fluid shift)
Health records (trend analysis)
Private Medical Communications
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICALSUPPORT(habitability factors)
Rest (Earthviewing ports, body position holders, etc.)
Recreation and Entertainment (electronic games, board/card games, physical
games, i.e., library, "darts" puff ball, music, TV, hobbies, diary
writing,etc.)
Work/RestTimelineProgramming(includescircadianrhythm considerations)
PrivateQuarters
Clothing (style,color, selection,fit)
PrivateCommunications(familyand friends)
Architecture(includescolor, local vertical,volume, layout,lighting,
noise minimization,stowage,etc.)
Social SupportAids (computerizedlibra_ to supplementground-training,
communicationwith professionalpsychologicalsupportteam, etc.)
Human PerformanceI4easurement
RESEARCHLABORATORYAND EQUIPMENT(add-onmodulesassumed;not necessarily
permanent)
HumanBiomedical Research Laboratory
Life Sciences Research Laboratory
Vivarium
HaterialsProcessingLab(s)
Orbital QuarantineFacility
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5. EXPLOSION
DEFINITION
In the event of an explosionwhereby the damagewill be confinedto one
compartmentand will consist of overpressure,heat, shrapnel,and atmospheric
contaminants. Equipmentin the compartmentmay be damagedand made
inoperative,unlessarmor-platedfor protection. Violentreleaseof energy as
a resultof equipmentoverpressurization,fire, chemicalreaction,excessive
temperature,equipmentmalfunctionor structuralfailureare candidatecauses
for explosion. For instanCe,an explosionof .025 Ib TNT equivalent,
releasing50 BTU of energy in the form of heat, shockwaves and kineticand
thermalenergy of shrapneldamage could be confinedto one small compartment
and would consist of overpressure,heat, shrapneland atmospheric
contaminants. The equipmentwould requirerepair/replacement,dependingon
tiledamagean explosioncan produce. Furtherhazardswhich can result in a
compartmentby such an explosion,such as fire, etc., should also be
consideredas part of the threat. Walls and primarystructure,or equipment
outsidethe affectedcompartment,would probablynot be damaged (021).
Equipmentwhich can disintegrateexplosivelyincludespumps,motors, blowers,
rocketmotors, generators,laser,etc. In excludingequipmentand materials
from Space Sation habitablevolumeswhose TNT equivalencyexceeds .Ol,
explosionimpact can be minimized. Equipmentand materialmounted externally
to the Space Stationhabitablevolumesthat exceedthe threshold.Ol TNT
equivalencyshould includeshrapneldivertershieldsto protectthe habitable
volumesfrom catastrophicpenetrations.
DISCUSSION
An explosionis a phenomenonresultingfrom a suddenreleaseof energy.
The release,however,must be a suddenone, happeningso rapidlythat a local
accumulationof energy occurs at the site of the explosion. This accumulation
is then rapidlydissipatedin variousways such as by an explosiveblast wave,
or by the propulsionof missi]esor debris. An implosionis a similar
phenomenonexcept that the energy releaseis initiallydirectedinward.
The magnitudeof an explosionis establishedby the amountof energy
that is released. This may be expresseddirectlyin energyunits - calories,
for example. But a relative,rather than an absolute,measure for explosion
size may be both more meaningfuland more practical. This requiresthat some
sort of standardbe defined;a generallyacceptedstandardis the energy
releasedby the explosionof TNT (symmetricaltrinitrotoluene),selectedas a
standardbecausechemicallypure materialis readilyavailablefor calibration
purposes. By measurementsof the energy in its blast wave it has been
determinedthat the explosionof one gram of TNT generatesa blast energy of
about ll20 calories. This is identifiedas the explosiveyield from that
quantityof material. The explosiveyield from some other material,relative
to that obtainedfrom TNT, is taken as its relativeexplosivestrength. With
regard to both laboratoryand field tests,there is alwayssome uncertaintyin
the measuredvalues,even for calibratingblastwaves as generatedby standard
TNT. This situationhas led to the acceptanceof an arbitrarystandardfor
blast waves - the definedton of TNT. This correspondsto an explosiveenergy
releaseof one millionkilocalories. An energy releaseof this amount
represents(l,O00,O00x I000)/(2000x 454) = llO0 caloriesper gram of TNT,
which is an approximateagreementwith averageexperimentalvalues.
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Damage from an explosionis a resultof energy that is transmittedfrom
an explosionto a target. The mechanismfor the transmissionmay be any of
severaltypes,the most severe of which is a directmechanicalcoupling. This
producesa shatteringaction, and is relatedto the shatteringpower, or
"brisance"of the explosion,as describedbrieflybelow. Transmissionof
energy from explosionto target by indirectmeans occurs throughthe action of
flyingmissilesand of the blastwave. The relativeimportanceof these
damage mechanismsvaries considerablywith circumstancesand dependson the
natureof the explosive,the magnitudeof the explosion,and the medium in
which it occurs. Damage by flyingmissilesis relativelymore importantfor
smallexplosionsin tileair than for large ones and for explosionsin the
vacuum of space, althoughthe blastwave is the major mechanismfor
destructionin large explosions. Direct energytransferfrom an explosionto
target also occurs by thermalradiation. This damagemechanismis important
only for the large nuclearexplosions,and is best consideredseparately.
Ionizingradiationmay be consideredas a mechanismfor the transferof energy
from an explosionto target. This may be a direct transferat the moment of
the explosion,or an indirectone associatedwith falloutof radioactive
debris,but is beyond the scope of this study (293).
Missiles/debrisare solid objectsflyingaway from the explosion. The
cumulativeaction of missilesmay well be the major damagingeffect from small
explosionssuch as those from the container. Or missilesmay be formed from
materiallocatedoriginallyat the site of an explosion;examplesare pieces
of a structure,parts of a barricade,or some casualobject includedby
chance. The impactenergy of a missile is the kineticenergy of its relative
motion. For a mis_ile with relativevelocityu and mass m, this may be
expressedas .05mu_. Like other energy items,this impact energymay also
be expressedin terms of its TNT equivalent.
There is an interestingrelationshipbetweenmissilesand barricades. A
barricademay act as a sort of armor plate and protecta person or a structure
from flyingmissilesin an explosion. As such, it may be a convenientitem to
have available. But if a barricadeis used in an attemptto confineor con-
tain an explosion,the barricadeitselfmay well be brokenup in the explosion
and so serve as an additionalsourcefor missiles. In this situation,the
barricademay actuallyassist in the transferof energyfrom explosionto
target.
Brisance,the rapiditywith which the energy is releasedin an
explosion,may be an importantfactor. Its influencecan be illustratedby
consideringthe releaseof energy storedwithin the compressedair of a
pneumatictire. When sudden,as in a blowout,the effect is that of an
explosion. A slow leak can dissipatethe same energybut would not be classed
as an explosion. Furthermore,two energy releaseseach sufficientlyrapid to
cause an explosionmay show differenceswith regard to the intensityof the
explosionthat they produce. This intensityis evidencedas a shattering
power, and is termed "brisance". Any item in contactwith explodingmaterial
receivesa mechanicalshock of such intensitythat it could well be broken
into small fragmentslong before it has opportunityto move away. Thus
dynamite,a detonatingmaterial,when placed on top of a bouldermay shatter
it even thoughthe explosionis completelyunconfined(293).
The pressure-timehistoryof a typicalblastwave in atmospheresas
observedat a locationremovedfrom the centerof explosionis shown in Figure
5.1. At an arrivaltime of tx secondsafter the explosion,the pressureat
this removedlocationsuddenlyjumps to a peak value of overpressure. An
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objectat this locationis then subjectedto an instantaneouslateralforce
equal to the productof this overpressureand tileprojectedarea in the plane
of the blast wave. But this is not a stablecondition,and the overpressure
immediatelybeginsto decay,followinga pressure-timerelationsuch as
illustratedin the figure and describedas quasi-exponentialin character.
Blast _aves of the type shown in Figure 5-I requirethat three
independentcharacteristicsbe specifiedin order to describetimm completely.
One of these is the initialshock intensity,specifiedperhapsby the peak
overpressure,but also by any relatedintensityitem such as iiachnumber or
particlevelocity. A second is the durationof the blast wave. A third
characteristicis the impulse (force-timeproduct)for the pressureforces in
the blast. In addition,for some purposes,sucilas for the planningof
evasivemaneuvers,it is desirableto know arrival time; that is, the time
requiredfor the explosiveshock front to travel from the center of explosion
to the locationof concern. Botllexperimentaland theoreticalmeans have been
utilizedto obtain the variouscharacteristicsof the blast wave from
explosionsin atmospheres. A theoreticalanalysisfor peak shock over-
pressure,that is, the pressurejump in the blast wave face, utilizesthe same
mathematicalapproachas for normal shock. It is, hmCever,more complex
becauseof the sphericaldivergenceand becauseof a transientnature.
Values,for the peak overpressuresgeneratedin a nominalstandardatmosphere
and as computedfor the blast wave from a one pound sphericalcharge of TNT,
are shown graphicallyin Figure 5-2.
STRATEGYOPTIONS
Approacll
In comparing incidents that can precipitate emergencies the space
station is most vulnerable to an explosion. See Table 5-I. Not only is the
reaction time zero, other ancillary issues are involved. Because of the risks
associated with explosion, a reasonable approach is to cascade prevention and
containment techniques. That is, every effort should be made to prevent
exposure to the tilreat and then to accept its possibility of occurrence by
i ncl udi ng contai nment tec-_ni ques i n space stati on designs and operations.
TABLE 5-I - ASSUMEDEFFECTSFOR VARIABLELEVEL
CREDIBLEEMERGENCIES(016)
I
I_linimum Need To Injured/ Restor- Can Cause
IReaction Evacuate Incapici-ation to Other
ITime Compart- tated Shirt- Listed
I(Minutes)ment Personnelsleeve Credible
I Environ. Emer_e_n..
Fire/ToxicEnvironment O.5 Yes No Yes Yes
Explosion 0 Yes Yes No Yes
EmergencyEvacuation 5 Yes No No No
Loss of Pressurization 2-8 Yes No No No
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ExplosionPrevention
For space stationapplications,the classicalfire triangleshouldbe
expandedto an explosionpenta-ring,see Figure 5-3, to exploit the advantage
of operationin a space environment. This expansionof concept from a
tilree-to-fiveelement approachallows concentrationor applyingstrategy
optionsthat work with, not againstthe space environment. That is,
"temperature"and "pressure"are elementsextractedfrom "ignition"in the
fire trianglebecausethere is a spaceadvantagein tileirhandling: absence
of pressureand an infiniteradiativeheat sink.
The classicalapproachfor fire/explosionpreventionof breakingone or
more legs of the fire triangle/explosionpenta-ringis equallyvalid in space
stationexplosionprevention. Guidelinesconcerningl) physicaland chemical
screeningto preventand/or isolatereagents,2) pressuresensing,relieving
and controland 3) system heat sensingand rejectionare techniquesthat can
be appliedin preventingexposureto explosionrisks.
The matrix shown in Table 5-2 indicatesexplosionpreventionoptionsor
strategies. Many are desirabledesignconsiderationsall of which are not
mandatory. Using single stringtankage,lines, sensingvalvingand use system
as a baseline,one or more optionsmay be consideredwith its respectivecost
impactsand synergies.
Table 5-3 shows typical Orbitercompartmentationcriteria. Table 5-4
indicatestypicalgas autogenousignitiontemperaturesthat may be considered
for temperaturecontrolmaximumthresholdlevels. The designeris advised
that equipmentin the compartmentsmay not exceed the temperaturesnoted (spot
or surface).
ExplosionContainment
Explosionimpact is relatedto four issues: l) Intensityexpressedin
TNT equivalency;2) Directcontaminationby explosiveparcel;3) Secondary
effects (debrisand overpressure);and 4) Preventiveand correctivedamage
control.
TNT Equivalency- The Shuttleapproachin isolatingcrew members from
the threat of explosionwas to limit systems/equipmentinto habitableareas to
those with a TNT equivalencyof O.Ol or less. Those items of equipment
exhibitingmore than a TNT equivalencyof O.Ol were externalto the habitable
volume. As a result,except for walk-around02 bottles,all pressure
tankagewas excludedfrom the cabin. Figure 5-4 shows two options in handling
the installationof explosiongeneratorsin the space station. If adjacent
mounting is chosen, it may be wise to consideran adjacentshirtsleeve
airlock,pressurizingthe criticalvolumewith an inert gas. This _louldallow
IVA (non-pressuresuited)crewmanto retain tactiledexterityto conduct
maintenancetasks in an inertenvironmentwhile wearingan oxygen or two gas
helmet. The adjacentmounting approachwith proper shrapnelshieldingand
inert pressure/depressoptionswould be the lower risk exposureapproacllfor
critical,high TNT equivalencyequipmentby allowingfor masked but not
shirtsleeveaccess.
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FUEL OXIDIZER
FUEL OXIDIZER 1
TEMP PRESSURE
IGNITION
IGNITION
Figure 5-3 Fire Triangle and Explosion Penta-ring
Table 5-2 EXPLOSIONPREVENTIONOPTIONS
i i
PENTA-RING SCREENI G PRESSURE TEMPERATURE
ELEMENTS HANDLING HANDLING
FUEL o Protect tankage o Pressure sensing and o Consumable auto dump
* lines from failure, valving into heat exchanger/
corrosion or erosion Io Vent onverboard of radiator loop for
Io Multistep control of I consumables for temperature rise trends
OXIDIZER I critical consumable I pressure increase io Maintain system or part
* I transfer/ignition io Blow out disks of system below auto-
Io Purge of interfaces io Vent to expansion genous ignition
io Explosion proof in- I tank for subsequent temperature
IGNITION i atmosphere components I consumable recovery o Size heat rejection
Io Electrostatic controlslo Auto level/immediate system for worst case
i (bonding and grounding)i action conditions: maximum
Io Compartmentation Io Provide cascade insolation, highest
TEMP. io Thermal protection of tankage: storage or internal pressure,
I sensitive elements standby pressure level adverse "lightside"
Io Providing expansible vs. more confined orientation
i inner bladder/tanks toi volume for operating
PRESSURE I accommodate expansion level
I without heat build-up
I
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TABLE 5-3 ORBITER COMPARTMENTATION CRITERIA
.......
.....
COMPARTMENT (1)
NOSE SPHERE
FORwARD ReS
NOSE GEAR WELL
FWD MODULE PLENUM
WINDOW CAVITIES
STAR TRACKER CAVITY
MID-FUSELAGE
CREW MODULE
WING LEADING EDGE ([&R)
WI NGII0X-mR )
MAIWGEJ'I.f(WELL (L&R)
WING/ELEVON INTERCAVITY
(L&R)
AFT FUSELAGE
VERT. STABILIZER FWD OF
REAR SPAR
VERT~ STABILIZER AFT OF
SPAR (REAR)
OMS/RCS POD (L&R)
HI L02 DISCONNECT
BODY FLA
-lH2 UMBIL CAVIIY
L02 UMBIL CAVITY
OPERATIONAL
FLUIDS NORMALLY PRESENT
~NONE)204, MMH He
HYO FL (83282&S606J
HYO-FL (83282), H20
(NlJNE1
INONE)
LH~02, HYD FL (83~8~).
MMH. He. N204. F21, H20.
N2.FC40(3)
N2/02. G02, 1301. H20
(NONET
(NONET
HYD FL (83282&S606)
-mO H.(83282)
LH2. L02. HYD FL (83282).
MMH. NH3. LUBE OIL, N2H4.
F21. He H20, N204
(NONE)
HYD FL (83282)
N204, MMH. He, N2
L02
HYD FL (83282)
LH2. HYO FL (83282), F21.
HI" _ N?
L02. He N2
ZONE (2)
I
11
III (4)
IV
V. VI
VII. VIII
IX (4)
X
XI. XI I
XIII
XV
XVI
XVII
IGNITION
PREVENTION
ZONE (6)
NO
ill
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES (S)
YES
YES
YES (S)
MAX ALLOW SURFACE
TEMP TO PREVENT AN
AUTO IGNITION
-DEGREES F (6)
1'\'
352
423
352
432
35
(5
4':1
432
(5)
Direct Contamination- Contaminationby the explosiveair parcel relates
more to preventionthan containment. Preventionof contaminationrelies
heavilyon an in-placespace stationmaterialcontrol system. Containment
centerson the ability to decontaminatethe volume. Both approaches,the
abilityto vent contaminantsto space,shmm in Figure 5-4 supportthis
concept.
TABLE 5-4 TYPICALAUTOGENONSIGNITIONTEMPERATURES
FLUID _ FIUID
JP-q LW_80F ETHYLENEOXIDE 804OF
JP-5 423
JP_ 450 _INE 518
KEROSENE L144 HHH
UOMH 482
t_THYI..ALCOFW1 800-870 t.tAF 480
ETHYLALCOHOL 700
ISOPROP_I.ALCOHOL 750 HYDROGEN 1075
FORFURYL ALC_ 915
AMMC_IA _ METHANE i0(]0
I_:_J_NE _ (F_flROPHORIC) MEII_YLENEG_I_ORIDE I0_
PENTABORANE 78 (PYROPHORIC) PERCHLOROETHYLENE IP94
TRICHLOROETHYLENE 770-786
OBJECTIVES:MOUNTHAZARDOUSELEMENTSEXTERNALTOCREWUSEORHABITABLEAREAS
WITHPROPERSHRAPNELSHIELDSTOPREVENTADJACENTPRESSUREVOLUME
PENETRATION
•EXTERNALMOUNTING •ADJACENTMOUNTING
__ HAZARDOUSELEMENTS
ELLiOt; _ >_ _//'/PRESSURE BULKI"IEAXSs ' Zg .ESSURIZED _as r,,,o) (6"'on .....
X / NORF'ALLY _ _ J
UNPRESSURIZED (_) EXPLOSION-PROOFEDELEMENTS
REOUIRED
Figure 5-4 Two Options for Explosion Containment
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Debris and Overpressure - Containment of debris relies on shrapnel
shields or detectors. Overpressure in normally unpressurized volumes is less
a problem than in habitable volumes. The control option then would be to
locate explosion generators in normally unpressurized volumes or volumes
pressurized with inert gas.
DamageControl - An active DamageControl System is mandatory for a long
term operable orbital facility. This system would handle all emergencies, not
just explosions. Accepting the damagecontrol concept, not only fire control,
the space stat!on designer must accept the fact that damagecontrol equipments(shoring, patching, repair) must be inventoried and space provided for their
installation and storage. Damagecontrol is an umbrella concept within whicil
emergency procedures are developed and refined.
Containment Strategy Summary- Explosion containment strategies are
summarized in Table 5-5.
TABLE 5-5 - EXPLOSIONCONTAINIIENTSTRATEGIES
DAMAGE I ISOLATION
CONTROL I
{
.[
o Machineryinspectionand io Peripheralcontainmentrings for
servicing,verifyingguards in high energy rotatingparts
place
o Compartmentation
o Providedamagecontrol lists Active (latches)
(structuralleak/tearrepair) Passive(structuralwebs)
in major modules
o Provide shielding/shrapnel
o Close active latchesduring deflectors
explosiverisk operations (See Figure 5-4)
o Providemaximum accessto module
pressurewalIs
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6. LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION
DEFINITION
A loss of pressurizationin a habitablevolumemay be caused by an
accidentalpenetrationof an outsidewall or bulkhead. Pressuresensing,
leakageand maintenanceimply the need for a Damage ControlSystem on-board
the Space Station. Such a systemwould includepressure,temperatureand
toxicitysensingwith additionalcapabilityfor smoke sensingand fire
suppressionfor each insolablecompartmentin the Space Stationwith primary
and back-upreadoutpanels locatedin separateSpace Stationareas. If
compartmentsize and criticalityso indicate,a need may exist for automatic
controlof hatch actuation. These design constraintsare dependentupon
assumedpenetrationsize, size of each isolatablevolume,use frequencyof the
compartmentand criticalityof the adjacentcompartments.
DISCUSSION
The EnvironmentalControland Life Support Systemprovidesti_eSpace
Stationcrew with a conditionedatmosphericenvironmentthat is both life
supportingand within crew comfortlimitations. Loss of pressurizationis an
extremelycriticalproblem sincethe provisionof an atmosphereof suitable
pressureand compositionis one of the most immediaterequirementsof the life
supportsystems. It must supplythe oxygenwhich the bloodmust absorb and
the total pressurerequiredto maintainnormalphysiologicfunction. In
addition,absorptionor eliminationof respiratorycontaminantsand toxic
materialsmust be accomplished.
Decompressionproblemsare similarto those encounteredin high altitude
aircraftflight. Atmosphericpressurefalls with ascent to altitudeas shown
in figure6-I. As total pressurefalls,the partial pressuresof the
constituentgases also fall. Therefore,even though the oxygen percentage
found in tileatmospilereremainsrelativelyconstantthroughout,the partial
pressureof oxygen (pO2) becomesinadequateto sustainnormalpi_siologic
functionas total pressuredecreases. It, therefore,followsthat if adequate
atmosphericpressurecan be maintainedwith normalcomposition,cre_embers
can be expectedto functionwithout resortto supplementaryprocedures.
However,it may not always be feasiblefrom an engineeringor operations
standpointto maintainsea level equivalentpressurewithin the life support
system.
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EmergencyDepressurization(025)
The followinganalyseswere performedfor situationsin which a major
penetrationhas occurredin the Space Stationwall:
I. Time to depressurization.
2. Wind velocityin the vicinityof the leakage.
3. Loads on a man in the vicinityof the leakage.
4. Wind velocitythroughthe internalhatches.
5. Loads on a man in the internalhatches.
6. Loads on the hatches.
The lowest acceptablepressurelevel for personnelto functionsafely
must be definedbefore defininteanswerscan be given for the time available.
A minimum partialpressureof oxygen (pO2) of approximately1.9 psi is
generallyconsideredto be requiredto precludehypoxia(insufficient02 in
the inspiredair), and to permit an acceptablelevel of crew performance.(384)
The visual functionsappearmost sensitiveto hypoxia,and visualperformance
becomesgenerallyunacceptableat pO2 of less than 1.9 psi. Unacclimatized
personsbreathingair (20.9percent02, 79.1 percentN2), at total
pressuresless than approximately6.0 psia (equivalentto approximately23,000
foot altitude),will lose consciousnessafter a variableperiodof time
(individualsusceptibilityvarieswidely),and total pressuresless than 6.9
psia (equivalentto approximately19,500 foot altitude)in an air environment
are consideredphysiologicallyunacceptable.
Assuminga homogenousgas mixtureand no gas makeup provided,a minimum
pO_ of 1.9 psia is reached at a total (cabin)pressureof 9.1 psia in a 14.7
psla system,and at a total pressureof 6.15 psia in a lO.O psia system.
Decompressionsickness(bends)should not be consideredto be a problem
becauseof the pressuredrop requiredto inducethe symptomsand the time
element involved. Generally,a pressuredrop to one-halfthe atmosphereof
prior exposureis consideredto be the thresholdof decompressionsickness,
which would be 7.35 and 5.0 psia respectivelyfor 14.7 and lO.O psia systems.
Hypoxic levelswould thereforebe reachedprior to the onset of decompression
sickness. Furthermore,for any one individual,decompressionsicknessis
unpredictablein its onset and course,though symptomsare rarely seen during
the first few minutes of exposureto low barometricpressure.
The resultsare presentedin Figures6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6. In
these, it was assumedthat hatchesbetweenthe two volumesare left open, so
that both hatchesare bled down. If the hatchesare closed so that only one
volume is depressurized,the times shown shouldbe halved. For different
volumes,the times should be adjustedproportionalto the volume.
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Figure 6-4 Air Drag on Hatch and Time Available Following Structural Leak
79
2OO
4O
IBO -
- 35
75-LB FORCEON
160 A MAN
ITY _ THROUGH - 30I THROUGH 5-F'T-DIA HATCH
i 3-F'T-DIA HAI'CH
140 tTOp =
50 LB
-25
120 40 LB
i 100 30 LB - 20
80-
- 15
/
60 ._ _ m 10 LB
/ ""
"='TCVELOCITY 5 FT FROM HOLE "" 10
40_ //
V_E"LOCITY10FT
FROM HOLE
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7
HOIEDtA_ET_R(FT)
Figure 6-5 Air Velocities, Loads and Time Available Following Structural Leak
8O
180
.... 75-LBFORCEONAWAN
HOLE DIA I'FT_! lIME TO 9. I PSIA(SEL-)
1 35
2 9
3 4
14( 4 2
5 1.5
50 LE 10 0.4
120 -- -- 40 LB
_ _ 30 LB
_' 100
>.
--
>=u_ 80 _JL BASEDON:
P0 = 14.7 PSIA
VOLUME= 30,000 CU FT
60
4O
10-FT- DIA HOLE2O
1
o !
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
DISTANCEFROM HOLE (FT}
Figure 6-6 Air Ve]ocities and Loads Following Structural Leak
81
Conclusionsfrom the analysesare:
I. For the maximum assumedmeteroidpenetrationof 2-inchesdiameter,
22 minutes is availablefor correctiveaction.
2. For holes of less than l-footdiameter,tilereis adequatetime
availablefor correctiveaction;tilewind velocitiesand loads are
not a problem.
3. For holes above 2-foot diameter,there is practicallyno reaction
time available,and wind velocitiesand loads are a problem
(particularlyin zero g).
4. Automaticclosure of intervolumehatches shouldbe consideredfor
time-criticalleakages (e.g.,time less than 20 sec) as a means for
savingpersonnelin the "good"volumewhen the pressurein that
volume reachesthe minimum acceptablelevel. This will be
facilitatedby the large loads on the hatches in such cases.
Considerationhas been given to whether the hatchesbetween the two
volumes shouldnormallybe kept open or closed. Keepinghatchesopen is
advantageousfor situationsin which relativelysmall holes occur. This
maximizesthe time availablefor correctiveaction.
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WindblastEffects
Emergency conditions which subject crewmen to high airflow are
encountered during situations such as explosive decompression or onboard
explosions. These aerodynamic forces can cause injury and degrade tile
crm_man's ability to perform necessary operational tasks. Dynamic pressures
created by explosive decompression can force an unrestrained crewman overboard
through an open door, hatch or large rupture in the cabin structure. Crewman
injuries from head impact with structural objects, or from body impact by
flying debris or loose equipment can result. Hypoxia, lung damage,
decompression sickness and low temperature problems are encountered during
decompression.
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The injuriuseffectsof decompressionwindblastdepend upon a numberof
variablesas follows:
I. Volume of cabin
2. Area of opening
3. Geometricshape (orificeflow coefficient)
4. Absolutepressurewithin the cabin
5. Absolutepressureof outsideambientatmosphere
6. Temperatureof cabin atmosphere
7. Outflowother than leakage
8. Inflowfrom pressurizationsource
9. Ratio of cabin to ambientpressure(ratiowill establishwi_ether
flow is greateror less than sonic)
lO. Ratio of initialcabin pressureto final cabin pressure
II. Distanceof cre_nan from opening
12. Positionand physicalattitudeof crewmanrelativeto directionof
airflow
13. Weight and body size of crewman
14. Restraintsystem, if any
15. Type of clothingbeing worn (airflow- drag characteristics)
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STRATEGYOPTIONS
Options for dealingwith a Loss of Pressurizationand relatedproblems
are discussedherein, llostof these involvedesignand operational
requirementsto prevent a loss of pressure,overpressureor explosion.
Physiologicalresponseand protectionrequiredat reducedatmospheric
pressure,and Life SupportSystem design data are shown on Tables 6-2 and
6-3. Recommendeddecompressionand recompressionrates are given where
operationaldelta pressurechangesare encounteredsuch as airlockoperations,
etc.
MultipleVolumes (021)
If an accidentoccurs which could result in decompressurization,
atmosphericcontamination,or loss of some criticalfunction,the crew must be
able to survivesafely in a separatepressurizedarea until the affected
volume is restoredto a habitableconditionor until they are rescued. As
many as 21 days may be requiredto reach the stationand this sets the minimum
time for crew survivalonboardthe station. These considerationsled to
systemsafetycriteriawhich requiredthe stationto be dividedinto separate
pressure-isolatablevolumes.
The suggesteddesign (see Figure 6-7) solutionconsistsof arrangingthe
habitablemodulesinto pressure-isolatablevolumesof approximatelyequal
capabilities. Each of the two volumes includeshalf of the core module, two
stationmoduleswith crew supportprovisions,and provisionsfor attaching
cargo modulesand researchapplicationmodules (RAI_s).Each of the two
volumescontainscompleteenvironmentalcontrol,thermalcontroland
informationsubsystems,a controlcenter,docking/berthingcapability,and
emergencysupplies. Each volume can supportthe crew of six indenfinitely
(subjectto adequateconsumables)independentlyof the other volume. Primary
electricalpower is suppliedto both volumesfrom a common power module and is
availableto both volumeseven if one has been evacuated.
One of the more crediblereasonsfor evacuatingone volume is that the
atmospherehas become contaminated,possiblywith smoke from a fire. The air
circulationsystemsin the two volumesare, therefore,kept separateso that
contaminantsfrom one volumewill not be introducedinto the other volume. It
was possibleto design the stationso that only the affectedmodule could be
isolatedfollowingan accident. However,this would require,for example,
that each environmentalcontrol subsystembe able to supply other modules in
the volume, and that many of the air ductswould have to be capableof
operatingin a vacuum (in the event of depressurizationof that area). The
valvingsystemwould also be considerablymore complex. Becauseof these
reasons,the simplerapproachwith each environmentalcontrol subsystem
servicingits own volumecould be adopted. This designallows for individual
module isolationin many emergencysituations. Loss of atmosphericand
thermalcontrol,however,would allow for only limitedshirtsleeveoperationsin that volume.
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Table 6-2
PHYSIOLOGICALRESPONSEAND PROTECTION
REQUIREDAT REDUCEDAII4OSPHERICPRESSURE
Altitude Inspired
(feet) p02 (mmH_) Physiolo@icalResponse ProtectionImplications
Sea Level 160 Normal functioning
5,000 130 Deficientnight vision Fiaximumaltitudefor normal
night visionwithout supple-
mental oxygen
8,000 120 Undetectablehypoxia Supplementaloxygen advised for
routineflights
lO,O00 lO0 Subjectivesymptomsof Maximum altitudewithout
hypoxiain some people routineuse of oxygen
18,000 75 Appreciable hypoxic handicap l_aximumfor emergencywithout
use of supplementaloxygen
20,000 70 Hypoxiarepresentsan Cabin pressurizationrecom-
increasinglyseverehandicap mended
23,000 65 above 20,000feet
25,000 60 Time of consclousnesswithout
oxygen, < 120 sec
28,000 50 Time of consclousnesswithout Pressurizationrequiredto
oxygen, < 70 sec preventdecompressionsickness
30,000 45 Time of consclousnesswithout Begin supplementingdemand
oxygen, < 60 sec oxygen with positivepressure
35,000 37 Time of consciousnesswithout Maximum for routineuse of
oxygen, < 50 sec demandoxygen system
40,000 30 Time of consclousnesswithout
oxygen, K 30 sec
42,000 25 Time of consclousnesswithout Maximumfor routineuse of
oxygen, < 30 sec pressurebreathing. Special
pressureprotectionrequired
above this altitude
43,000 23 Time of consciousnesswithout Maximum for short-termemer-
oxygen, < 30 sec gency use of demandoxygen
50,000 20 Time of consciousnesswithout {,laximumfor short-termuse
oxygen, <30 sec of pressurebreatiling
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Table 6-3
LIFE SUPPORTSYSTEMDESIGN DATA
Condition Optimum Normal Limits ExtremeLimits
Value Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Oxygen (p02) in inspiredair 160mm Hg llOmm Hg 160mm Hg 90mm Hg 760mm Hg
MetabolicOxygen Consumption O.l Ib/hr 0.075 Ib/hr 0.2 Ib/nr 0.050 Ib/hr 0.5 Ib/hr
CO2 in inspiredair O.3mm Hg 0 8mm Hg 0 23mm Hg
Nitrogenin inspiredair 596mm Hg 0 596nm Hg 0 619mm Hg
Respiratoryflow rates
Tidal volume 0.75 liter 0.25 liter 1.0 liter 0.25 liter 3.75 liter
Minute volume lO L/min 8 L/min 30 L/min 5 L/min I00 L/min
Peak f]ow rates 35 L/min 20 L/min 90 L/min 20 L/min 200 L/min
Breathingresistanceat 0 0 25mm H20 @ 0 lOOmm H20 @
Peak flow rates 50 L/min 200 L/min
Cabin pressure 760mm Hg 565mm Hg 760mm Hg 446mm Hg 760mm Hg
no added 02 no added 02
190mm Hg
with added 02
Decompressionrate 1.0 psi/rain l psi/rain 5 psi/min 5 psi/rain 1.0 psi/min
Recompressionrate 4.0 psi/min I psi/rain 4 psi/rain 4 psi/min 0.5 psi/sec
Ozone contamination O.l ppm O.IO ppm 0.30 ppm l.O ppm lO.O ppm
0.5 hr/max.
Carbon Dioxide contamination O.005% O.01% O.05% O.05% O.10%
I hr. max.
Inspired air temperature 75°F -O°F +150°F -60°F 390°F
Relativehut,_idity of inspired air 40-60% 20% aO% 0% 90%
1/2STATION
MODULE
Figure 6-7 Typical Configuration
PressureVessel Criteria
A recognizedhazard on any space stationconfigurationis the storageof
various fluids in pressurizedtanks for long periods. Since it was not
possibleto eliminatethis hazard,steps were taken to minimizeits potential
effects and to make provisionsin case of an accident.
Three main concernsarose with stored fluids. First, leakageof certain
gases such as hydrogen,methane,hydrazinecould result in fire, explosion,or
toxic effects;second,a large leakagerate insidea pressurizedvolumecould
cause overpressurization,leadingto structuralfailureof the station;and
third,a catastrophicrupturecould cause damage to equipment,structural
failure,and loss of life. A number of obviousprecautionshave been taken in
the space stationdesign. Every attempthas been made to locate hazardousand
toxic fluid storagetanks and higil-pressuretanks outsideof pressurizedand
habitablevolumes. Gases such as hydrazinehave been avoidedwhenever
possiblebecauseof their ilightoxicity. And, finally,for those tanks which
must be placed insidethe pressurizedvolume,every attemptwas made to reduce
the explosivepotentialof individualtanks and locatethem so that an
explosionof one tank would not propagateto adjacentones.
The gases wllichare necessaryon the stationdependon the selectionof
atmosphericcontrol,power, and reactioncontrolsystems. In all of the space
stationdesignsconsidered,large quantitiesof oxygen,hydrogen,and nitrogen
have been required. Variousmeans have been consideredfor preventing
shrapnelfrom causingadditionaldamage. These includeduse of chain link
armor, blast shields,the use of blowoutplugs orientedtowardsa safe
direction,and the use of nonshatteringtank materialsuch as filament-wound
fiberglass.
The explosivecontentof a storedgas, usuallyexpressedin terms of TNT
equivalent,dependsprimarilyon the total energy contentwhich can be
released,and is approximatelyequal to the total enthalpyof the stored
fluid. For a gas, this is proportionalto the mass of the gas, the specific
heat at constantpressure,and absolutetemperature. The pressureat which a
given mass of gas is stored relatesto the TNT equivalentas shown in Figure
6-8. Since an explosionof a low-pressuretank could be as catastrophicas
the explosionof the same mass of gas storedin a high-pressuretank, no
attempthas been made to requirestoragetanks on board the stationto be at
low pressuresfor explosivereasons. However,damage assessmentshowed that
an acceptableTNT equivalentfor storagewithin the pressurevolumecould be
approximately0.025 pounds or 50 BTUs of energy (approximatelythe same as a
hand grenade). While every attempthas been made to restricton-boardtanks
to such a size, this became very difficultwhen the need for maintenanceand
replaceabilityof the tanks was considered. (021)
A potentialsolutionconsistsof placingall of the high-pressureand
hazardousgas storagetanks in a specialmodule attachedto the station
externally. In this way, the hazardousgases are isolatedaway from the
living and operatingquarters. The outer hatch could be designedto accept
the olast from any credibleexplosion. The atmosphericpressurein this
module would normalybe kept low, but the module could be fully pressurizedto
allow crew access for maintenance,inspection,and resupplyof individual
tanks.
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Figure 6-8 TNT Equivalent of Pressure Vessel
9O
Flying Debris
In the event of explosivedecompression,windblastforcescan dislodge
equipmentand cause flying debris insidethe cabinwhich can jeopardizea
crev_ansescape similarto that experiencedin aircraft. This can be
minimizedby design such that air is not entrappedin enclosures,cabinets,
drawers,wall surfaceinsulationbatting,and panel covers,etc. This is
accomplishedthroughthe use of ventilationholes and fastenerswhich enable
flexingor movement. Thus, air is allowedto escape,preventinga large delta
pressurebuild-upacross enclosuresurfaceswhich enablesthe_ to stay
intact.
DecompressionSummary
Tilecausitivefactors,of the decompressionthreat,can be classifiedin
two categories;the first is unplannedand the secondis planned. The
unplanneddecompressionswould in generalbe causedby a puncturefrom debris
or materials,inadvertantcrew action,or externalleakage. The strategies
for overcomingthese problemsincludethe capabilitiesto inspectand repair
the vehicleinsideas well as outside. F_andatorystationsurvivalelectrical
functionsshouldbe coldplatedto assure the decompressedfunctional
capability. Other hardware/electricalfunctionsshould be capableof being
turned off.
The planned decompressionscould be encounteredto handlecontingencies
such as contamination,fire controland when necessary,maintenace. The
stationshouldbe capableof handlingthree pressurevolume changeouts. Also,
cabin planned decompressiondischarges,as well asany gaseousor fluid
discharge,should be designedto preventany rotationalor translationmotions
to the space station. This could be accommodatedby having the exhaust
terminatein a "tee"whereby the jet actionwould be split into two opposite/
reaction,cancelingforces.
For escape/rescueoperationconditionswhere there is "timeto react",
four optionsare available;(1) EVA escape to an attachedrescuevehicle, (2)
move into a safe haven and then into an attachedrescue vehicle,(3) move into
an attachedvehicle,and (4) use an IVA suit, then inspect,repair vehicleand
egressto a safe area.
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7. RADIATION
DEFINITION
Radiationthreatsare associated_ith the exposureof the astronautsas
well as equipmentto ionizingradiation,ultravioletor infraredlight,
lasers,and electromagneticor radio frequencyradiation. Ionizingradiation
threatsmay be causedby leakingor inadequatelyshieldedradioactive
equipmentsuch as RTG's,particleaccelerators,liquidmetal heat exchangers,
etc. RF and electromagneticradiationfrom RF generatorscan triggerordnance
devicesor interferewith the operationof criticalequipment. Allowable
levels of each of these energiesmust be established,and design accommodation
made to ensure tllatthe space stationastronautsand equipmentare protected.
Radiationin space is a major issue to be addressedfor manned space
station accommodation. The subjectincludesmany variablesthat effect and
are affectedby the space stationplanningobjectives. At this time, these
variablesare discussedto the degree of their effectivity.
BACKGROUND
Radiationeffectshave been under study for almost a century. However,
a need exists to correlateexistinginformationwith probableflight
conditionsas will be encounteredin the space station. Basic and applied
researchdata are sourcematerial. The subjectof radiationis addressedby
source:
Space Radiation- Solar
A solar flare, a brighteruptionfrom the sun's chromosphere,may appear
within minutes and fade within an hour. Flarescover a wide range of
intensityand size and tend to occur between sunspotsor over their penumbrae.
Sunspotsusuallyoccur in pairs with a sunspotcycle average lengthof ll.l
years but varyingfrom 7 to 17 years. Flareseject high energy protonswhich
present a serioushazardto men in unshieldedspacecraft.(403)
Occasionalsolar flaresare associatedwith sun and solar activity. The
data shown in Figure 7-I shows the sunspotnumbersduringcycles 19 and 20,
and plots of the proton fluencesgreaterthan 30 I1eV. This is the total
fluenceof each individualparticleevent as a functionof time. There is a
rough correlationbetweenthe numberof particlesand the degree of solar
activity. Generallythere are anywherefrom one to perhapsfive particle
events which might be calledmajor events duringany particularcycle. Some
detailsof what happenedduringcycles 18, 19, and 20 can be found in Figure
7-2. Here are shownjust the major events that occurredduring these
particularcycles. Notice that the largestevents happenedduringthe
ascendingor descendingphase of the solar cycle, tlajorevents are usually
absent during solar maxima and minima. (402).
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GalacticSpace Radiation
Galacticspace radiationis the resultof explosionsof supernovae.
These cause a flux consistingof approximately82%-85%protons,12-14% alpha
particlesand I-2% heavier nuclei. This flux will increaseand decrease
inverselyas the solar activitychanges since the screeningeffect of the
interplanetarymagnetic field lessenswith the solar activity. The flux
densityof galacticspace radiationparticlesin the energy range of lO0-1000
I,leV/nucleoni creases3-5 times when solar activitychanges from maximum to
minimum. The flux densityof galacticparticles,with energiesof over lO00
14eV/nucleon,is not as much effectedby solar activity. Over an ll-year
period, the change in flux densitywas about 20%. Densityof the total
geomagneticsolar radiationflux is decreasedby lO times at averageorbit
inclinationangles due to the geomagneticfield.
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Figure 7-2 Major Solar ParticleEvents of
the Last Three Solar Cycles
The GeomagneticField
The earth is enclosedby a geomagneticfield, the magnetosphere. This
trapsmagneticparticlesand is surroundedby the solar winds. At a specific
distancefrom the earth, the geomagneticfield energy densityequals the
energyof the solar wind. At this point, the magneticlines of force break
down. It is the boundarybetweendominationby the magnetic field and the
solarwind.
The inner boundaryof the transitionregion,the magnetopause,occurs at
about ten earth radii on the sunlit side of the earth and forms an elongated
teardropwith a long tail pointedaway from the sun. The outer boundary is
approximately14 earth radii. See Figure 7-3.
A method of depictingthe distributionof magneticallytrappedparticles
abo_t the earth is by using the B-L coordinatesystem. The magneticfield
strengthat some specifiedpoint in space is the B coordinateand L is the
magneticshell parameteridentifyingthe shell upon which the guidingcenter
of the trappedparticle is adiabaticallyconfinedas it drifts aroundthe
earth.
The penetrationof chargedparticlesto the vicinityof the earth is
alteredby the magneticfield.
In the vicinityof the earth, galacticspace radiation(GSR),even in
polar orbits,does not exceed 7m rem, in contrastto estimatesof 50-I00 rem
per year GSR dose equivalentin interstellarspace dependingon solar
activity.
The directionof travel of a chargedparticle(ion) is changedby the
magneticfield. The cosmic ray in the upper right of Figure 7-4 thus is
deflecteddownward. Such deflectionsof cosmic rays producethe "latitude
effect": cosmic rays are more intenseat high latitudes(northand south)
than near the Equator.
Deflectionsof slowermoving ions - the protonsand electronsin the
solar wind - are larger, and the Earth'smagneticfield has "captured"many of
them in the Van Allen belt (namedafter physicistJames Van Allen of the
Universityof Iowa,who discoveredit from measurementson the Explorerl
satellitein 1958). The cutawayview of Figure 7-4 shows the doughnut-shapped
regionswhere protonsand electronsare oscillatingnorth and south along the
magneticlines of force (dashedlines). These charged particlesspiral around
the lines of force at speedsof severalkilometersper secondand are
reflectedback where the lines of force get close togethernear the magnetic
poles. There are no sharpboundariesto the regionswhere protonsand
electronsare oscillating,but the whole Van Allen belt is between 320 and
32,400 kilometersaltitudeand extendsall around the Earth. The peak
intensityof protonsoccurs at about 3000 kilometersaltitude,where tile
protonshave energiesof more than I0 megaelectronvoltsand a flux of more
than lO,O00/cm2 sec. Becauseof the intensityof this radiationin the Van
Allen belt, this regionof space is by far the most hazardousto living
organisms(and to sensitiveinstruments)in spacecraft. The NASA PioneerlO
mission found the similarradiationbelt of Jupiterto be severalthousand
times more intense. (159)
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97
The Earth'smagneticfield is not as simpleas the diagramin Figure 7-4
would suggest. Its outer regionsare affectedby the solarwind, and the
"mag,letosphere"- the region of the upper atmospherethat is dominatedby the
Earth'smagneticfield - has a "shock front"facing into the wind (moreor
less towardthe Sun) and a "tail"stretchingdown-sun. More importantfor
Earth satellitessuch as Apollo-Soyuz,the magneticdipolemoment of the
Earth'smagneticfield is not at the Earth'scenter,causingthe Van Allen
belt to bulge downwardtowardsthe Earth'ssurfaceover the AtlanticOcean
just east of Brazil in a regioncalled the South AtlanticAnomaly. This
irregularityin the magneticfield producesa region of very intenseradiation
in the lower part of the Van Allen belt (aboutfOOD timesmore intensethan in
nearby space). NASA scientistshave learnedthat some instrumentson
spacecraftgive erroneousreadingswhile they are in the South Atlantic
Anomaly. NASA's Skylab,at a 444-kilometeraltitude,went through it
regularly. Apollo-Soyuzwas below it at an altitudeof 222 kilometers,where
the radiationdose was almost lO times less than the Skylabaltitude. (159)
RADIATIONSHIELDING
Shieldingfrom radiationis a major considerationin space station
design, As space occupancytime periodsincrease,the need for shielding
becomesmore pertinent. The incidenceof solar flaresis a major
consideration. Also, EVA, which placesan astronautin a vulnerableposition,
requiresseriousconsideration. Thus is well summarizedby Dr. Delbert
Philpott,NASA ResearchScientist,BiomedicalResearchDiv.,who has written
the following:(353)
Reviewof the literatureand conversationwith variouspeople in the
field of radiationpoints to the advisabilityof incudingradiationprotection
within the environmental"storm"shelter,even though projectedradiation
levels at a 28° inclinationorbit should be acceptablefor a 3 month tour.
However,since a "storm"shelteris needed for other safety reasons (fire,
noxiousgases, etc.),buildin9 the walls out of radiationabsorbingmaterial
would be advisablefor the followingreasons:
I. A large solar flare,which cannot be ruled out, could exceed
exposurelimits at a 28° inclinationand 200 to 300 nauticalmile
altitude.
2. The decreasedradiationaffordableby use of a sheltercould help
offsetany increaseddose absorptionwhich would be expectedduring
the longerEVA periods.
3. Future higher inclinationand geosynchronousorbitswill
necessitateradiationprotection. Experiencecan be gainedwith
shieldingmaterialsunder actual flightconditionswhich would be
especiallyuseful for penetratingcosmic ray (HZE)particles. It
is expectedthat the shieldingwould be kept to a minimum to reduce
the weight penalty.
4. The shelterarea would be very useful for a control area during
radiationexperimentsand for the exclusionof radiationfrom other
experimentsas required.
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5. While the presentradiationlimitsare the same for male and female
astronauts(35remto bone/qtr;75/yr),the earth recommendedlevels
are lower (3rem/qtr,5r/yr; fertilefemalesO.Srem/9months). The
lower level for females is based on their susceptibilityto
mutagenesisin the offspring. It appearsthat therewill be more
and younger femalestravelingin space. Also the N C R P is
planningto reassessastronautstandards. Therefore,it is likely
that the limitsare loweredand the necessityfor a radiation
shelterwould be increased.
6. Informationuseful for future polarand geosynchronousorbits would
be obtained.
In supportof a safe radiationhaven,additionalground based studies
are needed including:
I. Experimentsto establishthe efficiencyof shieldingand
susceptibilityof humans duringspace flight.
2. Experimentsto evaluatethe most efficientshieldingmaterial per
unit mass. Living tissueshould be used in such studiesto
confirm/correctthe detectedand estimateddoses.
3. Experimentsto determinethe biologicalresponseto cosmic
radiationespeciallythe low dose long term effects.
In summary,As Dr. Tobias of U.C. Berkeleyhas pointedout, the time is
comingwhen the astronautpopulationwill need to be consideredas part of the
generalpopulationand not a small and separategroup with separatestandards
of radiationexposurelevels. Consideringthe need for a "storm"shelter,
inclusionof radiationprotectionseems prudentand advisable. (353)
J. W. Haffner,RI, (290) has analyzedshieldingbased on a space station
effectivewall shielding. The resultsof this analysisare su1_arizedin the
chartswhich also reflectthe effectsof altitude.
The Van Allen belt radiationeffectson tileorbit altitudeselection
depend upon the shieldingeffectivenessof the Space Stationand the amountof
EVA required,and the shieldingeffectivenessof the EVA suit.
The tissuedose rates as a functionof altitudeand aluminumshield
thicknessare shown in Figures 7-5 and 7-6. These dose rates are based on the
AP8 and the AE6HI Van Allen belt models (at 28.5° the solar flare particles
are excludedby the geomagneticfield). At lower altitudes(300 NMi), the
bulk of the daily dose is acquiredover the South Atlanticanomaly;at higher
altitudes,the dose rate is less dependentupon the latitudeand longitude.
In calculatingthe rem (insteadof the rad) dose rates, use was made of the
relationship
rem = rad X RBE
where RBE = relativebiologicaleffectiveness(also sometimescalled the
qualityfactor). The RBE is a functionof the LET (linearenergy transfer)or
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dE/dx of the ionizingnuclearradiation. For this study,the RBE-LET
relationshipof Rossi was used to obtain the RBE for protonsbehindvarious
thicknessof shielding(the RBE for electronsof all energiesis _nity). The
RBE as a functionof shieldthicknessfor the Van Allen belts in the 150-450
NFiialtitudeis listed in Table 7-I.
Table 7-I
RELATIVEBIOLOGICALEFFECTIVENESSAS A FUNCTIONOF
ALUI_INUI4SHIELDTHICKNESSIN THE LOWER VAN ALLEN BELTS
ShieldThickness ProtonCutoff Energy RBE for PenetratingProton
(gm/cm2) (Mev)
0.5 18.5 l.8
1.0 28.0 l.55
l.5 34.5 1.45
2.0 40.5 l.35
2.5 46.5 1.3
3.0 51.0 l.25
4.0 60.0 l.2
5.0 67.6 l.15
The four criticalorgans of the human body, are the skin, the blood
formingorgans (bonemarrow),eyes, and reproductiveorgans. The effective
depth (withinthe body) and the recommendeddose limits for each critical
organ are listed in Table 7-2. Table 7-3 incorporatesSpace Station RFP dose
rate. Includedin Figures7-5 and 7-6 are the recommendedeye dose rates
which correspondto the 30-day,quarterly,and yearly dose limits of Table 7-2.
The shieldingrequiredto precludeexceedingthe 30-day,quarterly,and
yearly eye dose limits of Table 7-2 are shown as a functionof altitudefor a
28.5° inclinationin Figure 7.7. The data in the figure,which excludes
allo\_ancesfor radiationexposureoccurringdu_ingEVA, indicatesthat for a
275 N;4iorbit, approximatelyl, 2, and 3 gm/cm_ of shieldingare required
for the 30-day,quarterly,and yearly dose rate constraintsrespectively. An
allowanceof 0.3 gm/cmL was allo\vedfor self-shieldingof the eye.
Althoughno calculationsof the effect of EVA on radiationdose are
presentedherein, such calculationsmust be made to determinethe degreeof
radiationprotectionrequiredboth in the stationand during the EVA, and
possiblelimits to time in EVA must be identified.
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TABLE 7-2 SPACE SCIENCEBOARD RADIOLOGICAL
ADVISORYPANEL SUGGESTEDAVERAGERADIATIONDOSE RATE (154)
Constraint Bone Marrow Skin Lens Testes
5 cm depth .I mm .3 mm 3 cm
Avgd. over yr. 0.2 rem/day 0.6 rem/day 0.3 rem/day 0.I rem/day
30 day 25 rem 75 rem 37 rem 13 rem
Quarterly a 35 rem 105 rem 52 rem 18 rem
Yearly 75 rem 225 rem I12 rein 38 rein
Career 400 rein 1200 rem 600 rem 200 rem
a - Note: May be allowed for 2 consecutive quarters, followed by 6 months
of restriction from further exposure, to maintain yearly limit.
TABLE7-3 IONIZINGRADIATIONEXPOSURELI;41TS
FROMSPACESTATIONRFP (388)
Bone Skin Eye
Constraintsin REM (5 cm) (0.Imm) (3 mm)
l Yr. Avg. Daily Rate 0.2 0.5 0.3
30 Day Max. 25.0 75.0 37.0
QuarterlyMax. 30.0 80.0 40.0
Yearly Limit 60.0 170.O 85.0
Career Limit 200.0 600.0 300.0
REM - Radiationabsorbeddose in RAD's times a
qualityfactor(q)to accountfor tile
differentrelativebiologicaleffectiveness
(RBE)of differentradiations. For planning
purposes,q = 1.2
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It should also be mentioned that no allowance has been made for the
radiation dose the personnel might receive on their trips to and from the
Space Station via tile Space Shuttle. Since the duration of these trips is
expected to be short (I day) and the radiation protection provided by the
Shuttle (1.5 gm/cm2) is probably comparable to that of the Space Station,
the effect of neglecting the dose received during transit will be small. Once
a timeline has been established for the transits, the doses received during
this operation can be explicitly included.
SHIELDINGAPPROACHES
Current knowledge of radiation sources, radiation effects, shielding and
other protective measures should be applied to tile Space Station program in
order to assure optimum personnel safety. Pertinent points will be addressed,
representing suggested design and planning factors. As discussed previously,
vehicle wall and framing designs should be determined with consideration of
the shielding potential. This could lead to new concepts as well as
refinement of these existing. Tile use of mass, i.e., g/cm2 aluminum has
been commonand is well accepted.
Aluminum Shielding
Wilson and Cucinotta (389) of NASAdeveloped a series of curves based on
computer compilation of available data. This has been condensed into those of
Figure 7-8. It will be noted that the lowest altitude (200 km) experiences
the least radiation. At the other extreme, 600 km, the 0° orbit experiences a
minimal of radiation, the 30° orbit the worst, and the 60° orbit slightly less
than the 30°. At the 400 km altitude, the 0° orbit experiences the least
radiation. In general, the lower the altitude, the less the radiation.
However, orbit is a major modifying factor.
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The shieldingfrequentlyused is 6 gm/cm2 al. The curves show this as
having a major shieldingeffect.
These curves are excellentfor comparisonsand trends. Additional
informationwould be desirablefor quantitativeevaluationof shieldingunder
the myriad of space radiationconditions. Much researchin that area will
developa data bank necessaryfor the constructionof optimal space station
protectiveand structuralwalls, framesand flight structures.
Water Shielding
During a recent radiationconferenceat JSC on this subject(November
16-18, 1983),J. Loftra (400)suggestedthe use of 6 inchesof water in the
walls for protection. He thinksmagneticshieldingwould interferewith
communicationsand not help to shieldagainstHZEs. He believesthere will be
3 stationsin orbit by 1990. There are plans for a Polar Orbit flightwith 8
eople and a 28° orbit flightwith 12-28 people,and these flightswould be 90
ays/missions. A lO-yearlifetimefor use of the crews is planned. GEO would
have 30-day duty with 4-5 peopleand would be mainlymilitary. He thinks some
restrictionsmay need to apply to femalesfor EVAs. Averagemission time
would be 90-daysand 6-hoursfor EVA men. Age range now is 26 to 54 years.
Shuttlehas 14 psi (21% oxygen)but lO psi would be better (30% oxygen). This
may reducethe effectof radiationon the body. These factorsshould be taken
into consideration.
The positioningof space stationequipmentsurroundingpersonnelareas
is a practicaland economicalconsideration.This shouldbe a basic approach,
and with supplementalsteps,such as the water shieldconcept,will be
evaluated.
AtmosphereShielding
Duringthe recentJSC conference,J. Conklinnoted that some drugs help
by reversingcapillarypermeability. VitaminE and seleniumhelp survivalin
mice. Monoclonalantibodiescan be used to kill off gram negativebacteria
that kill people after radiation. Benedrylhas been found to affect histamine
productonin the blood and may play a role in radiatonprotection.
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These factors shouldbe evaluatedwith considerationof variablesand
practicalityfor application.
Extra VehicularShielding
The space stationoperationwill requireconsiderableEVA for
experimentsand maintenance. Shieldingof personnelwill be critical.
Currentshieldingmethodsmay not be satisfactoryfor the long term occupant.
Space suit shieldingis limitedby the requirementfor mobilityand comfort.
The space suit occupantcannot be impededby unwieldyshielding.
Space shieldsmust be considered. These will followvariousconcepts
currentlyunder developmentand will assureadequateshieldingfor normal
radiation. Solar flare occurrencewill requireimmediateretreatto sheltered
areas, as shieldingfrom these will necessarilybe substantial.
Section6, Volume I addressesEVA hardsuit'scapabilitiesto provide
radiationprotection.
ShieldFrom Space Station Sources
The space stationwill actuallydevelopradiationby reactors. This
radiationsourcewill be predictableand controllable. Current state-of-the-
art methods and materialswill be used for this purpose. The handlingof
materialswill follow provenprocedurescurrentlyin use, with consideration
for the space environment.
RADIATIO_IEFFECTS
The effectsof radiationare of extreme importance. Space station
personnelwill undergoexposureto all sourcesof radiationfor extended
periods. Althoughknowledgehas been gainedduring space flights,much
remainsto be learned. The followingdiscussesvariousaspectsof the
radiationhazard and effectsas resultof researchand tests in actual flight.
Bueckerand Facius,of the DFVLR Instituteof Flight 14edicine(357) have
providedthe followinganalysis:
The followingtopics are consideredpertinentfor a realisticassessment
of the risk to man when exposedto ionizingradiationunder space flight
conditions: l) predictionand measurementof the spectraof the physical
traitsof cosmic radiationas a functionof orbital parametersand the mass
shieldingof the spacecraft;2) synergisticor antagonisticmodificationof
radiationeffectsby dynamicflightconditionsand by the space environment;
3) productionof biologicaldamagebecomingmanifestonly long after exposure,
especiallyto the heavy ions; and 4) demonstrationof possiblyspecific
radiobiologicalmechanismsfor the denselyionizingheavy-ioncomponentof the
cosmic radiation. Some recentwork referrringto these topicswill be
presentedand discussedwith emphasison the high LET componentof the cosmic
radiation.
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Predictionof RelevantPhysicalParameters
Before turningto the problemof ascertainingthe spectraof some
physicalparameters,one must decidewhich of them are more relevantwith
respectto biologicaleffects. Allowingfor the accuracyof biologicaldata,
the measurementof energy spectramay be consideredsufficientto predict the
doses and therebythe biologicalrisk with acceptablereliability.
Unfortunately,the substantialcontributionof solar flaresto this ionizing
componentis still unpredictable. Where our radiobiologicalknowledgemight
be judged as adequate,at least for the practicalproblemof radiation
protection,the unknownphysicalaspectsof solar flarespreventany
deterministica prioririsk estimatefor longer term spacemissions. Instead,
_leare left with the necessityof estimatingprobabilitiesfor lower and upper
exposurelimits.
By contrast,an almost oppositesituationprevailswith respectto the
heavy ions of cosmic radiation. The mechanismsof the biologicalinteractions
of these ions are not yet understood.We only know that specificreaction
channelsmust exist, and we have some speculativeargumentsconsidering
acousticshockwaves as the physicalpart of this mechanism. With this
restrictionin mind, we want to mentionthe reportof Kovalevand {4arkelov
(355)on measurementsof LET spectrain the Cosmos 782 and the Prognoz-4
missions,coveringthe near-earthregionand the regionoutsidethe earth's
magnetosphererespectively. Until improvedunderstandingof the
radiobiologicalmechanismsarises, the quantitativeestablishmentof all
possiblephysicalaspectsof this radiationfield remainsan importan_ask.
The authorsdid not presenttheir originallymeasuredLET spectra. Instead,
they convertedthe LET spectrato a densitydistributionof absorbeddose over
LET in tissue,in order to estimatean averageradiobiologicalqualityfactor
representativeof cosmic particleradiation. The qualityfactor Q (LET),by
which tilephysicaldose is convertedfrom Gray (l Gy = lO0 rad) into rems, the
quantityrelevantfor radiationprotection,dependson the LET of a given
radiation. Q is unity for loosely ionizingradiationsuch as x-rays. By
convolutingtheir deriveddistributionof dose over LET with an empirical
functionQ (LET),they calculatedan averagequalityfactorof 1.5 for the
near-earthregionand 5.5 for the regionoutsidethe magnetosphere.
Presumably,they therebyacceptedthe commonlymade assumptionthat Q _eaches
a saturationvalue of about lO above an LET value of l to 2 GeV g-" cm-.
Their result is discordantwith qualityfactorsestimatedfor the cosmic heavy
ions from biologicalspace flightexperiments,which range from above lO0 to
above lO00 (356, 357, 358, 359, 360) and also from biologicalground
experimentswith heavy ions typicalfor the cosmic radiation.(361,362) The
crucialdifficultyapparentlyrests with the use of absorbeddose as the
quantityof reference.
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The modificationof the primaryfluencesby fragmentationof the
galacticheavy ions when penetratingmass shieldingshas been treated
previouslyby Heinrich(357). Recently,he extendedthese fragmentation
calculationsto the determinationof the depth-doserelationfor various heavy
ions and energieswhen penetratingwater as an approximationto biological
tissue (363). Comparisonwith experimentalresultsdemonstratesthat the
predictionof the energy spectraof primaryand secondaryparticlesis
possiblewith satisfactoryaccuracy,given the primary fluencesand a specific
mass configuration. The applicabilityof dose - which these spectrawere
convertedto - as a predictorfor the biologicaleffectsof cosmic heavy ions
remainsquestionable.
Another importantaspect for the predictionof particlefluencesfor the
galacticheavy ions, especiallyfor near-earthorbits,was treatedby Heinrich
and Spill. They calculatedthe modificationof the energy spectrumof primary
galacticheavy ions by the geomagneticshieldingas a functionof the orbital
parametersof a spacemission. Althoughthese calculationswere performed
only for verticalincidence,i.e., parallelto the earth-centeredradius
vectorto the orbit, they are alreadyquite involved. They demonstrate
quantitativelythe influenceof tileinclinationof an orbit on the resulting
energy spectrumand the therebyimpliedradiationexposure. Notwithstanding
the computationaldifficultiesof such a calculation,they should be part of
the a prioririsk assessmentfor longer term spacemissions,alongwith the
above mentionedpropagationof heavy ions throughany shieldingmatter.
Concludingthis section,we again emphasizethat a priori risk assessment
remainsconjecturaldue to eitherthe unpredictablesolar flare contribution,
to the low LET radiationor to the unknownreactionmechanismsof heavy ions.
BiologicalImpact
Related informationis by J. E. Pickering,(154),USAF Schoolof
AerospaceMedicineand providesthe recommendationsby the Space Sciences
Board RadiologicalPanel as follows:
Recommendationsof multiple reviewgroups have reflectedupon different
organ/systemsensitivitieswith both acute and latent resultsas concerns.
For example,the Space SciencesBoard RadiobiologicalAdvisoryPanel has on
severaloccasionssuggestedaveragedaily, 30-day,quarterly,yearly, and
career doses to the bone marrow, skin, lens of the eye, and the testes. Table
7-2 relatesthese data.
The graph,Figure 7-9 is intendedto place in perspective(1) the
environmentaland (2) occupationalexposures,(3) a one-time"peace-time"
emergencyexposure,and (4) the recommendedwartime "missioncompletion"dose
for nuclearcrews,while at tilesame time focus attentionon the depth dose
area (shadedarea) representingcurrentrecommendedcareer dose limitsfor
space operations,as reflectedin the above advisorypanel recommendations.
11o
Figure 7-9 Populationvs. ExpectedDose (154)
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In the absence of nuclear debrisand fissiontrapping,radiationexposures
from galacticbackground,the South Atlanticanor,laly,and solar flares (should
one occur)may producedoses on the order of the followingin a vehicle like
the shuttlewhere shieldingis assumed to be 2gm/cm2 or less.
Low Earth Orbit Polar Equatorial
GalacticBackground p+ 20 torero/day lO torero/day
So. AtlanticAnomalye-B" 200 torero/day lO0 torero/day
Solar Flare p+, HiZE lO-15 rem Greaterthan lO-15 rem)
Stay Time 90 Days 19.8+(I0-15) lO rein
Total 32 rem*
Likewisefor transferfrom low earth orbit to synchronous,a one-timedose of
5 reincould occur.
OrbitalTransfer
GalacticBackground p+ lO mrem
So. AtlanticAnomaly e-B- lO mrem
InnerBelt p+
Outer Belt e- 3-5 rein
Total 4.z rein*
*Note: These two doses equate to today's current
occupationaland one-timeemergencydoses.
Infrahumanprimatesexposed in 1964 to differentenergiesof protonsand
electronsforT.1the basis for the followinginferencesfor delayedas well as
acute effects. The energiesand doses are as representativeof space as
acceleratorswere availableat that time:
Radiation Energy Dose Range (REI_)
X-ray 2 I1eV 300-870
Protons 32 I4eV 280-2800
Protons 138 MeV 210-1220
Protons 400 I,leV 50-I200
Protons 55 {4eV 25-I800
Protons 2.3 GeV 50-IlO0
Electrons l.6 I4eV lO00-1500
Electrons 2 14eV 900-I500
Solar Flares - 120-1800
14ixedProtons
Initialexperimentswere designedto examineonly the short term or
acute effectsof proton irradiation. However,as the lower dose animals
survivedthe first 120-day postexposureperiod,they were maintained,and as
this populationof animals grew, so did the idea of a long term colony, now 15
years postexposure. One energy,55 t4eVis provided,since it is fairly
representativeof the area of space discussedabove.
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Protonsof this energy penetratethe body tissuesto a depth of about
2.5 cm, which not only irradiatethe integumentarysystem,but also irradiate
a considerablefractionof the bone marrow,gastrointestinaltract, and the
central nervoussystem. The LDso/30is about ll50 rem. The resultsare
outlinedbelow. The notationLDs_/30 indicatesthat the exposurewill be
fatal to 50 percentof the subjectsin 30 days.
There was a depressionof leukocytesand platelets,but to a much lesser
extent that that seen after x-ray irradiation. Diarrheaand gastrointestinal
symptomsoccurredwith doses above 1500 rem.
Exposuredoses of 1500 rem or greaterproducedsevere skin ulceration
within one month after exposure,and severe incapacitatingedema, especially
of the face, occurredtwo months after exposure. Exposuresof lO00 rem also
produceddesquamationand some edema within the first few months after
exposure.
An additionalconsiderationis providedby A. P. Arga (357)with respect
to dosagesand effects. The author developsall usable doseagesand defines
effects for variousexposures.
PermissibleRadiationDoses (357)
One importantconsiderationin recommendingany permissibledose is the
length of time over which the body is exposed. For example,a dose spread
over a period of 40 years may not show any significantdamage. If an
individualis exposedto a large single dose of radiationover a short
intervalof time, it is called an acute exposure,while a steadysmall dose of
radiationover a long time is called a chronicexposure. It is found that on
the averagea typicalindividualin the UnitedStates receivesa total dose of
180 mrem/yr (l mrem = lO-_ rem) resultingfrom (1) lO0 mrem/yrfrom natural
radioactivityand cosmic rays, (2) 75 mrem/yr from dentaland medicalx-rays,
and (3) 5 mrem/yrfrom fallout from nuclearweapons testing.
It is true that any amount of radiationexposureis consideredto be a
healthhazard. But there are situationswhere certainexposurescannotbe
avoided (for usefulmedicaland industrialapplications). Under such
circumstancesthe exposureshould be kept to a minimum. For this purpose,at
present,the maximum permissibleamount of radiationdose to which an
individualmay be exposed (withoutany ill effects)is set at 500 mrem per
year. It is assumedthat such exposuresare uniformlydistributedover the
wholeyear. It is also recommendedthat those personsunder the age of 18
shouldhave zero exposure. This is becauseat a young age, the body cells are
growingand are very sensitiveto radiationdamage.
One may wonder at this stage what are tileclinicalsymptomsof radiation
sickness. For low long-termexposures(chronicexposures),there are
basicallyno clinicalsymptons,but in many cases cancer has been found. But
high short-termexposures(acuteexposures)do have clinicalsymptoms,as
summarizedin Table 7-4.
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TABLE 7-4 CLINICALSYMPTOMSOF RADIATIONSICKNESS
Time After Lethal Dose Medium Lethal Sublethal Dose
Exposure (650r) Dose (40Or) (250-I00r)
First _¢eek Nausea,vomiting Nausea,Vomiting Possiblenausea,
within 2 h after 2 h vomiting
Diarrhea
Inflamationof
mouth and throat
Secondweek Fever Loss of hair
Rapid loss in Loss of appetite
weigilt Generaldiscomfort
Death
Third week Fever Loss of hair
Severe reddening Loss of appetite
of mouth and Generaldiscomfort
throat Sore throat
Pallor
Bleeding
Diarrhea
Fourth week Pallor Recoverylikely
Bleeding
Diarrhea
Rapid loss in
weight
Death 50% chance
STRATEGYOPTIONS
I. Select altitude/elevationto avoid South Atlanticanomalyand
higher radiationbelts.
2. Synergisticallydevelopa barriersystemsanalysis/tradestudy that
optimizes module external_valIs for at least pressurization,meteroid/debris
protection,shrapneland radiationprotection.
3. Considersupplementaluse of lead partial clothingelements
(ponchos,shorts,goggles,etc.)
4. Develop realisticallowabledose tablesfor EVA, flightquarter
year and whole life.
5. Develop realisticallowabledose tables for in-stationastronaut
for flight,quarter,year and whole life.
6. Developbettermdels for dose estimation.
If4
8. METEOROIDPENETRATION
THREAT DEFINITION
A large quantityof space debrishurtlespast the earth at speeds
rangingfrom 7,000 to 45,000miles per hour.Ten thousandtons of meteoritic
materialreach the earth daily. Most of the space debrisconsistsof tiny
particleswhich are preventedby the earth'satmospherefrom reachingthe
ground. A satelliteor space stationhas no such protection,and a meteoroid
the size of a pinheadcan penetrate2 millimetersof aluminum.
A meteoriteis a piece of spacedebris large enoughto penetratethe
earth'satmosphereand land on the earth. On rare occasionsvery large
meteoritesland. The largestone discoveredto date weighsmore than 50
tons. Very large ones are not found becausethey explodeon impact,causing
some of the largestexplosionsknown to man beforethe atom bomb. There are
craters givingevidenceof meteoritesweighingmore than 200,000tons.
:4eteorsare the shootingstarsand fireballsseen in the night sky,
usuallynot large enough to reachthe earth'ssurface. Their size ranges from
0.1 millimeterto several meters in diameter. Meteoroidrefers to all such
bodiesmoving through space,and hence the term includesboth meteors and
meteoritesbefore they reach the earth'satmosphere, l_neterm micrometeorite
refers to tiny dust particlesbelow about 0.1 millimetersin diameter. (349)
A falloutof spacedebris studieswill have to be a probabilityof
strikeand an assumedsize of meteoroid. The potentialimpactof this threat
has not been specificallydefinedat this time. However,basic assumptions
should considerpotentialmeteoroidpenetrationof the primarystructure.
Physicaldamage shouldbe confinedto one compartmentand is assumedto
consistof finelydividedmolten high-speedshrapnel(from spallationof the
innerwall).
Penetrationof the pressurewall of the primarystructureby a meteroid
will be a relativelyrare event; however,the potentialconsequencesof such
an event must be considered.
The spacecraftstructureis designedfor no penetrationby a meteoroid
definedby a certain probabilityof occurrencein a particularenvironmentfor
the missionduration. Figure8-1 shows the probabilityof no impact for a
typicalmodular space stationconfigurationduring a lO-yearmission. There
is betterthan 0.999 probabilityof no impactby a meteoroidlarger than 1 gm
mass and 15 mm (0.6 inch) diameter,and this size meteoroidhas been selected
for definingthe maximum crediblemeteoroidpenetrationin the credible
accidents. Such a meteoroidwould produce approximately50 BTU's of energy
insidethe compartmentit penetrated. This energywould be releasedin the
form of heat, s_ock waves, and kineticand thermalenergy of finelydivided
molten high-speedshrapnelfrom spallationof the innerwall. This event was
comparedin magnitudeto an explosionof a hand grenade(0.025Ib/TNT
equivalent)and may be expectedto injurepersonnelin the area, damage
equipment,and start local fires. It also will result in a hole of
approximately2 inchesin diameterin the pressurewall, and will cause
depressurizationof the module/vehicle. (021)
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Figure 8-I Probability of No. Meteoroid Impact (021)
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l'nedepressurizationeffect from a penetrationwill depend on its size
as well as the volumebeing depressurized. The pressurewill decay
exponentiallywith time and the crew will be able to functionuntil a pressure
of approximately9.1 psia is reached. At this point, the partialpressureof
oxygenwill be 1.9 psia, and below this hypoxiamay result in unacceptable
levels of crew performance,with degradedvisualperformance. At a pressure
of approximately6.0 psia, loss of consciousnessmay resultafter a variable
period,dependingon individualsusceptibility.Decompressionsickness
(bends)may occur if the pressuredrops below 7.3 psia. Althoughthe onset
and course of this decompressionsequenceis unpredictablefor any one
individual,symptomsrarely appearduring the first few minutes of exposureto
the low pressure.(021)
Figure 8-2 shows the decompressiontimes to 9.1 psia for the maximum
designcase of a 2-inch penetration. If a singlemodule were isolated,
approximatelyfive minutes of crew reactiontime would be availablefor
locatingand making a temporaryseal or for evacuatingand sealingoff the
module. If severalmoduleswere open to each other, so that all of them share
in the decompression,considerablemore reactiontime would be available.
Operatingthe space stationwith the hatchesopen betweenmodules, therefore,
maximizedthe reactiontime in the event of a leak, as well as allowing
quickeraccess betweenthe modules. (021)
The 2-inch penetrationrepresentsa very severecase which would
typicallybe encounteredonce in 10,000years of space activity. As seen from
Figure 8sdmeteoroidswith a more realisticprobabilityof occurrenceare
considerablyless massive and of smallerdiameter. Althoughthe size of
penetrationwill not vary much, the energy releaseddoes decreasevery rapidly
with the size of the meteoroid. Meteoroidswhich are just beyondthe
structuralcapabilityof the primary structurewill probablycause very small
penetrationsand the problem probablywill be in detectingand locatingthem
ratherthan in copingwith damage. (021)
DISCUSSION
The solid objectsencompassedby the term "meteoroids"range in size
from micronsto kilometersand in mass range from < 10-12g to > 10+16g.
Those less than 1 gram are often called "micromete_roids."If-objectsof more
than approximately10-6g mass reachEarth'satmospherethey are heated to
incandescence,producingthe visibleeffect called a "meteor." If the initial
mass and compositionpermits some of the originalmeteoroidto reach Earth's
surfaceunvaporized,the object is calleda "meteorite".
Meteoroidsare thought to deriveprimarilyfrom cometsand asteroids
with perihelianear or inside Earth'sorbit. The originalobjectswere
supposedlybrokendown into a distributionof smallerbodiesby collisions.
Meteoroidsrecentlyformed still tend to be concentratednear the orbitalpath
of their parent body. These "streammeteoroids"producethe well knownmeteor
showerswhich occur at certaindates and from particulardirections(Table
8-1).
117
TABLE 8-1• MAJOR METEOROIDSTREAMS (164)
• • '..' Geocentric.
• Name . Period of '.Date of ,.F max Velocity
• . Activity .'Activity '.Maximur(km/sec)i
Quadrantids January 2 to 4 !January3 8.0 42
Lyrids April 19 to 22 _April21 0•85 48
n-Aquarids May 1 to 8 !May 4 to 6 2.2 64
i
O-Cetids May 14 to 23 'May 14 to 23 2.0 37
l
Arietids May 29 to June 19 'June6 4.5 38l
-Perseids June 1 to 16 :June6 3.0 29l
B-Taurids June 24 to July 5 'June28 2.0 31l
a-Aquarids July 26 to iJuly8 1.5 40
August 5
l
i_Perseids July 15 to _August10 to 14 5.0 60August 18
l
Orionids October 15 to 25 October20 to 23 1.2 66
Arietids,southern Octoberthrough November5 1.1 28
November
Taurids,northern October26 to :November10 0.4 29
November22
I
Taurids,night November ' 1.0 37
l
Taurids, southern October 26 to 'November5 0.9 28
November22
i
Leonids,southern November15 to 20 :November16 to 17 0.9 72
l
Bielids November12 to 16 '•November14 0.4 16
!
Geminids November25 to '.December12 to 13 4.0 35
December17
Ursids December20 to 24 'December22 2.5 37
Fmax is the ratioof averagemaximum cumulativestream to averagesporadic
flux for a mass of 1 g and a velocityof 20 km/sec.
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Meteoroidsr,laybe classifiedby composition: stony,iron, and, perhaps,
icy. From their compositionthe type of parentbody can be inferred.
Meteoroidsare attractedby the Earth'sgravity field so that the flux
from allowed directionsin near-Earthorbit is increasedby approximately1.7
over the interplanetaryvalue. The Earthalso shieldscertain arrival
directions.
The total mass infall to Earth is estimatedto be approximately
10lOg/year. Figure8-3 shows the distributionof nul,lberwith _,lass,where N
(> r,1)is the number flux with mass > m. The flux is low and, therefore,
dTfficultto r.leasure.Evidenceincludes: spheruleson tilesea floor and the
polar icecaps,impactsdetectedwith specialsensorson satellites,meteor
trails in the at_1osphereobservedvisuallyand by radar, lunar crater counts
and zodiacallight.
The fluxesof Figure 8-3 are probablyuncertainby a factorof 10. Tile
units may be convertedto particles/_._2 sec by divisionby 3.155 x 1013 =
antilog 13.499. (To convert to interplanetaryintensity,particles/J,l2 sec
ster, multiplyby 2 to correctfor Earth shielding,divide by 2 to correctfor
gravitationalfocusing,and divide by 7). The data are of the fon,1N (> m) =
const/in=, with a, the slope, slowlychanging. There is SOl;leevidencethat
the flux in Earth-lunarspace is greaterthan the generallevel along the
Earth'sorbit by a factorbetween 1 and 2. The interplanetaryflux is higher
in the asteroidbelt than at 1 AU. (164)
The simplifiedfom N (> m) = coust/m_expressesthe curvatureof the
particleflux data as linear s-eg_lentsfor specificMass rangesaveragingout
the approximatecurvatureof the representedscattereddata.
ll9
Figure 8-2 Effect of Number of Modules in Isolatable Volume
on Depressurization Time
120
Figure 8-4 shows a recentcompilationof data for near-Earthspace
derived by variousmeans, over a more restrictedmass rangethan Figure 8-3.
(The fluxes shown in Figures8-3 and 8-4 are 1-yearaverages.) The flux for m
< 10-12g is ratheruncertain. There have been other recentestimatesof
micrometeoroidflux a factorof 10 higher than those shown in Figure 8-3.
This appears to representa real uncertainty.(164)
The main parametersaffectingthe meteoroidshieldare mission duration,
vehicle surfacearea and probabilityof puncture. Combininga mathematical
model of the likelymeteoroidenvironment,of hypervelocitypenetrationand a
puncturecriterionwith basic probabilitytheory,one finds that the shielding
thicknessrequiredfor icy meteoroidsof cometaryorigin is up to an orJer of
magnitudelower than that requiredfor stony raeteoroidsassumed to be of
asteroidalorigin. Shield thicknessand weight is thereforedeterminedby
asteroidalmeteoroidsin the first and secondarilyby mission time. Thus, for
flightsto Mars, and for long capture times, in the case of conjunction
missions,the requiredmeteoroidshieldingis likely to be heavierthan for
the space station. The tenativeeffect of heliocentricdistanceon the
meteoroid shieldweight is shown in Figure8-5 based on 99 percentprobability
of zero puncture. (078)
MeteoroidHazard for the ShuttleOrbiter
The debrismay be meteoroidspassingnear the Earth or man-madeobjects
generatedduring space operations.
Tne Orbiterwill nomina]lyoperatein a circularorbit with an altitude
of approximately300 km. Because it is so much largerthan the objects
comprisingthe debris population,the Orbiter'smean cross-sectionalarea can
be used to define the collisioncross section. The cross-sectionalarea
nose-onis approxiately50 m2, while the area in the plane Rf the wings is
approximately500 mz. A mean cross-sectionalarea of 250 mC was used in
performingthe collisioncalculations. The assumedindependenceof debris
size and the use of a mean cross-sectionalarea for collisioncross section
serve to introducesome uncertaintyinto the calculations.
The large values for the times betweencollisionscontainedin Table
9-3, Section 9, indicatethat man-madedebrisof size 4 cm and largerwill not
present a significanthazard to the ShuttleOrbiter. In fact, the times are
large comparedto times for collisionsinvolvingthe Orbiterwith a meteoroid
of sufficientmass to severlydamagea TPS tile, as shown in Table 8-2. These
times are based on the meteoroidpopulationmodel of Cour-Palais.(365) The
sensitivityof the LEO environmentto man-madedebris depositionis clearly
illustratedby comparingthe meteoroidpopulationparticledensitieswith
fragmentproducingoperations,such as antisatellitetests,which might occur
in orbit. At any time there are about 100 kg of meteoroidmaterial of mass
greaterthan 0.01 g in the volumeof space up to 4000 km altitude. Tilerefore
a single incidentwhich explosivelyfragmented100 kg of materialinto the
samemass distributionas displayedby the meteoroidswould, if these
fragmentswere disperseduniformlyup to 4000 km altitude,match the meteoroid
debris levels. (282)
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TABLE8-2 - TIME BETWEENCOLLISIOI|SBETWEENTHE SHUTTLEAND
A METEOROIDOFMASSGREATERTHANA GIVENMINIMUMMASS(282)
Minimum meteoroid Time between
mass, g collisions, yr
i0 350,000
1 25,000
0.i 1,800
0.01 130
Recorded Incidents
Post flight inspection of STS-8, Orbiter 0V-099, August/September 1983,
revealed that the forward windows (W-3 and W-4) had unacceptable visibility
due to heavy haze/glare which resulted from abrasion. Normal hand polishing/
cleaning techniqueswere not able to remove this haze/micropitting and the
windows _ere replaced. This is the first flight where micropitting/hazing was
noted. The cause of this micropitting/hazing is believed to be abrasion
during entry and is under investigation.
A micrometeorite or man-made space debris struck and damageda window on
the Soviet Salyut 7 space station July 27,1983 causing a loud crack heard by
the two-man cosmonaut crew. The Soviets characterized the impact as "an
unpleasant surprise," although the O.15-in.-dia. crater formed on the window
did not threaten the pressure integrity of the pane.
A shuttle orbiter Challenger _vindow suffered similar damage during
shuttle Mission 7, forcing the damagedglass pane to be replaced.
Micrometeoroids or space debris large enough to cause such damage are
considered rare.
Soviet scientists Delieve the material that struck the Salyut was a
micrometeorite because "experts have established that our planet is nm_
passing through a meteoroid shower. The surprise incident with the
micrometeorite attack amazingly coincided with preparations for a preplanned
training exercise called 'urgent escape from the station,'" the Soviets said.
Minimum Salyut crew escape time, to survive an emergency such as a
pressurization failure, is considered 15 rain., the Soviets said. This would
at least allow the crew to dive into the Soyuz transport and shut the hatch.
The basic Salyut/Soyuz emergency return schedule is based on a 90-min. period
that also includes some basic station mothballing activity, the Soviets said.
A micremeteorite or man-made space debris struck and damaged the shuttle
orbiter Challenger's windshield in orbit during Mission 7 in June 1983. The
small impact crater in the outer pane was measured optically at 0.0178 in
depth, with a crater width of 0.0892 in. The overall damagedarea was 0.2 in.
wide including the crater and flaws in the glass emanating from the impact
point. The outer thermal pane from 0V-099 right hand middle windshield(Window No. 5) was removed from the vehicle after the STS-7 mission for
inspection and analysis.
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The window was replaced not because of any concern over pressure
integrity caused by the impact, but rather the possibility the damagecould
expand to dangerous levels when subjected to aerodynamic and heating loads
during a later launch or re-entry.
Each orbiter window comprises three panes with the outer pane composed
of 5/8 in. thick silica glass. The impact damaged the outer pane, which is
designed for thermal protection. The two underlying panes provide both a
primary and secondary cabin pressure integrity seal.
Impact with a micrometeorite large enougil to cause the Mission 7 damage
is considereda rare event as statisticallythe chance for suclla strike
approximatesonly every 270 days in space.
Some minor damage from smallermicrometeoritesis expectedon orbiter
windows. A previoussuspectedmeteoriteimpactcraterwas detectedon orbiter
Columbia'sWindowNo. 3 thermalpane, but this 0V-102 pane was not removed.
However,0V-102 Window No. 4 thermalpane was removedbecauseof surface
cracks (bruisecheck) attributedto low velocityimpact by a large soft object
or to a staticload.
Analysisproceduresfor the two replacedwindowpanes are being
evaluated.
Other recordedincidentsof damage by or collisionwith Space Debris are
addressedin Section9, entitledDebris. In some of these cases the question
whether the incidentwas caused by meteoroidsor by man-madespace debrismay
never be answered.
MeteoroidBumper Experimenton Explorer46
In July 1981 NASA-LangleyResearchCenter (LaRC) releasedtechnical
paper 1879 sunm_arizingthe resultsobtainedfrom the MeteoroidBumper
Experimenton Explorer46 and the conclusionreachedtherefrom.
Introduction: The damage to a spacecraftfrom meteoroidimpactsmay be
greatly reducedby placinga thin shieldaround the spacecraftat some
distancefrom the hull. The shield,a meteor bumper,would vaporize
meteoroidsupon impact,thus dissipatingtheir penetratingpowers.
The validityof the bumperconceptwas demonstratedin a numberof
laborato_ studies. Even at impact speedstoo low to cause vaporization,a
bumperwas seen to fragmentthe projectileand dispersethe fragmentsover a
large area of the main wall, giving the double-wallstructurea much greater
resistanceto penetrationthan a singlewall of the same thickness. However,
all the laboratorytests were conductedat impact speedsless than the average
meteoroidimpact speed.
Even though the effectivenessof double-wallstructuresagainst
meteoroidshad not been demonstratedin space,the promiseof great weight
savingsseen in the extrapolationof laboratorydata led designersto use
bumperson a numberof spacecraft. The bumperused on Skylab was counted on
heavilyto reducetileprobabilityof a meteoroidpenetrationfrom
approximatley0.05, which is unacceptablefor a manned mission,to about
0.0001. Skylab survived;its hull was not penetratedduringthe manned
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missionor during the post-missionperiod. This flightexperience,however,
does not providedata on the effectivenessof that bumper. It does not even
demonstratethat double-wallstructureshave a greater resistanceto meteoroid
penetrationthan a singlewall becauseno penetrationswere expectedto occur,
even without the bumper.
The survivalof the pressurizedphotographiccanisterson four of the
five Lunar Orbiter spacecraftdemonstratedthat meteoroidbumpersare
effectivein reducingmeteoroidpenetrationdamage. The thermalblanketon
that spacecraftacted as a bumperwhich protectedthe pressurizedphotographic
canister. However,the small statisticalsample (only five canisterswere
flown and only one canisterwas penetrated)resultedin only a poor definition
of the effectivenessof the double wall, indicatingthat the double wall had
the same penetrationresistanceas a singlewall 10 to 840 percentthicker
than the combinedthicknessof the two walls.
The first accuratemeasurementof the effectivenessof a bumper in
reducingmeteoroidpenetrationswas made on Explorer46. Explorer46 was an
Earth-orbitingsatellitededicatedto the studyof meteoroidsand meteoroid
protection. Three meteoroidexperimentswere carriedonboard the spacecraft.
The meteoroidbumperexperimentwas the primaryexperiment.(284)
Descriptionof Experiment: Each wing consistedof three flat panels in a
configurationthat looked like a cross when viewedfrom the end. Each panel
containedeight pressurizedcells formed by joining two 50-_m-thicksheetsof
21-6-9 stainlesssteel by resistancewelding. The pressurizedcells were
long, narrowcells runningthe lengthof the panel. In addition,there was a
25-_m-thickbumperof 21-6-9 stainlesssteel on each side of the panel. The
50-_m wall representedthe hull or main wall of the double-wallstructure
being tested,while the 25-_m sheet was the bumperthat essentiallysurrounded
the main wall. The spacingbetweenthe wallswas 13_n.
The essentialdata obtainedfrom the bumperexperimentwere the times at
wilicheach cell was penetratedby a meteoroid.(284)
Explorer46 was boostedinto orbit on August 13, 1972,from the NASA
WallopsFlight Centerby a Scout D launch vehicle, l_lespacecraftachievedan
orbit of 490 km by 815 km with an inclinationof 380. The attitudeof the
spacecraftwas not known. The final interrogationof the experimentwas made
on January 29,1975.(284)
Conclusions: The meteoroidbumperexperimenton Explorer46 showedthat a
bumper is an effectivedevicefor reducingmeteoroidpenetrations. The
double-wallstructurereducedthe penetrationflux by a factorof 30 from that
expectedfor a singlewall of the same thickness,and it providedthe same
protectionas a 514-_m-thicksinglewall, which means it provideda weight
savingsof a factor of 6.9.
Explorer23, singlewall, and Explorer46, doublewall experiment
resultsare shown in Figure 8-6.
Hypervelocityimpact tests in the laboratoryimpliedthat failureof the
Explorer46 double-wallstructureoccuredwhen bumperfragmentspenetratedthe
main wall. Blast-loadingfailuresof the main wall did not occur because a
very large spacingwas used betweenthe bumperand the main wall.
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Even greatereffectivenessmay have been achievedif the distributionof
materialbetweenthe bumperand the main wall in the Explorer46 experiment
could have been optimizedby transferringsome of the bumpermaterialto the
main wall. Engineeringproblemspreventedthe experimentfrom being
optimized. The optimumdistributionwas calculatedto be one in which the
bumpercontainsabout 0.1 to 0.2 of the availablematerial.(284)
DesignApplication: The efficiencyfactorof 6.9 for the double-wall
structureon Explorer46 cannot be appliedto all double-wallstructures. The
efficiencyfactormay vary significantlywith the distributionof material
betweenthe bumperand main wall, the spacingbetweenthe walls, and the
materialof which the walls are made.
The real contributionof the Explorer46 data set is that it providesa
test point for models used to calculatemeteoroidpenetrationflux. A good
model can be applied to future spacecraftwall designsof various
configurations.(284)
PenetrationTests
On the basis of the encouragingresultsobtainedfrom the Meteoroid
BumperExperimenton Explorer46 furtherpenetrationtestingwas performedon
doublewall optimization. The conclusionsreachedto-date based on these
tests and data evaluationfrom the Explorerexperimentsare summarizedin the
following.
The MeteoroidEnvironmentModel, NASA SP-8013,1969 and the Meteoroid
Damage Assessment,NASA SP-8042,1970 formedthe data base for this
evaluation.
14eteoroidEnvironmentModel: The NASA designcriteriause the basicmodel of
the near-Earthmeteoroidenvlronmentfound in reference(365)which defines
the size distribution,velocitydistribution,mass density,and abundanceof
meteoroids. The model formulatesthe averageannual cumulativetotal flux _,
in impacts/m2s,of meteoroidsof mass m and greater,in kg, on a spacecraft.
This MeteoroidEnvironmentModel, NASA SP-8013,1969, is still valid
since no new data obtainedsubsequentlyjustifieda correctiveimprovementof
this model. (365)
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NUMBEROF METEOROIDHITS
N (m) : _ (m) At
N (m), number of meteoroids of mass m or greater
(m), flux of meteoroids of mass m or^greater (in impacts/m2s)
A, area of spacecraft component (m_)
t, duration of mission (s)
PROBABILITYOF AT LEASTONEHIT
P (m) : 1 - e -_(m)At
Reference(365)
MeteoroidDamageAssessment: Spacecraftdesignersneed a method of
calculatingthe penetrationflux for any double-wallstructure.,preferablya
l.lethodthat is based on a fundamentalunderstandingof tilemeteoroid
environmentand hypervelocityimpactphenomena. The method recommendedin the
NASA space vehicledesigncriteriafor meteoroiddamageassessmentonly
satisfiesthat requirementin part. (366) It is based on a fundamental
understandingof the meteoroidenvironment,but admits to a lack of
understandingof hypervelocityimpact phenomenain double-wallstructures.
(284)
The referencedmeteoroiddamage assessment,NASA SP-8042, 1970,only
providesformulasfor metal platesand recommendstestingany other components.
SINGLEWALL PENETRATIONEQUATION
(NASASP-8042)
t = K1 m0"352 pl/6 v 0.875
t = thicknessof wall, cm
K1 = constantcharacteristicof wall materialand temperature
m = mass of projectile,g
p = densityof projectile,g/cm3
v = impactspeed, km/s
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Example of Applicability to Manned Space Station
The need for debris protection and the relevance of the populatin and
size man-madedebris and meteoroids is illustrated in Figure 8-7. The flux of
meteoroids and predicted 1995 levels of man-madedebris, plotted as a function
of the effective diameter of those particles are taken from data presented by
Donald H. Kessler of NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) at an Orbital Debris
Workshop held at JSC during July of 1982. For the purpose of illustration, a
0.i0 inch aluminum wall thickness is assumed for the space station. Assuming
the meteoroid and debris particle densities and speeds noted in Figure 8-7,
the equation for single wall penetration is solved for particle mass and thus
particle diameter, using K1=0.54 for aluminum. The meteoroid and debris
particle diameters capable of penetrating the 0.i0 aluminum wall are nearly
the same as noted in Figure 8-7. At an altitude of 500 kilometers (270 nmi)
the meteoroids of sufficient size to penetrate the wall is better than two
orders of magnitude greater than that of debris particles.
Assuming an approximately 1800 square feet of space station modules
cross section area, the number of penetrations per year and the probability of
at least one penetration over a twenty year period have been calculated and
noted in the figure. Such penetration frequencies and probabilities are
clearly unacceptable for a manned space station, and indicate that a meteoroid
and debris protection is a must for the space station.
Evaluation and Interpretation of Penetration Test Data
It is important to understand that the Explorer 46 experiment was not
intended to establish the highest efficiency that a double-wall structure can
have in reducing the weight of meteoroid protection. The distribution of
material between the bumper and the main wall was not intentionally
optimized. Efficiency factors greater than 6.9 probably can be attained. The
discussion of optimum double-wall structures contained in this section is
included to support the contention that the Explorer 46 double-wall structure
was not optimum and that efficiency factors greater than 6.9 can be expected.(284)
The NASAdesign criteria do not provide a model for the penetration of
double-wall structures. Instead, they recommendthat the penetration
resistance of a double-wall structure to meteoroid impacts be established by
testing the structure in a hypervelocity impact laboratory at the highest
speeds attainable and extrapolating the results to meteoroid impact velocities
by assuming that meteoroids of equal kinetic energy have e_ual penetrating
capabilities. It _s recommendedthat glass (p = 2300 kg/m ) or syntacticfoai_1(p : 900 kg/m ) be used as projectiles to simulate low-density cometary
meteoroids. (284)
The following notes apply to the three zones (a), (b), and (c) shown on Figure
8-8. The scales of Figure 808 have been arbitrarily selected:
(a) As velocity increases, the particle mass required to puncture both
wall s decreases.
_o
(b) As velocityincreasesfurther,the particlestartsto disintegrate
when it bursts throughthe first wall (bumper). Penetration(of
the main wall) is caused by piecesof the particleand pieces of
the first wall.
(c) As velocityincreasesfurtherthe blast createdby the ruptureof
the firstwall (bumper)dominatesthe failuremechanismof the
secondwall (mainwall). The materialin the secondwall fails
becauseof stressfailuredue to the blast. See also figures8-9
and 8-10 depictingthe effectsin Zone (c)
The Double Wall Optimization,as shown schematicallyon Figure8-11, can be
summarizedas fol1ows:
s - Large enough to precludeblast loadingfailuremode
- No effect on penetrationby fragments
tB - Thick enough to break up projectiles
- Thin enough that bumper fragmentswon't penetratemain wall
tw - Thick enough to precludepenetrationby fragmentsfrom both
projectileand bumper
Tradeoffstudiesbased on the resultsof laboratorytestswill have to
considerall of the followingparameters:
s, tB, tw, total systemweight,probabilityof penetration,
meteoroids,man-madedebris,other factors (incl. radiation)
Other tradeoffstudieshave to weigh the advantagesof a void space between
bumperand _lainwall for meteroidpenetrationversusthe advantagesof a
materialfiller for enhancingthe radiationprotection.
STRATEGYOPTIONS
Damage containmentfor meteoroidimpact becomeslargelya tradeoffamong
structuralweight,probabilityof occurrenceof impact,and the acceptable
damage. Since these tradeoffsare outsidethe scope of this report,only
parametricconsiderationscan be addressed.(028)
Damage Containmentand ControlTechniques
Certaintime-criticalhazardoussituationsmay remain,even though every
effort has been made in the mission planning,designand operationalaspect to
minimizeor eliminatetheir causes. Some of these situationsare meteoroid
penetrationand/or damagecaused by meteoroidhits, resultingin potential
decompression,fire, explosionand major damage to the Space Stationmodules,
systemsand/or subsystems. These situations,which can be catastrophic,may
not allow time for the crew to take deliberatecorrectiveaction. Therefore,
the emphasismust be on designingthe Space Stationto limit and contain the
damage. Survivingcrew membersmust be providedwith the means and the margin
of time to escape to a designatedsafe area withinthe Space Station from
which they may evaluatethe situationand make rationalunhurrieddecisions.
(028)
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This safe area, or Safe Haven,may consistof certaindesignatedmodules
or an isolatablepart of the Space Station,which providesthe required
redundancyin criticalsystems,i.e., stationattitudecontrol,power,
comm.unications,life support systems,etc. In addition,redundancyof IVA/EVA
equlpmentand repairtools and kits must be availablein this safe area(s)to
perfom the requireddamage repairsor if the damage is too extensive,to
facilitatethe survivalof the crew for 21 days and subsequentrescueby theShuttleOrbiter.
Hazard Description
As stated earlierthe main damagefrom meteoroidsarises from the
secondarymaterialthrown out by the impact. Particlesthat do not penetrate
cause spallationof the interiorwall. Penetratingmeteoroids1 centimeterin
diameterwill perforatethe hull with the saraeeffectas a hand grenade,
spewingapproximately5 cubic centimetersof molten particlesinto the
pressurizedarea at velocitiesof 2000 fps or more. Resultantdamage to
electronicequipmentwould be irreparable,fluid lines would break,and
crewmenwould be injured. However,as shown in Figure8-12, the probability
of impactby this size meteoroidis very remote. The main damagecontrol
techniqueshouldbe aimed at reducingthe damage by meteoroidsby using
shieldsand confiningpotentialdamage to one compartment. Currentstructural
conceptsutilizeminimum-gaugematerial in the externalmeteoroidprotection
bumper. The use of doublewalls (e.g.,in the fom of honeycombmaterial)in
intercompartmentwalls and floorsmay be advantageousin reducingthe
probabilityof penetrationof a secondwall, howeverthe particleslarge
enough to pose a threat to thesewould practicallydestroythe module/
compartmentthey penetrate.(028)
Time-criticaldecompressionwill resultas a by-productof severe
meteoroidimpactor other structuraldamage to the spacecrafthull, as
discussedin the beginningof this Section in referenceto Figure 8-2, as well
as in Section6, Loss of Pressurization.As shown in Figure 8-13, a
compartmentof 2500 cubic feet will take approximately4 minutesto decompress
from 7 psia to a criticallevel with a 2-inch diameterhole, the time period
when bends could be a problem. Damage containmenttechniquescall for
alternativehabitablecompartmentswithin easy accessof all unsuitedcrewmen,
which can be quicklyoccupiedand isolatedby pressure-tighthatches. These
hatchesmay normallybe left open, and full controlsof criticalelectrical
and mechanicaloperationsin designatedareas must be providedfor in each of
the Safe Haven areas.
Collisionwith man-madespace debris (partsof spacecraftor boosters
and fragmentsfrom rocketand missile explosionsstill in orbit) will bediscussedin Section9.
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Strategies
Strategiesto minimize the hazardsto the SpaceStation posed by
meteoroidsmust address basic parameters,such as;
o Mission Planning
- OrbitalAltitudes
o Configuration
- Modules
- Solar Arrays
- Radiators
o ProtectiveDesign Considerations
- Doublewall concept (meteoroidbumper)
- Shroudsaround serviceand maintenancefacilities
- Provisionsto minimizeand isolatedamage in case of meteoroid hit
o Crew Protection
Safe Haven concept
Module isolation
Escape routeswithin Space station
- Interiorpartitions,hatches,etc.
- EVA suits,escape balls (for crew rescuecontingency)oxygen
masks/equipment
o OperationalProcedures
- Limitationon number of crew members in any one module
- Safetyprovisionsfor IVA, EVA activities
- Safety provisionsfor escape and rescue
o Maintenanceand Repair Considerations
- Accessibilityto main pressureshellfrom the insideof modules to
facilitaterepair of meteoroidpenetrations
- Emergencyrepairkits, patches
- Availabilityof ORU's (OrbitalReplacementUnits)
o Crew Training
- Emergencysituations
- Repairof damages
o SystemsRedundancy
- To accommodateemergencysituations
- To facilitatedamage repairwhile maintainingstationintegrityand
operationalmode
Numerousstudies have been conductedbased on meteoroidenvironment
models and meteoroiddamage assessments. Tilemeteoroidbumperexperimentson
Explorer46 furnishedvaluabledata regardingmeteoroidshieldingand the
evaluationof subsequenttest data confimed the advantagesof meteoroid
bumpersand doublewall construction.
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T_e strategyoptions regardingmeteoroidpenetrationcan be summarized
as follows:
o Environmentalshield shall provideprotectionfor a probabilityof
0.9 of no micrometeoroidpenetrationof space stationmodules for
ten years. (021)
o Implementdesign,operationaland proceduralfeaturesto minimize
and isolatedamages
o Providea meteoroidbumperor protectionsystemwhich will assure
an acceptablylow probabilityof meteoroidpenetrationover the
life of the Space Station.
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9. DEBRIS
THREAT DEFINITIOI|
The occurrenceof a collisionbetweenman-madeobjectsin orbit will be
a catastrophicevent for the objectsdirectlyinvolvedin the collision,and
may create hazardsto other spacecraftas well. Tne speed at which objects
will collidewill be on the order of the orbital speed--roughly8 km/s for
low-Earthorbit (LEO)--makingit likelythat the impactwill producea very
large number of new debrisparticles,most of them too small to be seen with
ground-baseddetectors,and leadingto an enhancementof the probabilitythat
collisionswith other spacecraftwill occur. If one of the collidingobjects
is a functioningspacecraft,the resultingdamage,even from the smaller,
untrackableobjects,might impair,if not terminate,its operational
capability. Hence on-orbitcollisionswill adverselyaffect future space
operationsby causingan increasedlikelihoodof additionalcollisions
occurringand by presentinga failuremechanismfor operatingspacecraftwhicll
will have to be factoredinto the cost of operation.(282)
The major sourceof the nearly5000 objectscurrentlyobservedorbiting
the Earth is from rocketexplosions. These explosionshave almost certainly
producedan even larger unobservedpopulation. If the current trend
continues,collisionsbetweenorbitingfragmentsand other spaceobjectscould
be frequent. By the year 2000, satellitefragmentationby hypervelocity
collisionscould becomethe major source of Earth-orbitingobjects,resulting
in a self-propagatingdebrisbelt. The flux within this belt could exceed the
meteoroidflux, affectingfuture spacecraftdesign. (283)
In space, stray orbitalobjectscan be dangerous. The enormousspeeds
of orbitingbodiesmake a collisionwith even the tiniestof them being
potentiallycatastrophic. Accordingto NASA astrophysicistDonaldKessler,at
Houston'sJohnsonSpace Center,the impact velocitybetween2 orbitingobjects
in the vicinityof earthwould average22,000miles per hour. If each
weightedjust 1 pound, their collisioncould releaseas much energy as the
detonationof 20 pounds of TNT. (179)
NORAD radarscan track objectsas small as baseballs,but fragments
smal]erthan gardenpeas can damagean artificalsatellite, l'nenumberof
potentiallydestructiveobjectsis estimatedat 15,000or more.
The most likely regionfor spacecollisionsis 460 nauticalmiles above
the equator,which objects in earth orbitmust cross twice on each trip
around. (179)
Debris consistsof spent spacecraft,spent rocketstages,separation
devices,shrouds,clamps,etc. and productsof deliberateor accidental
explosions. Becauseof the number of particlesthey produce,the latter
accountsfor the majorityof space debris. There are three main areas of
concern: the trackedpopulationof debris objects,the untrackedpopulation,
and the future population.
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The Tracked Population
At present,the North AmericanAerospaceDefenseCommand (NORAD)in
Coloradois trackingmore than 5,000 objectsin orbit. Most are larger than
10 cm in diameter. Over the last ten years this populationhas grown at a
rate of 10 percentper year. The greatestconcentrationof objects is at
altitudesbetween500 and 1,100 km, the maximum being at 850 km. The
probabilityof collisionfor the ShuttleOrbiterwith one of these objects has
been calculatedas only 4 x 10-6 for a typicalseven day flight. Large
space stationsand platfoms of the future,however,will be in increasing
danger from space debris unless its proliferationis halted.
The UntrackedPopulation
These are mainly the smallerparticleswhich are known to exist,
especiallythose resultingfrom explosions. Terrestrialtests in which
particledistributionsfrom explosionshave been studiedshow that it is
reasonableto infer the presenceof some 10,000 small particlesfor every
low-intensityexplosionand up to 10 million for high-intensityevents.
The Future Population
If past trendscontinue,the numberof trackedobjectsin space is
predictedto increaseby a factorof two to eight (dependingon the rate of
futureexplosions)within the next 20 years. In addition,there is the
possibilityof collisionsbetweenparticlesto produceadditionalfragments.(199)
Figure 9-1 illustratesthe hazardlevels presentedby debriscurrently
being tracked. On the horizontalaxis is a measurementin sq. m. of tile
surface area exposed to possiblecollision(risingfrom small unmanned
payloadson the left to the large space structuresproposedfor the 1990'son
the right,with 10,000sq. m. and more surfacearea). The verticalaxis shows
the expectedtime in years betweencollisions;the slopinglines are numbered
to indicatethe risksat differentorbita]altitudes.(199)
Figure 9-2 plots the observedobject density vs. altitude. The peak
density levelsare from 600 to 1100 km altitudeand again in the 1500 km
altitude region. It should be noted, however,that the objectsare assumed to
be unifomly distributedin sphericalshellswithout regardto inclination
angle effects. (199)
D. J. Kesslerof NASA, JSC addressedthe projectedenvironmentand
plottedthe 1995 predicteddebris in his AIAA paper 80-0855R (283),whicllis
coveredin the followingunder the heading"Discussion". Referenceis
specificallymade to Figure 9-7 thereinand the relateddiscussionportion.
Another figurewas presentedby D. J. Kesslerat the JSC debrisworkshopin
November 1983,which shows the 1995 predicteddebris for differentaltitudes.
This figureis covered in Section 8.0, under Figure 8-7 (281) togetherwith a
selectedtext portion.
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l'nisclutteringof space with debris raisesissuesof collision- hazard
assessment,controltechniques,and spacecraftsurvivability.
CollisionProbabilityin Low and GeosynchronousOrbits
The probabilityof col]isionbetweena given spacecraftand another
object in orbit is a complicatedfunctionof the orbitalparameters,relative
positionand velocity,projectedareas of the spacecraftand time. The
complexityresultsprimarilybecauseof the time-varyingencountergeometry
caused by Earth'soblateness,air drag, and solar-lunarperturbations. An
approximateexpressionfor the probabilityof collisionbased on the
assumptionof uniformdistributionof objects in a specifiedregionof space
takes this fore: p(col)=pAvAt where p=density,A=targetsatelliteprojected
area, v=target-satelliterelativevelocity,and At=timeinterval.
Applyingthis approachgives the followinglO00-day-missioncollision
hazard for representativespacecraftof 10- and 50-m radius in low Earth
orbit. The 1980 rangeof values representsthe uncertaintyin the densityof
the debrisobjects. The multiplyingfactor for the 1985 and 1995 periods
reflectsthe greaternumbersof objectsexpected. (138)
1980 1985 1995
S/c size (4000obj) (10,000obj) (30,000obj)
10-m 1.5 x 10-3 2.5a 7.3a
radius to 3 x 10-3
50-m 4 x 10-2 2.5a 7.3a
radius to 8 x 10-2
a - multiplyingfactor for 1980 results.
Table 9-1. lO00-DayMissionCollisionHazard (138)
The probabilityof collisionby 1995 for a 50-m radius spacecraftin a
lO00-daycircular-orbit,low-altitude(500-1500-km)mission could be on the
order of 50 percent. This would clearlybe unacceptable. (138)
Figure 9-3 illustratesthe current lO00-daygeosynchronous-orbit
probabilityof collisionfor a representativesmall spacecraftbased on the
sampleof 133 trackedobjects. The collisionhazardis severalordersof
magnitudesmallerthan at low altitudeprimarilybecauseof much lower
encountervelocities(50 m/sec vs. 7 km/sec,typically). It may not be
negligible,however,particularlyfor largerspacecraftwith respectto small
objects (e.g.,explosionfragmentsof less than a squaremeter in cross
section). The populationof the latter,and hence the collisionhazard,may
be as much as an order of magnitudegreater. (138)
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DISCUSSION
General
Numerous literature sources cover the aspects of Orbitdl Debris, its
sources, density in relation to orbital altitude and inclination, and the
associated hazards to space vehicles. Whereas different methods have been used
to predict the orbital debris environment model, resulting in slightly varying
data, graphs and tabular values, the general parameters are in agreement and the
conclusions reached are basically the same.
In order to preserve the continuity in this discussion and agreement
between the text and the incorporated figures and tables the following excerpts
under the heading "DISCUSSION"were taken from the two source documents as
fol 1ows:
o Source Document by D. J. Kessler, NASAJSC, Houston, Texas (283)
o Source Document by R. C. Reynolds, N. H. Fisher, and E. E. Rice,
Battelle'sColumbusLaboratories,Colur,_bus,Ohio (282)
Source Documentby D. J. Kessler,
NASA JohnsonSpace Center, Houston,Texas (283)
AIAA 80-0855R,Sourcesof OrbitalDebris and the ProjectedEnvironmentfor
FutureSpacecraft,by D. J. Kessler
Presentedas Paper 80-0855at the A.I.A.A.InternationalMeeting
TechnicalDisplay "GlobalTechnology2000,"Baltimore,Md., May 6-8, 1980;
submittedJuly 10, 1980;revisionreceivedOct, 24, 1980. This paper is
declareda work of the U.S. Governmentand thereforeis in the public
domain.
Reprintedfrom JOURNAL OF SPACECRAFTAND ROCKETSVolume 18, Number 4,
July-August1981, Page 357. This paper is declareda _vorkof the U.S.
Governmentand thereforeis in the public domain. (283)
Background
The hazardsfrom orbitaldebriswere firstexaminedin 1966 for the Apollo
program,and in 1970 for Skylaband possiblefuture programs. (381)The
probabilitiesat that time were sufficientlylow enough that no actionwas
taken,althoughthe largercollisionprobabilitiesfor structures100 m in
diameterdid produce some concern. Later, Brookset.al. (382) demonstratedthat
the observedpopulationwas increasingin number,and that an even larger number
of untrackedobjects should be expectedfrom the explosionsthat ilaveoccurred
in space. In 1978,Kesslerand Cour-Palais(383)predictedthat within the next
10 to 20 years, the space objectpopulationcould become"self-regenerative"
throughfragmentsgeneratedby collisionsbetweensatellitefragmentsand old
payloadsand rocketmotors. At that time, the orbitingdebrispopulationwould
constitutea larger hazardthan the naturalmeteoroidhazard for certaintypes
of missions.
In order to minimizethis hazard,it is importantto understandorbital
debris and its self-regenerativequality,with the goal of either protecting
againstor controllingthe futureenvironment. This discussionwill update the
environmentas it is known today, identifyits sources,and presentdata pre-
dictinga currentuntrackedpopulation. A futureenvironmentwill be predicted.
The damage to future spacecraftfrom the environmentand the sensitivityof the
environmentto controlsare identifiedas areas of futurework. (283)
145
ObservedPopulation
As of December31, 1979, 11,665objects had been offically"launched"
into space. (384)Of these,4549 were still in orbit. Another 170 objects
had been detectedby NORAD but were stillawaitingofficialstatus. (385)The
probabilityof a particularspacecraftcollidingwith any of these 4719
orbitingobjectsis a functionof that spacecraft'sorbitalpositionand
velocity. However,for most types of orbits,the probabilityis mainly
(withina factorof 2) a functionof spacecraftaltitude--themajor exception
being for spacecraftin orbitsof inclinationsbetween100 and 130 deg where
the probabilitycan be severaltimes the averagefor that altitude. (382)
Average probabilitieswere calculatedfrom a 4 percent random sampleof
satellitesin the October 78 catalogue. (387) A 4 percent samplewas chosen
becauseit was smallenough to both allow for the necessarycomputer
requirementsand the identificationof sourcesof each object,yet large
enough,at most altitudes,to be statisticallysignificant. However,the
numberof objectsat altitudesless than 450 km was sufficientlylow enough
that the samplewas graduallyincreasedwith decreasingaltitudes. All
objects below 200 km were used. The resultingflux on 1-mL cross-sectional
area is shown in Figure 9-4. The averagecollisionvelocitywas found to be
10 km/s. Note that a hypotheticalspace stationhaving a lO0-m diameterand
500-kmaltitudewould experiencea collisionrate of about O.O05/yr. Allowing
for populationgrowth and an orbital lifetimeof 10 years, the probabilityof
collisionwould approach0.1. Thus, for structuresof this size and larger
and altitudesbetween400 km and 2000 km, collisionprobabilitieswith the
observedpopulationare high. Smallerstructuresat loweraltitudeshave
significantlyless of a collisionprobabilitywith the observedpopulation.(283)
Sourcesof the ObservedPopulation
The sourceof each satelliteused in the 4 percent randomsamplewas
researchedusing the TRW Space Log (390)and the SatelliteSituationReport
(391). The resultof this researchis shown in Table 9-2. Note that 95
percent of the trackedpopulationis nonfunctioningand hence orbitaldebris.
The largest singlesourceof this debris is from explosion,with most coming
from 11 accidentalU.S. explosions. Some of these rocketswere presumably
dead in space for as long as 3 years beforeexploding. An engineeringproblem
obviously existedwithin some of these rockets,which allows the proper
functioningof the rocket,but causes the spent stage to becomea "timebomb"
in space. Once such problemsare identified,engineeringfixeswould do more
than any other single action toward limitingthe observedpopulation. Since
1972, the only U.S. explosionshave come from the Delta rockets. Steps have
recentlybeen taken to stop these explosions.
The relativelysmall numberof observedfragmentsgeneratedby the eight
USSR antisatellitetests may be misleading. High-intensityexplosionsproduce
a very large numberof small,unobservablefragments(392). Thus, their
contributionto the total debrispicturecould be much larger.
Since all explosionsproducea certain numberof small fragments,one
would expect an orbitingpopulationtoo small to be detectedby ground radar.
Recent test resultsand analysisindicatethat this populationmay be larger
than the observedpopulation. (283)
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UnobservedPopulation
In general,NORAD'soperationalsystemdoes not track objects smaller
than about lOcm at 1000 km, or 4 cm at 400 km. Duringa specialtest
conductedby NORAD in 1978, this sensitivitywas increasedslightly. The
resultsof the test revealedan unobservedpopulationthat was between 7
percentand 14 percentof the observedpopulation, However,a much larger
percentageof previouslyunobservedobjectswas found below 400 km. Most of
these objectshad sizes smallerthan 4 cm. Due to atmosphericdrag, orbital
lifetimesfor objectsthis low and small are very short--so,heas short as a
few hours. The obvious sourceof these objectsis from higheraltitudeswhere
they were too small to be observedeither by this test or the operational
system. A similartest in 1976 producedsimilarresults. (393) Thus, a
sufficientreservoirof small,untrackableobjectsat a higheraltitudemust
exist to producea continuousflow of objects "rainingdown" throughlower
altitudesbecauseof atmosphericdrag. The size of this reservoircould be
determinedfrom the turnoverrate at lower altitudes,if the altitudeof the
reservoirwere known. For example,the time an object in circularorbit
spendsat variousaltitudesas it descendsis inverselyproportionalto the
atmosphericdensityat that altitude. Thus a reservoirabout 450 km would
requirethe populationat 450 km to be a factorof 2 larger than the
populationat 400 km. A reservoirabove 600 km requiresa populationat 600
km that is 40 times the populationat 400 km. Of course, the reservoiris
actuallydistributedin altitudeand a more complexapproachis requiredto
obtain the unobservedpopulationnumber. Such an approachrequiresdeveloping
a time-dependentmodel that describesthe explosionfragments. The model is
then refinedby testing it againstthe NORAD test and other observations.
Such a model is currentlybeing developed.
A quicker,though less accurate,techniqueto determinepart of the
unobservedpopulationis to examinethe size distributionas a functionof
altitude. If the source size distributionis independentof altitude,then
the normalizeddistributionsobservedat each altitudeshould be identical,
except for the effectsof atmosphericdrag at lower altitudes. Drag changes
the shape of the size distribution,with smallerobjects removedmore rapidly.
As noted in Table 9-2 the primary sourceof fragmentsis the
low-intensityexplosionsof U.S. rockets,primarilythe 2nd stage of the
Delta. If these explosionswere simulatedon the ground,they would provide
significantinsightinto the actualdistributionof orbitingdebris. However,
tileonly similardata availableare from the low-intensityground explosionof
an Atlas missile,which produced1337 fragments. (392) These data were
tested for consistencyto representthe sourcesize distribution. (283)
The size distributionof fragmentsfrom the Atlas missile test was
comparedwith the orbitingsize distributionof fragments. Between600 and
700kin,the two distributions(nomalized to the numberof largerobjects in
each sample)were very mucllalike for sizes larger than 20 cm. Below this
size, the numberof objects producedfrom the Atlas explosionbeginsto exceed
the number of objectsobserved. Between1000 and 1100 kin,the two normalized
distributionswere alike for sizes larger than 40 cm, againwith the Atlas
data exceedingthe number of smallerobjectsobserved. If atmosphericdrag
were responsiblefor removinga significantnumber of observedobjectsat
these altitudes,then the minimum size in which the Atlas data fit the
observedfragmentpopulationshould decreasewith altitude. The observed
increasein the minimum size is consistentwith the loss in abilityof the
NORAD radarsto detect objectsat higheraltitudes.
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TABLE9-2 SOURCESOF IN-ORBIT POPULATIONTRACKED
BY NORAD
PERCENTAGEOF TRACKED
SPACEOBJECT POPULATIONIN ORBIT % NOTES
Operational Payloads 5 Distributions are roughly equallydivided between USSRand U.S.
Nonoperational payloads 12
Mission related(rocket
bodies,shrouds,etc.) 18
Explosionfragments 54 6 Delta Stages 20%
3 Agenas 12% U.S. 42%
2 Other I0%
8 USSR satellitetests 12%
To be determinedorigin II While a certainfractionof these
may prove to be nonexistens,most
are probablyexplosionfragments.
Many will reenterbefore they become
part of the officialcatalogue.
Some are in geosynchronousorbit,
possiblerefoundobjectswhose
orbitsare no longermaintained.
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In the altituderange between300 and 450 km, objectsas small as 4 cm
are detected;however,the size distributionis controlledby atmospheric
drag. The rate in which objectsdrag throughthis region is inversely
proportionalto the particlediameter,assuminga constantmass density.
Thus, the Atlas size distributionwas weightedby the fragmentdiameter,
normalized,and comparedto the normalizedsize distributionof fragmentsin
this altitude range. The two distributionswere verymuch alike, implying
that most of the 4-cm fragmentsmay be detectedat this altitude.
Thus, to assume that the Atlas missile data representthe sourcesize
distributionof fragmentsin space to 4 cm is consistentwith the
observations. Figure 9-5 comparesthe observeddebris flux in the 600-1100km
regionwith the correcteddebris flux using the Atlas missiledata. Note that
the orbitaldebris flux is alreadymuch greaterthan the flux of comparable
size meteoroids. Note also that the correctedflux to 4 cm is about a factor
of 3 larger than tileobservedflux. Since the NORAD radarsapparentlycannot
consistentlydetectobjects smallerthan 4 cm at any altitude,any attempt to
estimatetheir number becomes highlyuncertain. The Atlas data above
indicatesthat a significantnumberof these particlesexist; however,other
sources,such as high-intensityexplosionsor collisionalfragmentationcould
producea much largernumber.
From this analysis,it is obviousthat the flux shown in Figure 9-4
resultsfrom smallerobjectsat lower altitudes,while these same size
fragmentsgo undetectedat higheraltitudes. The numberof these fragments
was estimatedby assumingthat the Atlas missile data representthe true size
distributionof fragmentsto 4 cm. The ratioof the 4-cm flux to the observed
flux was then determinedfor variousaltitudebands by usi_igthe techniques
previouslydiscussedand illustratedin Figure9-5. This ratiowas then
plottedas a functionof altitude,curve-fittedto removestatistical
fluctuations,then multipliedby the fluxes given in Figure 9-4. The results
are shown in Figure 9-6. Note that the unobservedpopulationincreasesover
the observedpopulationwith increasingaltitudes,becominga factorof 10
above the observedpopulationat 3000 km. (283)
ProjectedEnvironment
Whereas the currentmajor sourceof orbital debrisis from explosion
fragments,tllefuturemajor sourcewill probablybe fragmentationthrough
collisions. Using the correcteddistributionshown in Figure 9-6 and the
associateddistributionsof size, velocity,and latitudedependence,the
probabilitytilatany two objectswill collidewas calculatedin an identical
manneras the 1976 observedpopulation. (396) The probabilityobtainedwas
O.06/yr,or 1 collisionevery 17 years. This comparesto O.013/yrobtained in
1976, with the increasesresultingfrom adding the unobservedpopulation
(factorof 3) and the 1978 increasesin number and area (factorof 1.5).
Within the next 20 years, if currenttrends continue,the number of objects in
space will easily double,possiblyquadruple. Since the probabilitythat any
two objectswill collide is proportionalto the square of the numberof
objects,the collisionfrequencyby 1998would be betweenO.24/yrand l/yr.
This new potentialsourceof fragmentsis importantbecauseof the
larger number of fragmentsthat are generatedin typical hypervelocity
collisions. Based on the current "correctedto 4 cm" population,a typical
collisionwould involvea fragmentbetween4 and 40 cm in diametercolliding
at 10 km/s with a payloador rocket body of approximately3-4 m in diameter,
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producingan averageof 300 kg of ejectedmass. Such a c_llisionwould
produce 1.4 x 104 particleslarger than 1 cm and 3.5 x 10u particles
largerthan 1 mm3. Figure 9-7 predictsa futuredebris flux where the
currentpopulationis increasedby a factorof 2.5, and 3 collisionshave
occured. If the past trend of the satellitepopulationincreasingat the rate
of between300 and 500 objectsper year (396)continues,this could be
representative of approximately the year 1995. Note that collision products
would dominate the projected environment for sizes smaller than 4 cm, causing
the flux from orbital debris to exceed the meteoroid flux over most sizes of
interest for both manned and unmannedactivities in the 600 to llO0-km region
of space. (283)
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Conclusions
If currenttrends continue,the orbitaldebris populationwill become
self-regenerativethroughcollisions. The resultingenvironmentalhazardof
other spacecraftmay exceedthe hazardfrom the naturalmeteoroidenvironment,
dependingon the type of spacecraftand its positionin space. Althoughthe
hazardmay be reducedby the additionof shieldingto some spacecraft,control
of the environmentmay be necessaryfor others. Controltechniquesare known,
althoughtheir necessityand relativeeffectivenessare not well understood.
(283)
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This paper representsa refinedmethod, a more sophisiticatedapproach
to the calculationsof Space Debris hazardlevels. The followingexcerpts,
figuresand tables are quoted from the above reference. (282)
{4an-madedebris in orbit representsa potentiallyseriousthreat to
satellitesresidingin low-Earthorbit, a threatwhich may become sufficiently
large to serve as an operatonalconstraint. Previouswork has focusedon
presentingthe hazardas a functionof altitude. In this paper,a path
integralformulationfor calculatinghazardlevels is presented. This
formulationenablesspecificspacecraftorbitsand debrisdepositedin
specificorbits to be consideredin determininghazard levels. Two cases are
presented:for the Space Shuttle in 160 nm (300 kin)orbit and for spacecraft
in sun-synchronousorbit. The previouswork is found to be in good agreement
with the path integralresults. The sensitivityof the llazardto spacecraft
orbital inclinationis presentedin tabularform. (282)
In this paper, a model is presentedwhich can be used to calculate
collisionhazardlevels based on a knowledgeof the set of orbitalparameters
for a debris population. The model is similarto the model first presentedby
Kessler and Cour-Palais(383) and discussedfurtherin a seriesof papers by
Kessler. A conceptualdifferencefrol_the Kesslermodel is tileuse of path
integralformulationfor calculatingcollisionprobabilities;a significant
sophisticationin this model involvesthe inclusionof the debris population
velocitydistributionfunctionin the probabilitycalculations. These
featuresallow collisionhazard levelsto be calculatedfor specificorbital
planes and for debris dePositedinto specificorbitalplanes,the latteran
importantcapabilityfor analyzingthe hazard increaseintroducedby a
specificdebris depositionevent.
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The discussionis divided into two parts. The first part is an
assessmentof the current hazardlevels,with a discussionof the problems
associatedwith controllingfuture hazardlevels, lllehazardmodel used in
this part of the discussionemploysthe traditionalapproachof using particle
densityas a functionof altitude. In the secondpart, a path integral
formulationfor calculatingcollisionprobabilitiesis introduced. This
formulationtakes into accountthe velocitydistributionof the debris
populationas a functionof positionand is suitablefor developingmodels for
hazardminimizationand for calculatingthe contributionto the hazardlevel
introducedby the depositionof debris in specificorbits. A comparisonof
resultsof the two formulationsverifiestheir essentialcompatability. (282)
Debris Hazard for the ShuttleOrbiter
The Orbiterwill nominallyoperatein a circularorbit with an altitude
of approximately300 kin. Because it is so much larger than the objects
comprisingthe debrispopulation,the Orbiter's_;leancross-sectionalarea can
be used to define the collisioncross section. The cross-sectionalarea
nose-on is approximately50 m2, while the area in the pldne_ofthe wings is
approxir,lately500 m . A mean cross-sectionalarea of 250 mZ was used in
performingthe collisioncalculations. As statedearlier,the assumed
independenceof debris size and the use of a mean cross-sectionalarea for
collisioncross sectionserveto introducesome uncertaintyinto the
calculations.
Given the orbitalaltitudeand collisioncross section,the collision
hazardas a functionof orbit inclinationcan be computed. The resultsare
presentedin Table 9-3 in the form of time betweencollisions. The debris
populationsare 1) the objectscontainedin the October,1976 Satellite
SituationReport ("PresentPopulation")2) the October,1976 population
correctedfor unobservedparticles,using Kessler'scorrectionfactors (283)
and 3) the October,1976 population,correctedfor unobservedparticlesand
augmentedby a 5 percentannualgrowth rate for 20 years. The corresponding
quantitiesfor the latitude-averagedebris values,assuminga relativespeed
of 7 kin/s,are also shown.
The large values for the times betweencollisionscontainedin Table 9-3
indicatethat man-madedebrisof size 4 cm and largerwill not presenta
significanthazardto the ShuttleOrbiter. In fact, the times are large
comparedto tiraesfor collisionsinvolvingthe Orbiterwith a meteoroidof
sufficientmass to severelydamage a TPS tile, as shown in Table 9-4. These
times are basedon the meteoroidpopulationmodel of Cour-Palais. (394) The
sensitivityof the LEO environmentto man-madedebrisdepositionis clearly
illustratedby comparingthe meteoroidpopulationparticledensitieswith
fragmentproducingoperations,such as antisatellitetests, which migh occur
on orbit. At any time there are about 100 kg of meteoroidmaterialof mass
greaterthan 0.01 g in the volumeof space up to 4000 km altitude. Therefore,
a single incidentwhich explosivelyfragmented100 kg of materialinto the
same mass distributionas displayedby the meteoroidswould, if these
fragmentswere disperseduniformlyup to 4000 km altitude,match the meteoroid
debrislevels.
The Problemof preferentialdepositionof debris into the Orbiter
environment,as would occur if an explosionoccurredon a stage still in the
low-Earthparkingorbit or if debriswas routinelydepositedduringnormal
Shuttleoperations,can also be examinedusing the path integralformulation.
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TABLE9-3 TIMES BETWEENCOLLISIONS(YRS) BETWEENSHUTTLE
ORBITERANDMAN-MADEDEBRIS (ALTITUDE300 KM)
Present popul ati on Corrected
Shuttle Orbit Present Population of tracked particles population with
inclination deg. of tracked particles corrected for annual growth
unobserved particles for 20 years
to size 4 cm
28.5 a 2.7 x 104 1.4 x 104 4.6 x 103
56 2.0 x 104 1.0 x 104 3.3 x 103
82 1.6 x 104 8.0 x 103 2.7 x 103
90 1.5 x 104 7.5 x 103 2.5 x 103
98 1.4 x 104 7.0 x 103 2.3 x 103
Lati rude averagedb
debris properties 2.5 x 104 1.3 x 104 4.3 x 103
apath integral formulation bResults based on analysis equivalent
to those used in Ref. 1
TABLE9-4 TIME BETWEENCOLLISIONS(YRS) BETWEENSHUTTLE
ANDA MEREOROIDOF MASSGREATERTHANA GIVEN
MINIMUMMASS(283)
Hinimum meteoroi d Times between
mass g collisions, yr.
10 350,000
1 25,000
0.I 1,800
O.Ol 130
Time between collisions between tile Shuttle and a
meteoroid of mass greater than a given minimum mass
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One of the conslusionsof Reynoldsand Fischer (395)was that observationsof
fragmentsresultingfrom explosionsof Delta secondstageswere consistent
with the productionof about 500 debrisfragments. If such an explosion
occurredat the Shuttleparkingorbit altitude,the debrisdepositedfrom a
28.5-degorbit would lead to a time betweencollisionsof about 600 years.
This resultassumesthe particleshave relaxedto havinga random distribution
in right ascensionof ascendingnode and in argumentof perigee. While the
motionsare correlated,the hazard level is higher. The relaxationtime for
the transitionof correlatedto uncorrelatedmotion is on the order of a
year. A model to calculatecollisionprobabilitieswhile correlatedmotion
exists is being developed. This collisiontime is based upon a fixed increase
in deris and does not considerdebris decay. (282)
Debris Hazardas a Functionof Altitude
The reductionto simplealtitudedependencefrom distributionsdefined
on the two-dimensionalgrid is quite simple.
The significanceof debrisdensitiesis best appreciatedby translating
them into collisionfrequencies.
Since the data contributingto Figures9-8 and 9-9 come only from
objectsbeing trackedby NORAD, a correctionshould be made for objectsnot
being tracked,most of which are those too small to be seen by NORAD
detectors. The minimum size of an objectwhich is detectableby NORAD is 4 cm
at lowestaltitudesand increaseswith altitude. (283) Since this size is
much larger than that requiredto cause extensivedamage in collisionwith a
spacecraft,there is a potentialsegmentof the debrispopulationwhich
representsa hazard but which cannot be seen.
The contributionof unobserveddebristo the collisionhazard represents
the major uncertaintyin currentcollisionhazard assessments. Kessler5 has
proposeda correctionfactorto accountfor this debris. If this correction
is included,tiletimes betweencollisionshown in Figure 9-9 are reducedto
those shown in Figure 9-10. Clearly,future programswill introduce
systems/structureslarge enough to collidefrequentlywith man-made debris,a
conclusionwhich may indicatethere will be severeconstraintson the use of
LEO space in the future.
The resultsshown in Figure 9-9 allow an estimationof the frequencyof
debris-debriscollisionsfor the currenttrackedpopulation. Acceptinga mean
collisioncross sectionof 5 m2 for these objects,the time between
collisionsas experiencedby a given objectwill be about 200,000years. The
mean time betweencollisionsinvolvingany two objectswill be this time
dividedby the number of objects in the population,which is about 5000.
Thereforethe expected rate of collisionsbetweenobjectsin LEO large enough
to be trackedis about one collisionevery 50-100years if the present
populationlevel is maintained. (282)
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Debris Hazard for Sun-SynchronousPayloads
A greaterdebris hazardmight be expectedfor sun-synchronous pacecraft
than for the Shuttlebecauselifetimeand stationkeepingrequirementsfor such
payloadsfavor placementat higheraltitude,in the range of from 600 to 1200
km, where debris densitiesare largest. However,the increasein debris
density,as shown in Figure 9-8 is compensatedfor by the characteristically
smallersize of sun-synchronous pacecraft,as shown in Figure 9-9. The net
effect is that the hazardlevel to sun-synchronous pacecraft,at least of the
type presentlyin use, is nearlythe same as for the Orbiter.
Because the sun-synchronouspayloadsmust residein retrogradeorbits,
the speed of the spacecraftrelativeto the debris should be largerthan 7
km/s, the speed assumedin generatingFigures9-9 and 9-10. Table 9-5
presentsa set of collisiontimes for tileOctober,1976 populationof tracked
debris, smoothedover latitudeand assumingV=7 km/s, and for the spacecraft
in a sun-synchronousorbit using a path integralformulationwith the same
debrispopulationsused to generateTable 9-3. A collisioncross sectionof 5
m2 was used.
The elevationof the hazardlevel from debris augmentationby explosion
of a Delta secondstage in sun-synchronousorbit is less pronouncedfor
sun-synchronous pacecraftthan it was for the Orbiter _ 300 km becausethe
debris density is already so much higherat the sun-synchronousorbit
altitudes. If the explosionproduced500 particles,the time between
collisionsinvolvingone of these particlesand a sun-synchronous pacecraft
would be about 50,000years. (282)
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Conclusi ons
Tile problem of man-madedebris on orbit has a varied character,
dependingon the size of tileobjectson orbit,on the operatingaltitude,and
on the length of time it remainson orbit. The debrispopulationwill
certainlybe sufficientlylarge enough that collisionswill occur on some of
the larger structuresbeing consideredfor use in future programs. The effect
of such collisionson the operationof the spacecraft,the implicationswhich
the depositionof the resultantdebris has on the evolutionof the debris
population,and its effect on spaceoperationsmust be understoodbefore such
eventsbegin to occur. If not, it is conceivablethat d debris population
will be createdwhich will make the near-Earthenvironmentunusablefor any
extensivespace program. If this occurs there will be very little that can be
done except to wait for atmosphericdrag to clean out the lower-altitude
regions.
The use of a path integralfomalism for the calculationof collision
hazard levelsallowsmore infomation on the propertiesof the debris
populationto be used than can be accommodatedwith a latitude-averaged
model. It is well suited to analyzingthe effectof debris augmentationfrom
a specificevent. Collisiontimes calculatedwith the path integralfomalism
are generallyshorter (Table9-3, indicatinga collisionis more likely to
occur than is shown by an analysisusing a smoothedpopulationwith relative
velocity7 km/s).
The hazard presentedto spacecraftas large as the Space Shuttleit seen
to be small,as long as they operateat low altitude. Much smallerspacecraft
can operatewith littledanger even in the regionsof maximumdebris density,
as can be seen for the sun-synchronous pacecraft. These conclusionswould
remain valid even if a significant(greaterthan a factorof 10) increasein
the spatialdensitiesof debris shouldoccur.
However,for large structuresin space, such a comfortablemargin is not
available. Large astronomicalinstruments,space stations,or large vehicles
such as the SPS ElectricOrbit TransferVehiclewould have to be flown
assuminga considerablerisk that collisionwith man-madedebriswould occur.
Increasesin the populationsize in the futurewill only serve to make that
risk greater. (282)
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Figure 9-10 Expected Time Between Collisions of
Fig. 9-9 Corrected to Size 4cm for
Unobserved Objects (282)
Table 9-5 Time BetweenCollisions(yrs) BetweenSun-
SynchronousPayloadsand Man-MadeDebris (282)
Present Present
population population Corrected
Correction of tracked Present of tracked population
factor particles population particles with
Orbit for smoothed of and factor the annual
altitude, unobserved over tracked for unobserved growth rate
cm particles latitude particles particles for 20 years
350 2.5 I.8xl03 l.2xl03 4.9xl04 l.9xl04
400 2.7 5.3xl03 9.3xl04 3.4xl04 l.3xl04
450 2.9 4.8xl03 7.9xl04 2.7xl04 l.Oxl04
500 3.0 6.Ixl03 9.6x104 3.2xl04 l.2xl04
550 3.15 7.9xl03 l.3x103 4.Oxl04 l.5xl04
600 3.25 1.5xl04 2.2xl03 6.8xl04 2.6xl04
650 3.5 3.5xl04 4.8xl03 l.4xl03 5.2xl04
Time betweencollisions(C-l) (inyears) between
sun-synchronouspayloadsand man-made debris
(collisioncross-section 5 I,I2)
RECORDEDINCIDENTS
Introduction
Objectsin orbit in the vicinityof the Earth,which will be referredto
as "debris,"presenta collisionhazard to spacecraftconductingoperationsin
orbit. Tilelevel of hazardto a given spacecraftdependson its size and time
on orbit and on the number and size of debris objectsin its operating
environment.1-3 The debrismay be meteoroidspassingnear the Earth or
man-madeobjectsgeneratedduring space operations. The focus will be on
man-madedebris since it is this debriswhich presentsthe dominantand
controllablecollisionhazardto operatingspacecraft. It is imperativethat
those involvedin the use of the near-Earthenvironmentbecomeconcernedwith
this hazard,as the growthof this debrismay in the near future begin to have
a significantand adverseeffect on space operations. Even now there is
mountingevidencethat orbitingspacecrafthave experiencedcollisions.(397)
It is certain that such events will occurwith greaterfrequencyin the future
as the debris populationgrows and/orthe space activityexpands. (282)
Both the NASA and the militarynow have active investigationsinto the
hazardsof accumulatingspacedebris. The potentialthreat to tilespace
shuttle,large space platformsof the future,and smallersatellitesnow in
orbit will only get worse. (139)
Nearly 5,000 orbitingobjects,rangingin size from a few inches to
completespacecraftand rocketbodies,are cataloguedand tracked by NORAD.
More than half of those objectsare debris from explosions. Othersare
protectiveclamshellshroudsejectedfrom payloads,pieces that have torn away
from tumblingsatellites,objectsejecteddeliberately,and unknown items
suddenly"spawned"from other objects. A new reportsays that another 5,000
untracked,but still dangerous,objectsare in orbit.
More than 70 explosionsor "fragmentations"have occurredin space since
1960. Some were deliberate,including19 Russiananti-satellitetests, but
most weren't. Of these, 10 were derelictU.S. Delta rocketsecond stages,
some explodingnearly threeyears after completingtheirmissions. At least
seven explosionsof all types occurredin 1981 alone. (139)
On 2 July 1982,on the fifth day of its final test flight,STS-4, the
Space ShuttleOrbiterColumbia0V-102,flew uncomfortablyclose to the burned
out upper stage of a 1979 Soviet Intercosmosrocket. Flyingabove the north
western coast of Australia(a regionstill smartingfrom the dramaticreturn
of Skylab in its midst in 1979),Ken Mattinglyand Henry Hartsfieldpassed
within eight miles of the stage. It flew past them at almost 7,000 mph
(11,200kph) above and in front of the Orbiter. F1issionControl said that
there was no danger of collision,but that Columbiacould have taken evasive
action if necessary. The Flight Directorcommented"No way they could have
seen that thing. You'd have to be lookingat exactlythe right place at
exactly tlleright time and not blink".
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The incidenthighlightedthe growinghazard posed by man-made space
debris. In the 25 years sinceSputnik 1was launched,this problemhas not
been consideredto be too serious,but with the possibilityof very large
space structuresin both low and geostationaryorbits in the 1990's, it is now
a problemthat must be faced. In 1981,the AmericanInstituteof Aeronautics
and Astronautics(AIAA)produceda "positionpaper"on Space Debris to
encouragedebate;a similarpaperwas also read at the International
AstronauticalFederationCongressthat year. The AIAA concludedthat "at the
presenttime, the collisionhazard is real but not severe." However, "the
probabilityof collisionwill increaseand eventuallyreach unacceptable
levels,perhapswithin a decade". (199)
On July 24, 1981 the RussiannavigationsatelliteCosmos 1275 was hit
and destroyedby what was suspectedto be a piece of metal space debris.
Cosmos 1275 was launchedon June 4, 1981, had become operational,and
was travellingin a near-polarorbit 600 miles high. Only 50 days later it
disintegratedinto more than 140 pieces of orbitingjunk.
The KesslerSyndrome-amoving layerof space garbagewhose flotsamcan
lead to disastrouscollisionsin orbit-hadalmostcertainlyclaimed its most
significantvictim.
"It's speculationbecauseno one could see it happen,"accordingto a
VlestCoast expert in the field,who also describedthe craft'sprobable
shape. "But of possiblecollisionsin the past, this one is the strongest
candidate.
"We think it was a gravity-gradientsatellitewith no thrustersor fuel
tanks on board. [A gravity-gradientspacecraftorientsitselfby responding
to changes in gravity. The Russianshave never releasedtechnicaldetailson
their navigationsatellites.] Its missionwas navigation,so it carried
nothingthat could explode. And it was working normallyuntil something
happenedthat broke it apart."
Anotherexpert who analyzedthe trajectorydata agreed. "There is a
good possibilitythat it was a collision,not a simple explosion,"he said.
That event is just one in 1981 that is helpingto feed a new and growing
concern about debris in space. (139)
Collisionsare increasinglyprobable. Two other Russiancraft may have
spawnedpieces from collisions,but the evidenceis circumstantial. A
deflatedU.S. communicationsreflectorballoonnamed PAGEOS probablywas
fragmentedby collisionin July 1975, but, again, absoluteevidence is lacking.
Near misses (objectspassingwithin 30 miles of each other) are
increasing. At least two satelliteswere put under specialwatch in 1981 when
NORAD radardata predictedclosestapproachby debris to be less than 1,000
yards. At geosynchronousaltitudesalone (22,000miles) therewere 120 near
misses in the last six months of 1981. Two activecommunicationssatellites
passedwithin six miles of each other in April 1980. (139)
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The Delta rocketexplosionsalreadywere being examined. Engineering
work traced the probablecause to the common bulkheadbetweenthe hypergolic
fuel and the oxidizer. A 15-pound-per-square-inchpressuredifferencecould
rupturethe bulkhead.
In a typicalmission,the Delta vent valveswere closed after a payload
was deployed. Floatingin and out of sunlightwould cause pressuresto build
up until the bulkheadblew, as one did on January 27, 1981,over Edith Range
Land,Antarctica. That Delta had been in space nearlythreeyears; others
explodedin as littleas a day. (139)
Once the problemwas isolated,a softwarechange was implementedto move
thestage away from its payload,then fire the engine until it burns to
depletion.
It seems to have worked. Recent Deltas have not blown. But some older
stages still in orbit may yet contributeto the growingvolumeof debris.
Most of the Delta explosionscome in tile900-mile-altituderange.
Another and heavierdebris concentrationis found about 500 miles up,
accordingto VladimirA. Chobotov,manager of the Space HazardsOffice at the
AerospaceCorporation. Much of that may be remnantsof Soviet anti-satellite
tests. Russian "huntersatellites"explodewithin about five miles of their
targets,sprayinglarge amountsof shrapnelinto the area.
That belt is within the altitudelimits of the space shuttle,though not
for a typicalmission. But debris does filterdown into the shuttle'sprimary
operatingaltituderange.
The hazard increaseswith the squareof the radidsof the spacecraft,
and right now the problemis not severe.
It is calculatedthat a shuttleat 170 miles altitudewill have 67
encounters(withina distanceof 120 miles) with objectslarger than one meter
during a four-daymission. The probabilityof collision:a millionto one.
But there are many more small objects rainingdown throughthis area,
and the number of objectsup there is growingeveryyear. NASA'sKessler
believesthat collisionsthemselves,mostly betweenpieces of junk, will be
the major sourceof debriswithin 10 years.
The most probablepoint for collisionsis where orbits intersect,
accordingto Kessler,and the impactvelocitiescan be from zero to about 10
miles per second.
Thus, the polar regions,where large numbersof surveillancesatellites
in north-southorbitsconstantlycross,and the geostationarynodes used by
con_nunicationssatellites,could becomedanger zones. Many of the Delta
fragmentsare in polar orbits.
Microscopicfragmentsof junk also orbit the Earth.Pitsfound in Apollo
spacecraftwindows and a Skylabwindow brought home for analysisshowed traces
of aluminumthat could only have come from a manufactureditem. The finding
causes concernfor future instruments,such as large telescopeswhose optics
could be degraded. (139)
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Previousspacecraftwindows have returnedwith microscopicpits, many of
them causedby impactwith aluminumoxide debris from solid rocketmotor
firingsin space.
Space debrismay be originatedby dislodgedthermalprotectiontiles
duringacsent,orbit or re-entry. After shuttleMission 5 in November1982,
Kennedy Space Center inspectionrevealedunacceptabledamage to a windshield
window on the orbiterColumbia,0V-102.
Kennedymanagersare not certainwhen the damage discoveredafter
Mission 5 occurred,since a new window polishingtechniqueused after the
flight helped revealthe flaw. A thermalprotectiontile struck that area of
the window duringMission 3 in March 1982, but it is unlikelytile alone could
cause such damage.
Analysissuggeststhe windowwas more likely struckby a metal 6 X 6-in.
tile carrierplate dislodgedfrom the orbiter'snose during reentryon _4ission
5. That windowwas removed,and the Kennedytechniqueused to installthe
tile carrierplate involvedalso was reviewed.
Reentryof decayedspacecraftposes uniquehazardsas heavy,solid
spacecraftparts do not burn-upduring reentryand impactthe earth surface.
Varioussuch incidentshave occured:
On July 11, 1979 parts of the 77-ton U.S. SkylabSpace Stationfell over
a wide part of the Australiancoast, some into the IndianOcean, some onto
coastalland areas along a path 160 km wide and 4,000 km long.
Since 1957, 5,700 space objectshave re-enteredthe atmosphereand
burnedup. Several hundredpieces of debris have hit the surface;none have
resultedin personalinjuryor damage claims. The largestpiece from the US
space program,a Skylab rocket stage largerthan the Lab, re-enteredin
January 1975 and fell into the AtlanticOcean.
Of concernare satellitespoweredby radioactivematerialsthat could
one day fall back to Earth. Two types of radioactivepower stations- one
activeand one passive- have been used either in the US or SovietUnion space
programs. The active kind is similarto the reactorthat poweredCosmos 954.
As in most nuclearpower stationson Earth, these reactorsuse uranium in a
chain reactionwhich fissionsatoms,producingenergy and harmfulga_na
radiation.
The Soviet nuclear-poweredsatellite,Cosmos 954, disintegratedover the
North-WesternTerritoriesof Canada on 24 January 1978.
The end of Cosmos 954 over northernCanada did not create any danger for
the populationof the area. Nor was there any danger to people duringother
emergencyfalls of satelliteswith nuclearpower units on board.
This was the opinionof AcademicianLeonidSedov in a Tass interview
publishedon 4 February,1978.
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AcademicianSedov emphasisedthat Cosmos 954's small nuclearreactor
containingUranium-235was designedto ensure its destructionand burning up
on entry into the dense layersof the atmosphere. It was not in any way
explosive.
The origin of Cosmos 954's erraticbehaviorwas not definitelyknown
since it was beyondthe range of Soviet trackingequipment. But on 6 January
1978, Cosmos 954 suffereda suddendepressurizationcausingthe on board
systemto go out of operationand the satelliteto begin its "uncontrollabledescent."
It may be assumed,said AcademicianSedov,that the satellitecollided
in flightwith some other object of naturalor artificialorigin.
Only one US satellitewith such a reactoron board has ever been
launched;that occuredin 1965 and the satellitehas since been boosted to a
very high orbit where it will remainfor 4,000years. Accordingto US
sources,all Soviet satellitesusing reactorsalso have been boostedto higher
orbits - except when the apparentfailureof the boosterenginecaused the
re-entryof Cosmos 954.
The secondclass radioactivepower station,and the one used
operationallyin the US spaceprogram,is a passiveunit (not a reactor)
called the radio-isotopethen_alelectricgenerator,or RTG. These units
contain plutoniumwhich decays naturally,givingoff heat that is convertedto
electricity. During the Appolloprogram,astronautson the Moon handled
RTG's; using tongs,they removedthe units from a compartmenton the Lunar
Module and insertedthem into a centralstationthat poweredscientificinstruments.
At present,the UnitedStates has eight satellitespoweredby RTG's in
Earth orbit, six in deep space and five on the Moon. The eight are a NASA
Nimbusweather satellite,five Navy navigationalsatellitesand two
communicationssatellites.
All of the RTG's are encased in graphite,designedto withstandthe heat
of re-entryand bring them to Earth intact shouldthe satellitesre-enterthe
atmosphere. None are expectedto re-enterfor years, well beyondthe time
when the plutonium,with a half-lifeof 88 years, is exhausted.
Three RTG's have, in fact, survivedre-entry,in each case on aborted
satellitesor spacecraft. Two units powereda Nimbus satellitethat fell into
the Santa BarbaraChanneloff the West coast of the UnitedStates. The RTG's
were recoveredundamagedfrom the ocean. The third was on the aborted Apollo
13 Lunar Module that fell into the South Pacific.
Before the change in designwhich insuresthe RTG'swould survive
re-entry,the RTG's were designedto burn up in the atmosphere. In 1964, a
satellitewith an RTG did re-enterand burn up._
All the rest of the OrbitingUS satellitesare poweredby solar energy.
But spacecraftsent to planetsat great distancesfrom the sun use RTG's
for power. The two Pioneerspacecraftthat flew by Jupiter in 1973 and 1974
respectivelyboth have RTG's on board. One Pioneeris on a path that will
take it out of the Solar System; the second flew by Saturn in 1979. The two
Viking Landerson Mars are poweredby RTG's as are the two Voyagerspacecraft
en route to Jupiter.
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Norad's commandcenter, under Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs,
constantly sorts the information, maintaining records of space debris that can
be rapidly distinguished from missiles or other attack weapons.
With the increasing number of pieces to be tracked, and concerned with
the ever growing risk of collision, other tracking systems are being studied
to complement the existing system, such as radar, lidar (laser-radar) and
passive optics. Each of these systems would consist of sensors aboard
orbiting spacecraft, to monitor the amount and trajectories of particles from
0.1 to 10 cm. (139)
SOURCESOF SPACEDEBRIS
Discussion
The significanceof the orbital debrisproblemdependsprimarilyon the
number and size of objectson orbit. When consideringobjectslarge enough to
damagemost spacecraft,man-madedebrisconstitutesthe dominantthreat. In
the past, man-madedebris had two sources:routinespace operations,which
includethe depositionof spent stagesas well as hardwarereleasedduring
normalmaneuvers,and on-orbitexplosions,both intentionaland accidental.
More recently,there have been severalunusual eventsinvolvingdebris
generationwhich might be attributedto collisionsratherthan explosions. An
additional debris source, which may be significant for optical devices, is
particulate matter ejected in solid rocket motor exhaust.
The number of objects which are large enough to be tracked by NORAD
detectors is about 4500 and consists of about 35 percent objects released
during normal operations and 65 percent objects associated with on-orbit
explosions. In addition to the tracked objects, there is a population of
uncertain size consisting of objects too small to be seen with currently used
detectors. (282)
The amount of debris in space is increasin 9. Although the number of
spacecraft launched each year stays almost constant, the number of associated
fragments, discarded rocket stages, non-functional components such as despin
cables, release bolts, tie-down clamps and miscellaneous bits and pieces, is
going up. Almost 75 percent of the objects in orbit can be classed as either
debris, rocket stages or non-functioning spacecraft. These inhabit a wide
range of orbits from a few hundred kilometers high to several thousand
kilometers. Objects in the latter orbits have lifetimes between several
months and hundreds of years. And each piece of the space debris poses a
potential space hazard.
As an example of how space is being increasingly polluted by debris, let
us take the case of Soviet navigation satellite Cosmos1275. This spacecraft,
for no apparent reason, suddenly disintegrated in space in July 1981.
Nicholas Johnson suggested that, because Soviet navsats do no carry either
internal propellant supplies or destruct packages, disintegration of this
military operational payload, a mere seven weeks after launch, was caused by
the impact of a piece of space debris, possibly travelling in exactly the
opposite direction and at exactly the same altitude; by October 1982 some 180
individual fragments of Cosmos 1275 had been tracked by NORADand these will
inhabit this particular orbital slot for years to come and will themselves
become a hazard to spacecraft orbiting in this region.
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This case is not unique;earlierfragmentationshave includedDelta
second stage rocketsused to launchLandsats1, 2 and 3; Soviet spacecraft
involvedin anti-satellitetests;Agena rocket stagesand Soviet upper stage
rockets.(265)
DisconnectedRocketStages
When the spacecraftis separatedinto a similarellipticaltransfer
orbit,ground commandsinitiatespacecraftapogee injectionrocketmotor
firing at an equatorcrossing-pointnear apogee; this pushes the payload into
geostationaryorbit. It is here that one source of geosynchronousdebris
originates.
The majorityof U.S. communicationssatellites,existingand planned,
use an apogee injectionmotor which is integralto the payloadstructure.
After firing,this remainsa part of the spacecraftand does not become a
separateobject.
But Sovietcommunicationssatellitesbehavedifferently. Their apogee
motors are attachedto tileoutsideof the spacecraftstructure. After firing,
these are separatedby a springmechanism. Althoughthe spacecraftis
controlledfrom the groundand commandedto move around the geostationary
orbit until the desiredlocationis reached,the spentapogee motor is left to
drift. Soviet apogeemotorsmeasure about two meters by two meters and are
liquid -fueled. Any propellantremainingin the motor after firing is usually
vented throughthe engine to providefurtherseparationfrom the main
spacecraft.
Most of these apogeemotors, 23 to date, are currentlytracked by NORAD
sensors,so their orbits and positionsare known. But, there are about a
dozen of these separatedmotors which are not tracked;these are driftingin
orbits that intersectthe geostationaryaltitudeat widely varying
longitudes. The potentialcollisionhazard from all these apogeemotors is
_uite high. In 50 percentof cases,they presenta potentialsource of
rouble to other spacecraft.
The biggest (in terms of size) danger to geostationarysatellitesare
Titan-3Otransstageswhich enter geosynchronousorbitsafter injectingtheir
payloadsinto geostationaryorbits. The transstagesare about six meter by
about three meters and weigh over 1250-kgin orbit. Today, over 25 of these
rocket stages are trackledin a varietyof paths,most of which intersectthe
geostationaryorbit. A good exampleof the inherentproblemsoccurredin
1965,when a Titan transstage,in a 6OO-kmorbit,explodedinto 460
fragments. Even though theseobject are continuouslymonitoredby NORAD, the
dangersof a collisionare alwayspresent.
Fortunately,at the presenttime, debris at geostationaryaltitudesis
not as bad as nearerEarth, but a potentialhazarddoes exist. This arises
from defunctspacecraft,some small components,and some very large rocket
stagesdriftingaround tilegeosynchronousorbit and not under any controlfrom
Earth.
All four countriescapable of placingspacecraftin geosynchronousorbit
- the United States,the Soviet Union, EuropeanSpace Agency and Japan-use
similartechniques:the payloadand attachedrocketstagesare placed in a low
Earth parkingorbit where, during the first revolutionafter launch,the upper
rocket stage ignitesto place the payloadinto a geostationa_ transferorbit.
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This procedure,especiallyduringSoviet launches,leavescomponentsin
the low parkingorbit. These componentsre-enterwithin a few days of launch
and do not normallypose a hazardto other space traffic. Once in the highly
ellipticaltransferorbit,with an orbital apogee near the geosynchronous
altitude,but inclinedbetween 100 (for ESA-launchedspacecraft)and 470
(for Soviet spacecraft)to Earth'sequator,the launchvehicle stage is
jettisoned. It remainsin this orbit and so poses littlehazard to
geostationaryspacecraft.(265)
DriftingComponents
Another sourceof orbiting "debris"is componentsthat are ejectedor
separatedfrom the parent spacecraftafter geostationaryorbit has been
achieved. Few of these are tracked,partlybecause they are usuallyvery
small objects. Some examplesare the navigationspheresejected from ATS-3;
apogee motor nozzlesfrom the weathersatellitesGoes-4 and Goes-5;the
radiometercoversfrom Europeanand Japanesegeostationaryweather satellites;
an adapterfrom Indian spacecraftApple-1 and possiblysolar cell array panel
releasemechanismsfrom some Soviet geostationaryspacecraft. These objects
are usuallytoo small to be detectedby Earth-basedsensorsand because their
preciselocation,orbitalcharacteristics,and drift rates are unknown,they
presenta hazardof unknownproportionsto geostationaryspacecraft.(265)
MisplacedSatellites
Placinga spacecraftinto a preciseequatorialgeostationaryorbit is a
complexoperation. Occasionallythings go wrong: spacecraftare placed in
incorrectgeosynchronousorbits and may or may not be controllablefrom
Earth. The first and secondJapaneseExperimentalCommunicationsSatellites,
for example,were both placed in incorrectorbitsand are now driftingaround
Earth,with the former in a "subsynchronous"orbit below the geostationary
altitude,and the latter in a "supersynchronous"orbit above this altitudein
eastwardsand westwardsdirectionsrespectively. Both these spacecraft,and
severalearly U.S. and Soviet satellites,no longeroperatingor under ground
control,also pose a potentiallyserioushazard. (265)
DefunctSpacecraft
Finally,defunct spacecraftpose a serioushazard. Becauseof the
gravitationalattractionof the Sun and Moon (air drag is virtually
non-existent:at 35,800 km) geostationarysatellitesare graduallypulled out
of their 24 hour orbits. Regular thrusterfiringsare needed to nudge them
back into place. A defunct spacecraft,however,does not have this capability
and eventuallybegins to drift. Althoughthere are a large numberof these
satellites,none are tracked. These includeearly militarygeostationary
spacecraft,the first Syncomsand old Intelsats,althoughtilelatterare
usuallypushed out of geostationaryorbit when they expire. (265)
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STRATEGYOPTIONS
Introduction
Three fundamentaloptionsexist for dealingwith the debrisenvironment:
1) accept the risk 2) add shieldingto reducethe risk and 3) alter the
environment. For certaintypes of missions,the risk is at an acceptable
level. For example,tileSpace Shuttle has an averagecross sectionof 250
m2 and an operationalaltitudeof about 300 km. At this altitude,the
current collisionprobabilityfor the Space Shuttleis about 1X lO-4/yr.
Thi@ is less than the probabilityof an accidentaldeath on Earth (5 X
lO-_/yr.,of which half is from trafficaccidents)(398). However,this
acceptabilitywill decreasewith time,with largerstructures,and with higher
altitudes. The inherentstructurewill protectmost spacecraftfrom impacts
of l_n and smaller. The additionof shieldingmay be a practicalalternative
to protectingagainst impactsbetween1 mm and 1 cm. However,the amountof
shieldingrequiredto protectagainstimpactslargerthan 1 cm becomesvery
large and may be totallyimpracticalin terms of additionalweight
requirements. Thus, the aternativeof controllingthe environmentmay be
essentialto certaintypes of missions. (283)
The most effectivecontrol techniqueconsistsof eliminatingobjects
from space before they become a sourceof fragments. Emphasisshouldbe
placed on designingrocketsto eliminateexplosionsin space. The combination
of explosionfragments(actingas projectiles)and nonfunctioningrocket
bodies and payloads(actingas targets)producesan effectivemix of objects
that will eventuallyproducea self-regenerativefragmentationprocessthrough
collisions. This processmay also be minimizedby reducingthe number of
targets. The eventualdispositionof a rocketbody or payloadcould be
plannedbefore it is placed into space. Techniqueshave been developedto
cause geosynchronoustransferorbits to reentersimply by controllingthe time
of their launch. (399) With the Space Shuttle,it may prove beneficialto
retrieveold payloadsand rocket bodies. Tiledesignationof an area of space
to become a "garbagedump" may be useful. However,tlleseoptionsshould not
be implementedwithout carefulconsiderationof their effectiveness,
alternatives,and other possibleconsequences. A programis being developed
to understandthe current and projectedenvironment,and the most effective
methodsof control. This programwill eventuallylead to a space object
managementphilosophywhere remedialactionswill be recommended. However,
since the problemsare internationalin scope,coordinationwith the
internationalcommunitywill be requiredto implementany controls.(283)
Discussion
The discussionon StrategyOptions has been adressedin the followingin
two separatesubsections,i.e.:
o Safety StrategyOptions.
o Space EnvironmentStrategyOptions.
Safety StrategyOptions
Safety StrategyOptionscover safetyaspectsand parametersto be
consideredand/or implementedduring the designdevelopment,constructionand
operationof the Space Station,and associatedspace vehicles.
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Three Basic Safety StrategyOptionsare discussedin the following.
These are:
o Accept the Risk.
o Add Shieldingto Reduce the Risk.
o Avoid tileRisk by EvasiveManeuvers.
These strategyoptionsare within the presentstate of technology,and
implementationis realisticallyfeasible.
These basic space stationsafetystrategyoptionsare illustratedon
Figure 9-5, and can be summarizedas follows:
o Design to smallestsize debristrackableor accept risk.
o Plan to move stationto avoid largersized trackabledebris.
DEBRIS TOO SMALL TRACKABLEDEBRIS
TO IRACK
- By Space Station- By NORAD
ACCEPT THE RISK
Debris Size
< 1 mm 1Cm 4 Cm > 4 cm
DESIGN SPACE STATION
TO WITHSTAND- ACCOMMODATE-SURVIVEHIT
MeteoroidBumpers SystemsRedundancy
Double Wall Concept Safe Haven
ProtectiveShroudsAround Rescue
Maintenance/Servicing
Facilities
DESIGNAND PLANSPACESTATION
TO I_ANEUVEROUT OF DEBRISPATH
Space Station NORAD Tracking
Tracking
-SophisticatedDetection -Pre-PlannedOrbit
and TrackingEquipment Changes/Evasive
Maneuvers
- PropellantReserveto PerformManeuvers
Figure 9-5. Basic Space StationSafetyStrategyOptions
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Accept the Risk.
The time betweencollisionfor objectsthe size of the ShuttleOrbiter
will be very large, even in regionsof greatestdebrisdensity. However,
larger objects,such as the large astronomicalmirrorsor other large space
structures,will certain]ycollide duringtheir operationallifetimewith
man-madedebrislarge enough to be trackedfrom the Earth if they operate at
these altitudes. Collisionswith such large objectswill not only jeopardize
the continuedfunctioningof these spacecraft,they will also act as sources
of additionalman-made debrisand contributeto an elevationof the collision
hazard level. (282)
Impactprotectionmay not be feasiblein most cases becauseof the
likelihoodof very high approachvelocities(of the order of 10 km per second)
and the fact that protruberancessuch as solar arrays,radiatorsand antennae
cannot easily be permanentlyshielded.(199)
Since the large relativespeedsof objectsin LEO make even very small
objects a danger, sophisticateddetectionand avoidancesystemswould be
requiredonboardall operatingspacecraftif avoidancewas to be attempted.
Such systemswould cost payload,both for the detectionhardwareand for the
extra fuel, and are considerablybeyond the currenttechnology.(282)
Add Shieldingto Reduce the Risk
Even with the current debrislevels, thereare some regionsof space
which would be very hazardousfor some of the largerproposedspacecraftto
use if they had no collisionprotection.
The alternativeto avoidancewould be to employ bumperswhich could
accommodatethe impactwithoutallowingit to damage the operatingsystemson
the spacecraft. However,there are essentialparts of a spacecraft,e.g., the
solar panels,which are difficultto shield;moreover,the fact that much of
the man-madedebris is of large mass would requirevery massive or complex
bumpers.(282)
Meteoroidbumpersand double-wallfeatureshave been extensively
discussedin Section8, MeteoroidPenetrations. Referenceis herebymade to
these pertinentdiscussionsregardingthe Explorer46 Bumper Experimentand
subsequentlaboratorytests. Meteoroidbumpers/double-wallconstructionoffer
considerableweight savingsfor shieldingagainstspace debris.
Avoid the Risk by EvasiveManeuvers
The threat categoryof externaldebris includesobjectsin excess of
meteoroidsin size, usually referredto as space garbage. Nominally,space
debris, as opposedto meteoroids,would have lower closure rates allowingthe
possibleoption of collisionavoidance.
The possibilityexists that enough debris from U.S. and foreign
spacecraftmay be in intersectingorbitswith the space station to pose a
significanthazardprobabilityfor a ten-yearoperation.
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Means must be evaluated to detect, track, and predict the paths of such
debris; and to provide means of evasion by providing adequate and timely
delta-v capability at the station. (21)
The prerequisite to initiating evasive maneuvers is of course the
detection and tracking of space debris. The concept of evasive maneuvers,
therefore, can only apply to trackable debris and may be considered in two
categories:
o Pre-plannedevasivemaneuversto avoid collisionwith orbital
debristracked by NORAD, i.e. larger than 4 cm in size.
o Forced evasivemaneuversto avoid collisionwith orbital debris
detectedby on-boarddetectiondevices. This appliesto debris
sizes smallerthan 4 cm in size,which cannot be tracked by NORAD.
A scenariofor pre-plannedcollisionavoidanceis describedin the
followingin general terms based on hypotheticalparameters.
The method used to eliminate or considerably reduce the number of
collisions in LEO involves a rescheduling of the orbit trim (drag makeup)
maneuver of the Space Station. It is assumed in this scenario, that the
orbital profile results in 15 revolutions around the Earth per day and that at
the completion of the 15th revolution an orbit trim maneuver is performed and
the gradual decay begins again.
Collisionavoidanceoperationstakes place in the followingmanner. At
a given revolution(suchas number4) it is determinedthat on rev 5 the Space
Stationwill be hit by an object(approachingperpendicularto the orbital
track) if no correctiveaction is taken. At that time, however,an
unscheduledorbit trim maneuverwill be initiatedwhich will increasethe
altitudeof the stationand as such resultsin lower orbitalvelocity,and on
a relativepositionbasis, puts the stationat a new positionfor rev 5, which
is approximately7 kilometersdowntrackfrom the originalscheduledposition
of rev 5, and consequentlyshouldeliminatethe possiblecollision. The key
factor in this avoidanceoperationis a need for approximatelyi rev of
warning time, thus requiringboth on-orbitand groundtrackingand predicting
capability.(337)
Objectcoming into the Space Stationalong a more tangentialpath can
also be avoidedusing a similartechnique,but requiringa greaterchange in
altitudeand consequentlymore propellant. For example,a change of 6
kilometersin altituderequiresTBD kilogramsof propellant. Since the large
change in altitudealso results in excessivelylarge changes in along track
position,a deorbitmaneuveris also required(TBD kilogramsof propellant),
thus bringingthe stationback to its nominalorbitalposition. (337)
Forcedevasivemaneuverswould requirenot only sophisticated,
long-rangedetectiondeviceson-boardthe Space Station,but also computerized
debris path evaluationand automatedreactioncontrol systems,as the lead
time for collisionavoidanceis limitedby such factorsas debis size,
detectionrange and reactiontime.
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Evasive maneuvers may reduce the present probability of collision for
specific satellites in certain circumstances, but they do not provide a
practical long-tern solution• In addition there will be the added weight
burden on spacecraft of llaving to carry sophisticated detection equipment (to
catch the untracked particles) and propellant to perfon,1 the maneuvres. (199)
Space Environment Strategy Options
Space Environment Strategy Options, however, cover considerations which
require either international cooperation and observed policies or new
technology development or both, such as:
o Eliminate Fragmentation Sources•
o Minimize Nm,lber of Targets•
o Retrieve Space Debris•
o Achieve Space Object ManagementPililosophy.
Implementation of the above by the U.S.A. alone may reduce the
proliferation of space debris temporarily, but as more and more nations
develop space technology and actively pursue space exploration, the solution
to the debris problem and associated hazards for all participants can only be
achieved by an International Space Environment Management Policy.
These basic space environment strategy options are summarized in Figure
9-11.
Eliminate Fragmentation Sources . Accidental Explosions
• Planned (Military) Explosions
Minimize Number of Targets . Eliminate Detachment of Components •
• Facilitate Out-of-Orbi t Maneuvers
• Control Time of Launch
Retrieve Space Debris . Space Shuttle '.(. Orbiting Garbage Truck)
(. Dedicated Space Tug)
(. Scavenger Rockets)
(. Designated Area of Space as Garbage
Dump)
Achieve Space Object Management . Education on the Critical Nature of the
Phi 1osophy Problems
• Explosion Prevention Policy
• Debris Monitoring and Control
• Collision Hazard Assessment
• Measures to Limit the Likelihood of a
Collision or Minimize Damage
• Review of Space Vehicle Design Guide-
lines B Operations
• Evaluate the Best Orbits
• International Space Environment Manage-
ment Pol icy
FIGURE9-11. SPACEENVIRONMENTSTRATEGYOPTIONS
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Background
The evolution of the debris population under plausible conditions can be
sketched. In this scenario, normal operations and on-orbit explosions, which
might result from correctable design flaws, insensitive operational
procedures, inadequate preventive design characteristics, or antisatellite
operations, which represent controllable debris sources, would continue to
contribute to the population of man-madeobjects in orbit. These objects,
being generally large, would populate long-life orbits and increase the size
of the population, characterized by tJ, its number of members. In c_nsequence,
the expected time between debris-debris collisions, which has a I/N _
dependency, would decrease (as will be seen, this time is already unacceptably
short, -50 yr. for the current population levels). With the advent of
debris-debris collisions, an uncontrollable debris source, which for some
events might produce many thousands of debris objects, would be introduced.
If the removal time for the collision debris proved to be greater than the
expected time before experiencing another collision, collisions could become
the dominant debris source and would yield a rapidly escalating growth rate in
the number of debris objects. (383, 396) The increasing number of debris
objects would also decrease the time between collisions as experienced by a
particular spacecraft since this time has a I/N dependency. (282)
The rise in the number of debris objects would continue until debris
removal by atmospheric drag balanced the debris being generated by
collisions. This method of removing debris will become more effective as
debris undergoes successive fragmentations, since the smaller particles will
generally have a larger ballistic coefficient. However, the inefficiency of
debris removal by atmospheric drag indicates that the debris population might
become very large before this debris sink became effective.
While most of the orbital decay will occur during the period of maximum
solar activity, many solar cycles will be required to remove massive objects
deposited as low as 700 km.
Orbit decay by atmospheric drag will eventually cause the debris to
re-enter the Earth's lower atmosphere, but this mechanism will take a very
long time to remove all but the very smallest debris pieces or debris
deposited in low-perigee-altitude orbits. Therefore control of the problem
must come by adopting procedures which prevent the deposition from occurring.
Operations which violate such procedures, whether they are antisatellite
operations or debris released during normal operations, might, if they are
maintained, lead to a state where the near-Earth environment is so heavily
populated by debris as to be virtually impossible to use. (282)
Such procedures, which tend to decrease the collision hazards caused by
Space Debris and contribute to the safety of the space environment are briefly
discussed in the following.
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EliminateFragmentationSources
The most promisingstrategyappearsto be the design technology
developmentto prevent rocketexplosionsin space and therebyeliminatingthe
major source of fragmentdebris.
These explosionscan be categorizedas follows:
o Accidentalexplosionscaused by engineeringproblems,during the
earlierstages of space exploration.
o Since 1972, the only U.S. explosionshave come from the Delta
rockets. Steps have recentlybeen taken to stop these explosions
thru engineeringchanges.
o The solutionto planned rocketexplosionsis politicalin nature
and must be addressedin the overall InternationalSpace Object
ManagementPhilosophy,if this fragmentationsourceis to be
eliminated. This categorycoversmilitaryweaponstesting,such as:
o Fragmentscaused by the eight USSR antisatellitetests. (283)
MinimizeNumberof Targets
To exerciseeffectivecontro]of man-madedebris,the numberof objects
being placed in long-lifeorbitswithout their havingan onboardmechanismfor
removalfrom orbit must be minimized. Once debris is depositedin orbit it is
extremelyexpensive,if not impossibleto retrieve. (282)
The eventualdispositionof a rocketbody or payloadcould be planned
before it is placed into space. (283)
Three possibledesign solutionsto this problemcan be summarizedas
follows:
o EliminateDetachmentof Components
o FacilitateOut-Of-Orbitmaneuvers
o Controltime of launch
EliminateDetachmentof Components- First, satellitesshould be
constructedto ensure that componentscan not become detachedafter
geostationaryorbit insertion. Solar panel tie-downclamps, apogeemotors and
radiometercovers need to be designedto remainfixed to the satelliteafter
deployment. Specificexamplesare the following:
The apogeemotors of USSR communicationsatellitesare attachedto the
outside of the spacecraftstructureand separated,after firing,by a spring
mechanism. The spent apogeemotor is left to drift.
Titan-30transstagesenter geosynchronousorbitsafter injectingtheir
payloadsinto geostationaryorbits. (265)
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FacilitateOut-Of-OrbitManeuvers- Second,all spacecraftOperatingat
geostationaryaltitudesshouldbe designedwith sufficientresiduesof onboard
thrusterpropellantto ensure that a final,out-of-oribtmaneuverwill remove
the satellitecompletelyfrom the geostationaryarc. Spacecraftsimply
abandonedat geostationaryaltitudewill drift aimlesslyuntil they collectat
one of two gravitationalanomalyareas, near longitudes750 East and 1050
West, thus creatinga potentialdisasterzone.
Satelliteoperatorstoday are taking positivesteps to alleviatethe
problemcreatedby defunct geostationarysatellites. The last of a
spacecraft'sthrusterfuel is used to push the payloadout of the
geostationaryarc. If performedcorrectly,this maneuversuccessfullyplaces
the satellitewell above, or below the 24-hourorbit.
NASA'sApplicationsTechnologySatellite6, for example,was
successfullykicked out of its geostationaryorbit at the end of its active
life and now drifts around Earth in a subsynchronousorbit at the rate of 60
East per day. More recently,Canada'sTelesat-1was boosted into a superior
orbit usin_ the last of its onboardpropellant. It is now moving around Earth
at about 5u West per day.
Intelesathas announcedtilatdefunct Intelsat4-seriesspacecraftwill
be moved away from the geostationaryorbit in a similarmanner. However,not
every maneuverof this kind achievesis intendedaim. Canada'sCommunications
TechnologySatellite1, for example,was moved out of geostationaryorbit, but
not quite far enough. The resultwas that this satellitedrifts back and
forth betweenlongitudes650 West and 1400 West, crossingtile
geostationaryarc's most crowded regionimmediatelyabove the UnitedStates.
(265)
ControlTime of Launch - Techniqueshave been developedto cause
geosynchronoustransferorbits to reentersimplyby controllingthe time of
their launch. (283,399)
The solutionto the problemrests with establishinginternationaldesign
technologyand operationalguidelinesas part of an all encompassingSpace
EnvironmentManagementPolicy.
RetrieveSpace Debris
Retrievalof space debrisappearsto be the most unattractivesolution
to the problem,consideringthe present state of technologyand the enormous
costs involved. Furthermorethe retrievalof space debriswould serve its
purpose only in isolated,specialcases without resolvingthe overall problem.
The only viableoption is the use of the space slluttle.
o The space Shuttlemay retrievespecificold payloads,such as
misfiredor malfunctioningsatellitesstrandedin LEO or drifting
rocket bodies. The economicsof such a mission are to be evaluated
for each individualcase.
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Other options are mentionedin the following,even though,these
solutionsare outsidethe present stateof technologyand do not appear to be
economicallyviable:
o Collectionby "OrbitingGarbageTruck" spacecraftwould be
extremelydifficultand expensive. (199)
o Dedicatedspace tug for scoopingup orbitingtrash.
o Scavengerrocketsthat fly throughspace scoopingup stray
garbage. Any scavengerrocketwould have to switchfrom one orbit
to anotherto catch each object. Changingorbitswould consume
large amountsof energy.
o The designationof an area of space to becomea "garbagedump" may
be useful. (283)
None of the above options is presentlyunder activeconsideration.
AchieveSpace ObjectManagementPhilosophy
The inabilityto introducecontrollableand effectivedebris removal
into the problem increasestilepossiblityfor catastrophicdebris growth,in
which the onset of debris,with debriscollisions,would introducean
extremelylarge and uncontrollablesourceof debris objects. These could
remain in the environmentsufficientlylong to triggera runawaycollision
process. (282)
Naturaldrag by the atmosphereis the major factoroperatingin our
favor,but it can take a very long time to be effective,especiallyfrom the
"busy" higheraltitudes;and it causes debristo ;,ligratefrom higher to lower
orbits (thuscomplicatingtrackingproblemseven further). (199)
Effectsof sunspotand solar-flareactivityon earth'supper atmosphere
change the air density,increasingthe drag rate (happenedon Skylab).
In theory, the debris hazardcould be controlledby limitingthe rate of
debris depositionor by balancingdepositionand growthwith debris removal.
However,only the institutionof programsto control (minimize)the rate of
debris depositionis an effectivealternativesince an active debris removal
program,which would requiremany thousandsof feet per secondof propulsion
capabilityto acquireeach debris object,is not feasiblewith the present
propulsiontechnology,and removalby atmosphericdrag is generally
ineffectiveon short time scales. (282)
More accuratetrackingof all objects in orbit is needed. Apart from
the fact that untrackedspace debris poses a high risk to operational
satellites,compensation(and insurance)problemsarise if, for example,a
piece of debrisof unknownorigin collideswith, and disablesa multi-million
dollar communicationssatellite. Only by increasingglobal space object
detectionand trackingcapabilitywill such potentialdisastersbe averted.
Advancedwarning of the approachof driftingTitan transstage,for example,
could allow the satelliteoperatorto move the satelliteout of the way.
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So far, there have been no orbitalcollisionsat geostationary
altitudes. Today'snon-functionalspace populationat geostationaryaltitudes
poses limitedhazardsto the 150 or so activesatellitesin the arc, but
uncontrolledproliferationof geostationaryspacejunk in the future could
have catastrophicconsequences. (265)
In 1981, the American Instituteof Aeronauticsand Astronautics(AIAA)
produceda "positionpaper"on Space Debris to encouragedebate: a similar
paper was also read at the InternationalAstronauticalFederationCongress
that year. The AIAA concludedthat "at the presenttime the collisionhazard
is real but not severe." However,"the probabilityof collisionwill increase
and eventuallyreach unacceptablelevels,perhapswithin a decade". (199)
The AIAA concludedthat the problemcan be forestalledby immediate
action in five areas:
1. Educationon the criticalnature of the problem;educationof space
designerson the need for litter-freesystems.
2. Technology;detectiontechniques,monitoringsystems.
3. Space VehicleDesign;especiallyencouragingdisposalby retrieval,
re-entry,earth escape,or transferto selected"dump"orbits.
4. OperationalProceduresa Practices:avoidingcrowdingspacecraft
orbits;limitingexplosionsto low orbits so that particles
re-enterquickly;planninglaunch trajectoriesto ensure early
re-entryof spent rocket stagesand dead payloads.
5. InternationalCooperation;to answer such questionsas "Shoulda
policybe adopted that requiresall spacecraftto be boostedout of
geostationaryorbit at the end of its useful life_ Should a policy
be adoptedto regulatewhich objectsmay be left in long-life
orbits_" (199)
Since the problemof space debrisand its solutionis international,the
need for definingan InternationalSpace ObjectManagementPhilosophybecomes
apparent. With internationalcooperationa Space EnvironmentManagement
Policymay result as this appearsto be the only viable solutionto the
growlngproblemof man-madespace debris,affectingall nationsparticipating
in the explorationof space.
The Space ObjectManagementPolicywould encompassthe following
objectives:
o Educationon the criticalnatureof the problem.
o Explosionpreventionpolicy.
o Debrismonitoringand control.
o Collisionhazard assessment.
o Measuresto limit the likelihoodof a collisionor minimizedamage.
o Reviewof space vehicledesign guidelinesa operations.
o Evaluatethe best orbits.
o InternationalSpace EnvironmentManagementPolicy.
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I0. THREAT/CRITERIA
The followingpages identifyeach of the criteriawith the threat
driver. It silouldbe noted that more often than not, multiplethreatsare
involvedwith a singlecriterion. The criteriawere futherexpandedinto
implementingguidelines.See AppendixD, Volume IV of this report.
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CREW SAFETY CRITERIARELATEDTHREATS
........... f !A-1 No credible single apace station failure, operational error • • • • " • • • • ,0 • • • • • • •
or radio frequency signal should result In damage to
space station or mlsslonlpiyload equipment or In the use
of emergency equipment; some limited degradation In
mlsslonlpsyload accommodations, crew
convenlencelcomforl, or space sleUon altitude or orbit
may be allowed
A=2 No credible combination of apace station failures, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
mlaslonlpaylosd equipment failures, operator errors, or
radio frequency signals should result In the potential for
crew Injury or permanent loss of the space station or
primary mlselonlpsyloed capability; Institution of
emergency procedurelequlpmenl may be necessary but
no hazardous operational level will be reached
A-3 All subaystemfequlpmenlcriticalto preservation of Ilia • • • •:e • • • • • • • •
end spice station survival should be fall-operational/fill-
safe (excepting primary structure and pressure vasaell)
!A-4 Fall-operellonallfill-ssfe designed subsystems should • • • • • • •
allow maintenance to upgrade the subsystamlequlpmant
without being degraded below fall-sale during the
maintenance actions following the second failure
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP:[_^_mGETOLUlU_NCI_
A-5 Potentially rupturable containers shouldconlilnloee • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0!• • • • • • •;• •
material (gas, liquid, solid) then would cause
unacceptable ovsrprsezure If all the materiel were
released In z leakage, rupture or explosion
I
A-6 Redundant accommodations for command and control of • • • • :• • • • • • • 01•. • • • • • • • • • •CO
the space italian should be provided such Ihat the
primely control cosier hal complete capability, but the
backup control cenlsr will have, as s minimum, control of
critical functions
•.-A-71 Design Inhibits to prevent failure propag-,tlon from one • • • • • • • •
volume/eubsyetemlcomponsnt Is another should be
Incorporated
A'81 The space zillion should be designed and spiraled is • • • • • • • • el •
that any damaged module can be Isolated as reqblred.
Provisions shall be aids foR pressure Isolation within
the volumes. Modules should be equipped and
provisioned so thai the crew can safely conllnua n
degraded mission and lake corrective action Is either
repair or replace the damagod modulo
CREW SAFETY CRITERIARELATEDTHREATS
GROUP:DhJ_th,GF_ TOI--.EI_,NCE
A-9 Any volume should be capable of sustaining the whole • • • • • • • • • • • • tO
crew, end capability should be provided for performing
critical lunctlon= st on emergency level until Ihe crew
can be rescued. Electrical and fluid lines In each
preasure-leolateble volume required for critical functions
should he protected against the effects ol explosion, lira,
vacuum, and corrosion
i
co_ A-10 Capability should be provided for performing critical • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
functions with = portion of = subsystem Inoperative for
maintenance, and any preseure-lsolatable volume
inactivated and not accessible
A-11 Redundant equipment, lines, cables, end utility runs .0 • •; • •
which ere critical for safety of personnel or mission
continuation should either be located and routed In
separate compartments (i.e., separated by a structural
wall) or should be protected against fire, smoke,
contamination, loss of pressure, overpreeeure, and
shrapnel
I
A-12 All walls, bulkhesde, hatches end seals whose Integrity Is • • • •
required Is maintain pressurization or atmospheric
leolallon should be readily accessible for Inspection and
repair by crewmen In pressurized suits
I,
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATEDTHREATS
GROUP:D_,C;E "rOLEImncE
ITEM
A-13 t\S A DESIGN GOAL_ INSI'F_CTIONj MAINTENANCE
AND I¢I._PAIR OF (;[_ITICAI. SUBSYSTEMS BY SItIRT
.GI.F.EVED-CRF.W MEIqBERS SIIALL BE ACCOMMODATED
CO
€.o
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
gROUP: cn_-w z'r_(nl;.(:r.roN
B-li Provisions ohould be mode for o safe haven within the • • • " • • ;1 • •
specs Itotlon, Ilolalsble from the hazard capable of
sualolnlng the crow for 22 dayo beyond normal rozupply
end allowing rescue by a Shulll@. Provisions shall be
mode to monitor the health of the remaining habitable _'
modules from this note haven
B-2 Personnel protection from electrical shock, radiation, i•
mechanical end thermal hazards should be provided
Co
B-3 Accosawayo between comportments ohould be olzod • O: • •
ouch that on IVAIEVA-sulted crewmen Is allowed free
peeaege
B-4 Provisions shell bo mode for the protection and •
ourvlval of the whole crew during aolor storm octivity
as defined by the TBD design mission radiation model
O-U Personnel escape routes should be provided In oil • • •
hmzerdous oltumllons
I
B-6 Provisions and hobitoble lecllllloo ohould be odoquale to •
oustoln the entire crew for = minimum of 22 days during
an emergency situation requiring rescue
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP: (:lzi_wPiZOTL$CTION
B-7 Atmospheric stores end =ubsyetem capacity eulllclenl for • • •
two lull repreeeurlznllon of each pressurized habitable
volume should be maintained onlet the space slallon
during manned operations
B'8 Access is EVA end IVA elrlock and suit station(s) should i• • • • • •
be provided for all credible emergency conditions.
Alrlock chamber(s) should be provided to permit crew
access for EVAIIVA operations
Co
(.I"1
a-9 ,we or more lulled crewmen should participate In any ;0 • •
pressure mullactivity and rescue provisions should be
provided to allow Isle return to space station following
the Incapacitation of any one crewman
B-IO Real-time monllorlng of Ihe elmospheree constituents, • •
Including harmful airborne trace conlemlnanls end odors
should be performed. Control shell he provided for each
pressurized habitable vohJme
i
B-11 ,we or more entrylegreee paths should be provided to •
end from every module or pressure-lsolsteble volume.
The Iwo paths should be separated by airtight partitions,
or shall be at least 10 fool apart, end should each lead to
an area In which the crew can survive until escape,
rescue or removal of the hazard
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP:(:R]_.w|'R()°I'I'_CTI()N
B-12 Materials used In the habltssble areas should not outgas O="
toxic consllluenlss In the lowest presssureenvlronmenl
and highest lemperelure to which they will be exposed
B-13 A,I EVA lind unproasurlzed compartment IVA should be ;0 • el
conducted using the "buddy system." (Note: buddy
system criteria can be met with suited crew to elation
exll In visual contact with subject). The buddy system
sshouldelse be used during ahlrtsleeve operations In
hazard•use ,,roe,=
B-14 A margin of consumables should be provided onbossrd, •
sufficient for performing crlllcssl fuocllone for TBD hours
el = reduced level Iollowlng any credible accident which
renders one proisure-lsoletebla compartment unssvalleble
B-15 At least two =greasepaths sshouldbe available from each •
module for emergency egress=of personnel during
manned ground operations
B-16 Emergency ssult, required In the splice station, sized Io • I1 • •
fit any crewman, should be In readily accessible
Iocell_nsswithin each prlsaure-leolnlable volume
"'o-I 7 Provlslonssshould be made for emergency medical •
Irealment of credible accidents end Illnesses for
dursstionecompertlble with Ihe rescue provisions
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP:CJZl:WI"I_OTF.CT]()H
B-18 The sale envlronmlnl and the safe operational status of • • ! •
=€llvalad subsystems within the space elation Ihould be
verllled prim: to personnel entry, Initially end prior Is
reentry following lemporsry slellon abandonment
B-19 Deployment end Initiation of opersllon, considered • •
hazardous should be checked out from a Isle location
before exposing crewmen to the potential hazards
-,,,j
B-20 Provision should be made for the return of a crewmen • • •
Incapacitated while performing EVA
B-21 prov,,,on, should be made Ior the detection, conlalnmenl •
andlor dllpolal of Ioxlc contsmlnanls
B-22 Pressurized volumes should hive adequate Ires volume •
(not occupied by equlpmenl) to allow crew freedom el
movement Io support long-duration hablletlon
B-23 Hazardous or toxic fluid storage, conduits and • I• • •
I.terconnectl between modules should be external to the
pressurized volume. Exceptions may be made for
Ilsmmeble but nontoxic gales where the maximum
possible quantity released by = leak cannot le-,ull In a
Ilsmmsble mixture
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP: ¢Rt,:Wt,l_O'r=;,crloN
m
ITEM
B-24 Pro,,a,on, should be made for detection and control of
pathogenic egenla onboard the space station using
melhode harmless to crew end equlpmenl
B-25 Planned crew tasks should be assessed Initially, for
compliance Intent with TBD regulellons before
perlormlng such teaks
....a
t_'_t) Provision should be made for handling Irrational
crewmember= end the remains of deceased
crewmembers
B-27 "Nil;. (E;('UPIF-D C()blI'AI_I'IHI;,NT'S ACOUSTICAL NOISF.
I,:NVII{ONHF.NT SII(g.IID RE WITIIIN IIIIFIAN "F()LI.:.RANCE
NOISE EXI'OSUI_F. I.ISIJ:TATI(_qSp I'ERBIIT IN'FELI.1-
GII_I.F. AUDITORY COFI_flJNICATIONS_ ItAVE A FIINIFIUSI
• OF I_I.IRI). TONI;- OR NAIiRIXq FRI!QIII!NCY P,AND(S)2 A
MINIMUFI OF INTI'.'ItFIITTENT OR I)ISCONTUOUS NOIS'B5
AND A MININLIFI 1)1; II1GII Fi_F__LII'.'NCYNOISI;.So SYS-
TEIH AND Ef_UJ_i"MI;NT DFJSIGN SII(R.ILD EEACCU_I-
i'I.ISIII::D Fi_(_i Till;. OUTSET TO PI_ODUCE AND AC-
CEPTABLE NOISE ENVIR(_IRENT, DESIRAI3LY s Tile
NOISE I._NVIRONMENT SHOULD FLEET NC-TI3D-OR-LOLq-
ER NOISF. CONTOUR FOR WORK I_EIZlODS AND
()R I.(_qF.R FOR SLEI;.P I'ERIOD5o
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP:czmw i 'R().[ECTI" ('_1
R-215 ANY Ht)DULE DESIGNATED AS A SAFE ItAVEN SliALL • •
BF. F'ROVIDED WITll AND AIRLOCK CIIAHIH,.'I_ AT Tilt;.
PORT ASSIGNED FOR ORBITER DOCKING AND RE.SCUEp
TO ALL(Xq CREW TRANSFER AND RESCUE FROM A DE-
GID\DED AND/OR MARGINAL SAFE ltAVEN.' TIlE RFL5- '
CUE IIATCII SIIAI.L PROVIDE FOR ACTUATION FROH
THE INSIDE OR OUTSIDE TO ACCC_IMOI)ATE CC_NTIN-
GENC I
_]
B-29 SI_IBSYSTEF1S SIIAI.I. BE DF..SIGNED TO I-'REVENT IN- • •
ADVEI_TENT OI5 ACCIDENTAL ACTIVATION OR DF&_XCTI-
VATION OF FUNCTIONS OR E_UII'FIENT TIIAT WOULD
BE tlAZARDOUS TO I'ERSONNEL 01_ THE SF'ACE STA-
TION
R-30 RADIATION D(kGE.S TltAT AFFECT i'EI¢S(g'INEL SAFETY •
bllJ.qT I_E CONSIDEI_FA) FROH ALL SOURCESj INCLUD-
ING NATURAl. ENVII¢ONMENTj, EXTERNAL ISOTOPE
AND REACTOR SOUI_CES (IF ANY) _, ELF.CTI_OMAGNETIC
SOLAR I_DIATION AND INTERNAI.LY ALLCkCABLE
RADIATION LEVELS FR(_.! EXI'ERIMENTGp PROCESSES
AND IIEALTH MAINTENANCEi/DIAGNt.kGTIC EQUIPHENT
1_-31 EXi'(X-;ED SURFACES WlllllN IIABITAI3LF. Iq0DULF_S • •
SIIALI. hOT EXCEED A TEHPF.RATURE OF l13°F (WITII
A DIk'r;IGN GOAL OF lOB°F) AND A LO_q. TEH|'EI_TURE
Of NO LE.SS TllAN 40°F
I
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP:cm_w pmJn;.c°rrr._
i',-32 EXCI-I"[ FOR CONT.[NGF.NCIES EVA SIIALI. NOT BE • • •
IJ_]l-I) FOR IIAZI\III)OiJs OPF.RATIONS OR WIII-N A
Fb\NI-UVERING SPACFA'IL_FT IS WIlllIN TIlE I'ROXI-
HI'FY OI'ERATING ZONI:. (_+5Nbl)
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP: s'I',\T t(l'l ]N'rl,:G_ITY
C-1 Primary pressure struclurel materials should be •nonllammable, Interior walls and secondary structure
should be sell-extinguishing °"
C-2 Normally exposed nonmetallic materials should be sell- • •
extinguishing In the most severe oxidizing environment
to which they will be exposed. Means shall be provided
for fireproof storage of medical supplies, mslnlenance
supplies, food, tissue, clothing, trash, and for other non-
self-extinguishing Ilems, when they are not in use
I.--=
C-3 Potentially explosive containers such as high pressure 01 • • • • •
vessels or volatile gas storage containers should be
placed outside of and as remotely as possible from
person,el living and operating quarter. Wherever
possible the containers should be Isolated and protected
so thai failure of one will not propagate to others
C-4 Containment of all materials requiring return via the STS •1
to prevent contamination of the space station
environment should be provided to reduce the hazard of
potential fire and toxic conditions
C'5 Tank supports should be designed to restrain the tank • •
under propulsion ellect of rapidly escaping gas
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP: S°l/'_:rt oN [N ]'L;(_,I,:ITY
C'6 Design provisions should be Incorporated to prevent • • •
uncontrollable hatch opening due to pressure
dlflerentlale, and to allow controlled closing el hatch
openings with or against pressure differentials, for the
worst case pressure differentials enllclpaled .-.
C-7 Equipment or materiels sensitive to contamination should • •
be handled In • conlrolled environment. Fluids and
materiels should be compatible with the combined
,.o environment In which they are employed
r,_
C'8 Provisions should be made to allow communication • • •
between any and all Isolatablelhebllable volumes on a
primary end backup basis
C-9 Provisions should be made for material usage, • • •
Identification and Iocallon mapping to allow real-time
evaluation to determine adequate
Inspactlonlmalnlenance replacement frequencies
..... | ....................................................
FI.IIIIj (Jlt GA.%IgtXf',, I"I.(JW SIJCII A.% I'ItI;.,..'SSIJI?I,:
C-]O ItI_I.IEF VA[,VIL%/ILXIIAUS'L'S_ FLII_L TIU_,NSFIEIt • • • Q
D].'.-II:TINNlgC'I'S_ [:.T(.:.p SItOULD 17,_ I':)I,:S].(.;NED
T(,) I'ItI._.VEN'_I" "J'OItf)IIING/TIJI?,NING OR I_IDE.-
SIRABLI_ I"ItAN,'SI.AI'I(.)N 1_'OTHE. SPACE STA'I_']:CX,I
- ,; J' i i ,
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATEDTHREATS
GROUP:STATION INTEGRITY
ITEM
i
C-IJ ALl. ICF.A('TI(_N .CON]:I?()L "I'ilI_US'£IHG I)PVIC'F.S USED
I'I_IMARILY 1;'O1_ ALTJ'ILIDI.: I_SITIONING OF TIlE
SPACE .%TATION, AND OCCASIONALLY I-'()l_ VEI.OCITY
CIIANGF.Sj SIIOULD HI,: LOCATED SIJCll TIIAT "hie
[-XIIAI/ST PLUME DC)F.S NOT I/qPINGE UNi_)N OTIIER
S]'I_tlCTLII_AL I.;LEr,II-NTS SUCil AS SOI.AR CELI_% 9
IZl.;i.)I.III¢ING F.VA IqAINrL;.NANCE OR OTIII.;.I_ VEIlICI.I_.q
DtK,I(ING N[TIt "]'lie SPACE STATION
,.o C-12 SI'ACE .%TATIL,_I MOI)UI.Ik% StlOOLD BE TUMBLF..D TO
t.o
RID TIIEIq OF INTERNAl. DIiBI_IS AND CONTAI,IINANTS
. IIHIHI-I)IATI.;LY l'll[()l¢ TO [JREPARATLON FOR LAUNCIi
C-l'-.! I'IHIVISI(INS SIIALL I_,L MADE FOR /N-I:LIGIIT SEI_V1-
CING_, AD.IUG'[ING t I:I.I'.'ANINGj ItEMOVAL AND IH:.-
I'I.ACI':MI.;NT OF I)I'I:I:NI_ING C(_IPONI;.NT.%_ TI_%TING
ANI) RI!IV\IRING 01. ,\1.1.. CItITtCAL SIJl',SYSl'l;.hlS
(:-1-1 WI;.AI_ ITI:.MS SII()III..D I',1;. l.].l-I'L CYCLE ThSTI':I) IN A
ItFAI.IS'I'IC ENVII¢( *qHFNT
C-1.5 AI.L I'I':RSI_NAI. l'/'l':blS SIIOULI) I_1;_SCItEL;NI:I) t:01_
I:I.AMHABILll3' AND :I'OX.[Cll_/
C-16 SI'ACI;. STAI'[f._N I'I_()TI-CTIVF. gNCl.(kSIJl¢lkg SII/\LL lAB
I'h'(gVIDI'J) FON AI.ol. IIIGII MASS/IILGII SI'L,_ED RO-
TATI NL, MACIIINI,:hW
CREW SAFETY CRITERIARELATEDTHREATS
GROUP:STATION ZN']'EGRI'I_
'ITEM
!
C-17 fiCTIVE/PASSIVE COblPARTHENTATION _IiOULD lie
PROVIDED TO CONTAIN fiND/OR PREVENT FIRE/
F.XI'LOSION/DEPII_GSURIZATItSq INITIATION (JR
IMI'fiCT PROPAGATION° Cf31qPARTMENTG SIIOULD BE
INSPECTABLE TO SUPPORT DAMAGE CONTROL AND
FIAINTF.NANCE OPEIOXTIONS
t.O
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
GROUP:CONTINGENCY CONTROL
0-1 Identified hazards should be eliminated, reduced to • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
controlled hazards, or specified 1= residual hazards
D-2 Provision should be made for detecting, contslnlngl • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
confirming, controlling and restoring Is a sets condlllon
emergencies such s= fire, toxic contamination,
depressurlzatlon, structural damage, etc. The tools,
leeks, spares, workspace, storage volumes necessary for
__= these provisions shall be Included In space station
design planning
O-3 For those malfunctions indlor hazards which may reaull • • • • !•
In time-critical emergencies, provision should be made
for the automatic switching Is a sale mode of operation
and for caution and warning of personnel
0-4 The capability should beprovlded on the space station • • • • •1• • • • • • • • • • •• • • •e • •
for the detection of mellunctlons andlor hazards, tracing
Is the tailed replaceable unit and the display of
Information to the crew necessary for corrective action
I'
, ,,, ,.
D-5 ! P,ov,.,o,,. ,hould be mad. for ,ha crew 1o ..c.,,.,n ,ha • • • • •
hazard statue of any habitable module external to the
Inhabited module and to mltlgale or control remotely
rheas hazards whlch would preclude sale entry to the
module In queal]an
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA RELATED THREATS
0ROUP: C¢)NTINGENCY (:tx_'rl_()L
D'6 The crew should be able to override any automatic sating • •
or awllchover capsblllly, All overrides should be two-slap
operellone with positive feedback to the Inltlalor, which
reporl impending results of the override commend, prior
to the acceptance of an execute command
_o
o"1
CREW SAFETY CRITERIARELATEDTHREATS
6ROUP: SELECTION/INDOCTRINATION
i
ITEM
E-I Crew selectionshouldbe based on selecteescross-
trainabilityin fieldsother than specialty.
E-2 Orbitalcrews shouldbe an integralpart of the
air/groundsystemactive interfacewith on-orbit
crews.
E-3 Station crews and teaming should allow equa]l-a
thirds of.schedule for on-orbit, ground interface
operation and recycle operations (post orbit re-
habilitatlon, leave, additional training, public
relations, etc.)
E-4 Assurance should be provided that each mission
segment crew is familiar with 1) Station Opera-
tions and l_aintenanceas concerns critical sub-
system and 2) Procedures necessary to render SAFE
all experiments and/or user-processes.
E-5 Screerlin g criteria should include assessment of
attitudes, physlca] needs, psycho]ogical needs,
personality traits, ability to function under
stress, ability to accept direction, and TBD
ThisPageIntentionallyLeftBlank
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II. CRITERIA IMPACT
The followingtable relateseach criterionto the areas it impacts.In
the samemanner as tileThreat/Criteriarelationships,the criteriausually
have more than one area impact. This table can be helpfulto systemsor
design engineersin flagginga criterionas it impactstheir discipline.
199
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTSI
SPACESTATIONIMPACT
GROUP:I),\_Ol': T()LI._I_,'\i',ICI;.
A-1 No credible single apace zt,,llon failure, operationalerroror radio frequency • • • •
signal should result In damage to space station ormlaslonfpsylosd
equlpmsnl or In Ihe use of emergency equlpmenl;some Ilmlled degradation
In mlaslonlpiyloed accommodations,crew convenlencelcomforl,or space
=fallenaltitude or orbll may be allowed
A-2 .o credible combination of space Italian failures, mlzslonlpeylosd • • •
no equlpmenl failures, operator errors, or radio frequency signals should result
8 In Ihe potential for crew Injury or permenenl Ion o! Ihe apace station or
primary mlaslonlpeyload capability; Inslllullon of emergency
procedurelequlpmenl may be necessary but no hazardous operational level
will be reached
A-3 All =ubeyatemlequlpmenl critical Io preaervellon el fife and space elation • •
survival should be fall-operational/fall-safe (excepting primary slruclure end
pressure vessels)
;-4 Falkoporetlonallfell-eafe designed subsystems should allow malnlenance Is • • • •
upgrade the zublystemlequIpment wllhou! being degraded below fall-sale
during Ihe maintenance actions following the second failure
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS I
SPACESTATIONIMPACTI
GROUP:DAMAGE TOLERAI']CE
A'5 Polenllally rupturable containers should contain lees materiel (gee, liquid, • • • •
solid)then wouldcause unacceptableoverpreesureIf all the malarial were
released In • leakage, rupture or explosion
r_ •A-6 Radundmnl accommodation| for command and control of the space elation • !e • •
should be provided such that the primary conlrol center has complete
capability, but the backup control center will have, so a minimum, control of
crlllcal |unctions
A-7 Oeslgn Inhlblta to prevent failure propagation from one • • •
volumelsubeystam/component to another should be Incorporoled
A-8 The space =tallon should be designed end operated so thai any damaged • • • • • I• •
module can be Isolated el required. Provisions shell be made for pressure
Isolation wllhln the volumes. Modules should be equipped end provtaloned
=o that the crew can zalely conllnue e degraded mission and take corrective
action to either repair or replace the damaged module
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
SPACESTATIONIMPACTI
QROUP: I)AIH_\GI,; T(JLI-IIANL'I,_
A-9 Any volume should be capable of sustaining the whole crew, and capability • • • • • • •
should be provided for performing critical functions el an emergency level
until the crew can be rescued. Elaclrlcsl and fluid lines In each pressure-
I=olalabla volume required for critical functions should be prelected against
Ihe effecle of explosion, fire. vacuum, and corrosion
r'o
o
A-10 Cepeblllly should be provided for performing crlllcal funollon, wllh • portion • • • •
of • subsystem Inoperative for mslnlenence, end any preseure-lsoletable
volume Inactivated end not accessible
A-11 Redundant equipment, lines, cables, end utility rune which are critical for • •
safely of personnel or mission conllnuetlon should either be located and
routed In separate compartments (I.e., zepsrzled by z ztruclurzl wall) or
should be prelected =gainer fire, smoke, conlzmlnatlon, loss of pressure,
overpressure, end shrapnel
A-12 A,, walls, bulkheads, hatches end seals whose Inlegrlly Is required to • • • e e
melnleln preszurlzsllon or atmospheric leolnllon should be readily
accessible for Inspection and repair by crewmen In pressurized suite
i ii
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
GROUP: Di\Mi\GE TOLEIU\NCE
ITEM
1\-11 ,\S A DESIGN GOI\L, INSPECTION, ~1i\lNTENi\NCE
I\Nn IWI'i\W 01"- CIUT ICi\L S(JI3SY~;TmIS'BY ~,ilJln
SLEEVED C1IE\<J ~IE~ILIEHS Stli\LL BE I\CCor-tr-IODiHED
• •
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
SPACESTATIONIMPACT
GROUP: o_l_w I't_ort-c'rl(_
B-1 Provisions should be made for msafe haven within the space elation, • • •
Isolatsble from the hazard capable of sustaining the crew for 22 days
beyond normal resupply and allowing rescue by a Shuttle. Provisions shall
be made Is monitor the hesllh of the remaining habitable modules from Ihl,,
safe haven
ii , ,, j
B-2 Personnel prolectlon from electrical shock, radiation, mechanical end • • • •
thermal hazards should be provided
'B-3 Accesswayl between compartments should be sized such thal In IVA/EVA- • '0 • •
suited crewman Is allowed free passage
B-4 Provisions shall be made for the protection end • • •
survival of the whole crew during solar storm activity
es defined by the TBD design mission radiation model
B-5 Personnel escape routes should be provided In ell hszardous situations • ,•, •
B-5 Provisions and habitable facilities should be adequate to sustain the entire O' •
crew for • minimum of 22 days during an emergency situation requiring
relcue
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
SPACESTATIONIMPACT
0ROUP: (ld,_tq I'I_OTI-CTi.ON
ITEM
m-7 Atmospheric stores and subsystem capacity aufflclenl for two full
repreaaurlzatlon of each pressurized habitable volume should be maintained
onlaf Ihe space station during manned operations
re B-8 Access to EVA and IVA alrlock and lull elation(s) should be provided for all
u_c_ credible emergency conditions. Alrlock chamber(s) should be provided fo
permit crew access for EVAIIVA operations
B-9 Two or more aulled crewmen should participate In any pressure suit activity
end rescue provisions should be provided fo allow safe re.turn to space EVA operational provisions)
.,.,oo,o,,o.,o0, .°o.,.o,,.,,o°o,.°o°.o..o.n iiillli
e-10 Real-time monitoring of the efmospheree conatlfuenta, Including harmful I IololI I I •
I l I l I I I
airborne trace contaminants and odors should be performed. Control shall (Monllorlng ot each
be provided for each pressurized habitable volume ,ressurlzosble volume
B-11 Two or more entrylegreas paths should be provided to and from every • • • • •
module or presaure-laolstsble volume, The Iwo paths should be separated by
airtight partitions, or shall be at least 10 lest apart, and should each lead fo
an area In which Ihe crew can survive unlll escape, rescue or removal of the
hazard
!
J
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SPACESTATIONIMPACT
B-12 Metorlela used In the habitable ereoa should not outgas toxic constituents In
the lowest pressure environment end hlghoet temperature to which they will
be expoaod
B-13 All EVA end unpreeeurlzod compartment IVA lhould be conducled using the • •
"buddy system." (Note: buddy eyelem criteria can be met with sulled crew
to elallon exit In visual contact with subject). The buddy eyelem should oleo
be used during Ihlrleleeve operations In hlzerdoul areal
r',o
° IO'_
B-14 , margin of consumables should be provided onbosrd, sufficient for •
perlormlng critical functions for TBD houri It I reduced level following Iny
credible occident which renders one pressure-lsoleteble complrtment
unevailable
B-15 At Ioiet two egress paths should be available from each module for • •
emergency egress of personnel during manned ground operations
B-16 Emergency suite required in the spice elation, sized to fit ony crewmen, • • •
should be In readily accessible locations wllhln each preeeure-laolateble
volume
B-17 Provisions should be made for emergency medical treatment ot credible • • •
accidents end Illnesses for durellone comparilble with the rescue provisions
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
,_PACESTATIONIMPACT
GROUP: cRi_wI-'ROTIiCTION
B-18 The I•fe environment •nd the safe operational st•tus of •ctiv•ted • • •
subsystems within the space elation should be v•rified prior to personnel
entry, Initially end prior to reentry following temporary station abandonment
B-19 Deployment and Initiation of op•r•tlons considered hazardous should be • •
checked out from • safe location before exposing crewmen to the potential
hazards
B-20 Provision should be made for the return of • crewmen incapacitated while •
performing EVA
B-21 Provisions should be made for the d•tection, contslnment andlor disposal of • •
toxic €ontaminants
B-22 Pres0urlzad volumes should have adequate free volume (not occupied by • •
equipment) Is allow crew fr•edom of mov•m•nt Io support long-duration
habit•lion
B-23 Hazardous or toxic fluid storage, condulls lind interconnects between • •
modules should be external Is the pressurized volume. Exceptions may be
made for flammable but nontoxic gases where the msxlmum ponlble
quantity rel•asad by • I•ak cannot result In • flammable mixture
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
GROUP: cRI,W i'h'(_[I-C'rl()N
i__
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onboerd the space station using methods hJrmlosa to crew and equipment
B-25 Pllnnad crew tasks should be sssellsad lnlllslly, forcomplllncalntlnlwlth elI'1I'1"1
{_ TBD regulations before performing such lelka (Standard industrialsafely
i t,,.o"o°'orwo,_.,°-.,
,.,0 o,.w..°,..., '" :1_,-27 TIlE OCCUPII'.'D COHr'ART_U;-N'r's ACOUSTICAl. NOISE
[_VlR(_I_,It, IENT SIt(_XJLr) BE WITIIIN IILJIqANTOLEI_NCE
NOISE EX[-'OSURE LIHITATIONSo IJERNIT INT[_-LI-I-
G1BI.E AUDITORY COI_IUNICATIt_S, HAVE A HINIIqUH
OF PURE TONE OR NARROtq FIIEL}IIIgNCY BAND(S)_ A
HINIHUr.I OF INTERMITTENT OR I)I.(;CONTU(X,IS NOISES
AND A HINIHUH OF IIIGtl I:RI_X_UENCY NOISES. SYS-
• TEH AND F_IJLPMENT DILSIGN SIIOULD BE ACC(-_-
I'LISIII;.D FROH TIlE OUTSET TO I"RODUCE AND AC-
CI-I'TAIH.E NOI:;E ENVIR(.}NNF.NT. DI_qII?ABLY t ]'lU_
NOISE ENVIRONMENT SHOULD HEET NC-TI}D-OI_-I.O!,'J-
EI,_ NOISE CONTOUR FOR WORIt. I'ERIODS AND NC-TBD-
O1€ LO_'ER FOIl SLEEP PERIODS.
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GROUP: (:Rl:.wPI_OTECTI(_
I_--'H ,\NY NODULE DESIGNATED AS A SAFE IL,XVI._N SIL,XLL • •
P,E I_I(OVIDED WITII AND AIRLOCK Ctb\HI._,ER AT ".['lie
I'O[tT ASSIGNED FOR ORi}ITER DOCKING AND RESCLIE=
TO ALLOW CI{EW' TI?_NSI:EIt AND R;IL%CUEFI{(_i A DE-
(.;Ib%bLD /MSlD//(IR MAI_GINAL SAFE ILgVENo TIlE I_I;.S-
('ilL; IIATClt SItALI. PROVIDE FOR ACTUAT].(_ I_'RON
1"111_INS1DE 01_ OUTSIDE TO ACCONNOL)ATE CONT1N-
GENCIF..S
i
1_-2:1 SLII}SYSI'I_FLS SIIALL BE DF_SIGNED TO I"I_EVI;.NT IN- • •
AL)VI_RTENT OR ACCIDENTAL ACTIVATION OR DEACTI-
W\TION OF FUNCTIONS OR F_QUII'Nt_.NTILAT WOULD
I_I'_IBZAI_L_IS TO I'ERSC_NEL OR Till':SPACE "STA-
TION
|
I:-'}_ I'AI_IATION I)OSF.S TIIAT AF'I:L'.'CT I'I.R,%{_k'_INELSAI_ETY • •
NHST I_E CONSIL)I;.18;.D I;R('X_IALl. SOLIRCF-Ss INCLUD-
ING NATUI_AL [:NU.(I_(}NMENT_ EX'FI,_'I{NAI. ISOTOPE
AND III:ACTOI_ S(;)UI_CILS (.IF AN_')s I,.'LI_CTI{t_IAGNEI'IC
_,()lJ\fl Ib%DItV_rI(,,1'_AN[I TNTF.ICNALI.Y IU.LOWtll}[.I'_
Ibll)[I\TION LEVELS F'i_ON EXI}EIZINENTS, PI_OCI;3SF.S
AND llE_LTH MA1NTEN/_3qCEi/DIAGNOGT TC EQUIPNENT
I}-31 EXI'(}_;I:D SIJRFACI;.S WITIIIN ILgl3ITABI.E NODI.ILILS •
Sll!\U. NOT EXCEED A TI';.NI)I_Ib%TUI_I'201:113°1; (WITII
i\ I)I;.SIGN GOAl_ OF 105°F) AND A LOW. T|:.MI'I;.i_ATIJRE
01: NO LF.SS 111AN 40°F
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GROUP: (;_);.wI)IZOT[_CTI(_I
B-32 .ILXCIiI"T FOR CLt_ITINGENC1F.;.S EVA SilAI_I. NOT BE I!
USI..'I) FOR IIAZ_RDOUS OI'ERATIONS OR UtlI'.'N A
I_b\NI,_UVERING SPACF.CI_FT IS WITIIIN "tile PROXI-
NITY OPERATING ZONE (:I:5NN)
i=
I-..=
Q
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GROUP: .%"I'AT1CX_ 1N TL_G[tI'I'Y
C-1 Primary pressure structural materiels should be nonflammable. Interior walls • •
and secondary structure should be sell-extinguishing
C-2 Normally exposed nonmetallic materials should be self.extinguishing In the • •
meet severe oxidizing envtronment to which they will be exposed. Means
shill be provided for fireproof storage of medical supplies, maintenance
supplies, food, tissue, clothing, trash, end for other non-self-extinguishingr_
_-. llama, when they are not In use
C-3 Potentially explosive containers such el high pressure vessels or volatile • •
gas storage containers should be placed outside of and el remotely el
possible tram personnel living and operating quarter. Wherever possible the
containers should be Isolated and protected so thai |allure of one will not
propagate to others
C-4 Containment of all materials requiring return via the STS to prevent •
contamination of the space station envhonment should be provided to
reduce the hazard of polenllel tire and toxic conditions
C'5 Tank supports should be designed Is restrain the lank under propulsion •
effect at rapidly escaping gas
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
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i
C'6 Design provisions should be Incorporated to prevent uncontrollable hatch
i opening duo to pressure differentials, and to allow controlled closing of
: hatch openings with or against pressure differentials; for the worst case
pressure dlflerentlals anticipated
C-7 Equipment or materiels sensitive to contamination should be handled In e
controlled environment. Fluids and materials should be compatible with the
r_ combined environment In which they ere employed
r,o
C'8 Provisions should be made to allow communloatlon between any and ell
laolateblelhabltable volumes on a primary end backup baals
C-9 Provisions should be made for material usage, Identification end location
mapping to allow real-time evaluation to determine adequate
Inspecllonlmalntenance replacement frequencies
C-10 FLUID OR CASEOUS FLOW SUCH AS PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES/F_X-
HAUSTS. FUEL TRANSFER DISCONNECTS s ETC., SHOULD BE DE-
SIGNED TO PREVENT TORQUING/TUftING OR UNDESIRABLE TRANS-
LATION HOTIONS TO THE SPACE STATION
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS
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C-11 ALl. Id,'.ACT[L_,I I::t_l',ll'l_Ol. TIII_IJL_T.[NG I)I._VIC[Lc, IJSL;D •
['I_[HAR.II.Y I;r)l¢ AIo'II'IIIDE P(_ITI(J_ING (11; TIlE
_:,1',\CIi STA]'.IfIN_ AND (/CCAS [ONALLY FOR VI'I.OCTTY
(]IANGli.';,p SII(.II!LI) I;F. L(X::ATI;.D SUCII 3.11A'J"l"111-
F.XII/xU'.;I." PLIJHI_ IRq.:.S NO'I" lblI+INGI ,'. UNI'C_I O'[111i1_
STRU(;I"IJI{A[. I'_':I.I_FII;.NTSS[ICII AS S(-Jl.=\lt (;[;.l+l_Sp ARIU\q
I_I'.'O111RiNG EVA blA IN I'hNANCL;. ('III OTIIF.I_ VEIII.CI.[;_
I)I_.:I(INC; lg.l[ll Till- ,%I"ACI-_STA'I_'1rON
r_
C-l;:' _;I'A(':I" .%TA'I'](_I FI(qllII.F..% SIIOULD I'1": ]71JPII:I.FJ3TO
RID "IIIF._I OF £NTI;.RNAL DEBRIS AND C(_TAHINANI'S
IHHI-IJ]A]'ELY I1( I_ _1_1"O I'REI'AIMT ION FOR I_tiJNCII
C-1: I'h'UVI._I(_N._ .qllAl..l. I_,15IqADF. FOR :[N-FI.IGIIT SF-RVZ-
(:IN(;_ AllJU.q'rlrl<;= (.'I.FAN[N(_;p IH;.I',IfWAI. AND I(I_;-
I'I.ACFJqI-NT I'11: (q:I,I;.ND[NG CC_II'()lXli£NTS_ TIL_TING
AND I+I:I'AIRING ()F ALl. CItITI(2_31+ SUI;SYS:I'I;_MS
i * ii
C-I,I t_'l:Al_ I'PILHS SII()IIi..D F,F. LII:F. CYCLI.;..TF._'!I_D IN A l ,I
h'l.A1.1 .'-,TIC F.NVI III_NI_IEN'I"
C-I', AlL I'I:II,%(_IAI. I'I'I:FI.'; SII_)III.D l;l;..%CIII'LF.NF.I) I O1_
I:I.AM%lI_II+JTY ANI) T(IXICII'Y
('-1_, ',I'A(:F. %TA'l'l=_rq I'l,()'rl,.(':l".[v[- I+Nt-.I.I_LJI+Ii_ SIIAI.I. I;1_"
I'ItlR'IDI;I) Fill+ ,_1.1 Iii1;11 lqh_,;5;/lll(;ll ._11'1:1:11I,'l_-
Jr/\[ I ,qb _\CII I NI,.h'Y
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GROUP: STATION ]NTEGR]TY
C- i 7 ACTIVE/PASSIVE CObIPAllTFII;.NTATION ._IIOULI) BE • •
I'ROVIDED TO CON'rAIN AND/OI_ I'IO£VENT FIRE/
I:.XI,LO_;It3N/DEPI_F_ASUItlZATION INITIATI(IN OR
1FII'_\CT PROI_AC_"rION. C_I'.IPAIITIqEN'I_-_ SItOLII.D BE
INSi'ECTAI_LI;. TO SUI'PORT DAbI._GE C(..)N'flIOL AND
FLAIN'I'I;.NhJ_ICI_OPI_RATIONS
I II I I I I
Po
4_
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IITEMI
I
i lieD-11 Idenlllled hazards should be ellmlnaled, reduced to controlled hezerda, or (Saluly program adminlslrallon)
specified ms residual hazards
, ,,i si
D-21 Provision should be made for detecting, conlelnlngl confirming, controlling • • • • • • •
and reetorln O to a safe condition emergencies such as fire. toxic
conlsmlnallon, depressurlxallon, structural damage, etc. The Ioo111,tasks,
r_ spires, workspace, etorege volumes necessary Ior these provisions shell be I
o_ Included In space station design planning
I
0-31 For those malfunctions endlor hazards which may result In time-critical • • •
emeroenclee, provision should be made for Ihe automatic switching to I life (Aulomalic redundancy
mode of operellon and for caution end warning of personnel man.oemenI)
I ! "
D-41 The capability should be provided on the space 8titlon for the detection of • •l
mslluncllons sndlor hazards, tracing to Ihe failed replaceable unit and the
display of information to the crew rfbcessary for corrective action
I
D-51 ,,ov,,,on, should be made for ,he crew lo elcarliln the hazard status of any • •l
habitable ,nodule externll to the Inhibited module end to mitigate or control (Flemolo switchinG) I
I
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--
D-6 The crew should be able to override any automatic sating or ewllchover
capability. All overrides should be two-step operations with positive
feedback Io the Inlllator, which report Impending results el the override
command, prior Is the acceptance of an execute command
I'O
0"1
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA IMPACTS,
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GROUP: SELECTl ON/I NDOCIR] NATI ON
,i
ITEM
E-! Crew selection should be based on selectees cross-trainabili-
ty in fields other than specified.
E-2 Orbital crews should be an integral part of the air-ground
system active interface with on-orbit crews.
E-3 Station crews and teams should allow equal thirds of
schedule for on-orbit, ground interface operation and recycle
operations (post orbit, ground interface operation and recycle
operations (post orbit rehabilitation, leave, additional train-
ing, public relations, etc.)
E-4 Assurance should be provided that each mission segment crew
is familiar with 1) Station Operations and Maintenance as
concerns critical subsystem and 2) Procedures necessary Lo
render SAFE all experiments and/or user processes..
E-5 Screening criteria should include assessment of attitudes
physical needs, psychological needs, personality traits,
ability to function under stress, ability to accept direction
and TBD.
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12. AREASFORFURTHEREMPHASIS
The following tabular listing extracts areas identified in tile human
factors follow-on study that should be given more attention. Someof the
items may be underway or have been completed. The listing in no way comments
on completness or status of the related items. Rather, the list indicates
that within the data reviewed there seemed to be areas of data deficiency.
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AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY
I
AREAOF RECOMMENDEDFUTUREEI4PHASIS THREAT
I. Airlock for lab module vs. dual egress study Contamination
Loss of Access to Hatch
2. Airlock for lab module vs. delta P pressure Contamination
curtainstudy
3. Externalstowageof EVA suit (cost impacts) Contamination
vs. internalcontamination
4. Free flyer for "dirty"payloadsvs. on- Contamination
board decontamination/clean room costs
5. Up-frontcosts vs. programcosts for Contamination
regenerativeECLSS or a consumable-using Stores DepletionECLSS
6. User safety requirmentsdocumentsvs. Program
user safety ombudsman
7. Refurbmodule on orbit vs. returnand refurb Program
8. User guide to automatevs. manual approach Program
to experiments/processes
9. Testingone-of-a-kindpayloadvs. Program
recommendingencapsulation
lO. On-boardmaterial/inventorycontrolvs. Corrosion
on-groundcontrolwith data link (expanded Contamination
FIATCO-Rl-System) InadvertentOps
Stores Depletion
II. Costs of measuringinternalcontamination Program
vs. risk of acceptingcontamination
12. Dedicated(module)vs. centralizedECLSS Contamination
Loss of Pressurization
13. Relaxed contaminantallowables per zone Contamination
(hazardcritical/contaminationsensitive) Injury/llIness
vs. minimumcontaminationallowablesfor
entire station
14. ThresholdLevel Values (TLV's)for 24-hour Injury/Illness
stationvs. TLV's for 8-hourwork week
regimes
15. EVA dedicatedmodule (w/decontamination Contamination
capability)vs. decontaminationin dedicated
airlock
220
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i
AREA OF RECOMMENDEDFUTURE EMPHASIS I THREAT
I
16. Level of materialassessmentand control Program
for stationvs. user
17. Cost of medicalcare on-orbitvs. medical Injury/Illness
screening(appendectomies,radiation
max-out, etc.)
18. Realtime contamination monitoring vs. Contamination
"snap shot"monitoring
19. ClassifiedMaterialsControlsvs. Lack of Crew Coordination
"IndustriallySensitive"materialcontrol
20. High altitude(Debris/Radiation)vs. Debris,Radiation,
Im_er altitude (oxygenbombardment) StructuralErosion,
Contamination
21. Re-orientingstationmass vs. providing Radiation
shieldingfrom solar flares
22. Optimum repairlevel: Unit vs. Component Program
23. Walk-aroundbottlesvs. plug-in02 system Loss of Pressurization
Contamination
24. Synergisticallydevelopbarrier system Radiation,Debris,
(modulepressurewall) to accommodate _4eteoroidReduction,
debris,meteoroids,radiation,oxygen Loss of Pressure,
bombardment,pressureredundancy,shrapnel 14echanicalDamage,
shieldingand structuralinspection/repair Grazing/Collision,
Leakage
25. Developbody vital signsmonitoringsystem Injury/Illness
for each crew member witlldata aggregated
for controlpanel displayor down listing
26. Definemedical facilitiesfor build-up, Injury/Illness
initialand growth stations
27. Provideorbit changingmaneuveringcapabilityJ Debris
of stationto avoid debris,including
determiningcycle-rateand total propulsion
requirements
28. Developon-going internationalprotocols Debris
for trafficcontrol in space. Expand
NORADS capabilityto identifydebris dm_n
to Xmm diameter
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AREAOF RECOMMENDEDFUTUREEMPHASIS THREAT
29. Define fragmentationdispersionof pressure Explosion
vesselsin a vacuum: calculateddisperson
or actual disperson(291)
30. Definitionof blastwavecharacteristicsfor Explosion
typicalgas storagevessels (291)
31. Better definitionsof fragmentimpact Explosion
effectson a varietyof struturesand
facilitiestypicalof those occurringin
aerospaceveiliclexplosions(291)
32. Centrallized/Decentralizedwork stations Lack of Crew Coordination
(stationsubsystemmaintenance,EVA/EMU
maintenanceand storage,module repair/
refurb,user equipmentmaintenanceand
repair)
33. EVA suit vs. chamber/airlockfor hyperbaric Injury/Illness
treatmentof the bends
34. EVA suit externalsurfacematerial Contamination
compatibilityor selectedovergan_ents
35. Small tool "passthrough"compartmentto Stores Depletion
supportEVA vs. cost of module or airlock
press/depress
36. Remoteactuatingof airlockouter hatch vs. Injury/Illness
manual actuationby EVA crewman
37. Assessmentof personaland equipment Lack of Crew Coordination
restraintsand tether
38. Minimizetypes and sizes of fasteningdevices StoresDepletion
(weightvs. logisticsimpact)
39. Free flying (pemanently co-orbitingstation) Injury/Illness
EVA tool box vs. space stationmounted tool
box
40. Clear definitionof EVA ionizingradiation Injury/Illness
impactto crewmemberand shielding
capabilityof EVA suit materials
41. Experimentsto investigateand determine Fire
propertiesof combustionand propogationof
fire in Micro g.
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AREAS FOR FURTHERSTUDY
I
AREA OF RECOMI4ENDEDFUTUREEMPHASIS I HUMANFACTORS ISSUE
{
I. Developrealisticallowableradiationdose Violationof Safety
rate tables for part of body for EVA, flight,
quarter,year and whole life
2. Dedicatedmodule tasks for crew vs. common Scheduling
task, all-moduleassignment
3. Less than 90 day recyclesvs. on-station Scheduling
expandablecosts and cre_vpersonalequipment
needed to supportextendedstay
4. Generalistvs. specialistfor crew training Scheduling
guidelines
5. Polarizedshades vs. opaque shades Confinement/Isolation
6. Define crewmemberpsychologialand All
physiologicalscreeningelementsto support
functioningin a long term confined/isolated
environment- an extendedapplicationof
submarinescreeningtechniques
7. Aggregateman-machinedesigntrades to Scheduling
determineinterfacepoint for each trainable
task. This is neededto supportcrew
trainingfor task as well as crew training
for tool use
8. Define a privateelectroniccenter for each Recreation
stateroomto include,at least an enter-
tainmentcenter (visual/aural),a private
televisionlink to Earth, background(white
noise)mood generator
9. Allow personalizationof stateroomsor Confinement/Isolation
workareas(photos,cartoons,books,etc.) Recreation
includingdecoroptions
lO. Includearchitectural/interiordecoration All
consultationin habitablemodule desing
II. Look into feasibilityof UP-DOWNstation All
orientation(acceptingsemi-fetalcrewman
micro-gposition)in overallstationdesign
12. Developcolor coding systemfor all tubing, Violationof Safety
piping,emergencypassageway,damagecontrol
equipmentand tasks including"warnings",
"cautions",and "notes"
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AREAOFRECOMMENDEDFUTUREMPHASIS HUIC_NFACTORSI SUE
13. Considerpossibilityof single,large-volume Confinement/Isolation
space (inflatableor structurallybuilt-up)
to provide "open"environmentfor crew on
growth station
14. Developchemical/physicalrestraintsystem BehavorialProtocols
for abberantcrew members
15. Look into conceptof ground teamingand Scheduling
early orientationof completeteamingto
staff the space stations,including
coordinatedon-orbit,on-leave,at ground
console,in-trainingsegments
16. Specifythe need for a maximum allowable Acoustics
NC-acousticrequirementper module (work
area vs. habitablearea) and requireacoustic
subsystem input apportionment within each
module, Include a qualification test to
apportioned acoustical requirements
17. Develop standard decision-making and Acoustics
techniques to be used for insulation vs.
isolation of noise
18. Include crewman noise tolerance testing in Sensory Deprivation
screening procedures
19. Screen crewmembers for "open" vs. "closed" Behavorial Protocols
interaction acceptance pattern
20. Develop authority hierarchy for station-to- Behavorial Protocols
groundand intra-stationso crewmembers
understandthe lines of authorityand
individualresponsibilities(this includes
stationassignedvs. transientscientist/
specialistinteractions)
21. Provide education/orientation for crew- Behavorial Protocols
members regarding cross-cultural issues
and problems
22. Consider the need to schedule health Scheduling
maintenance equipment and consider its
placement with respect to sleeping areas.
Exercise is mandatory, not a recreational
option.
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I
AREAOF RECOMMENDEDFUTUREEMPHASIS I HURONFACTORSISSUE
{
23. Consider adequate capability for storage, Cleaning/Disinfecting
inventoring, handling and disposition of
servicing, maintenance, cleaning and
repairing consumables and just plant garbage
24. Identify family of cleaning/disinfecting Cleaning/Disinfecting
chemicals compatible with the selected ECLSS
approach
25. Isolate/decontaminate/quarantine crewmembers Cleaning/Disinfecting
for X-days before being sent to station,
considering the possibility of being con-
taminated in the orbiter while in route
26. Train cremembers ira _II places of station Cleaning/Disinfecting
tasks, housekeeping
27. Define minimum crew cleanliness requirements Cleaning/Disinfecting(this may be an intra-cultural issue)
28. Define requirements (total volume and flow Cleaning/Disinfecting
rates for potable and non-potable water
29. Whenteaming, screen crewmembers for Recreation
compatible recreation interests
30. Prepare specification for recreation Recreation
equipment/kit - with options per person
31. Determine method of measuring reasonable Territorial Issues
personal "space bubble" - flat vs. the
sphere within which an individual feels
threatened. Then, screen for crewman who
can function within this volume.
32. Define/provide personal storage space Territorial Issues
33. Include personal consumables (toilet Territorial Issues
articles, etc.) in master logistics planning
list
34. Orientcrew toward "non-violation"of TerritorialIssues
personalterritory
35. Consultingwith astronauts,developa Hygiene
standardfor clothingoptionsand ilygiene
consumablesoptions
36. Considerschedulinghygiene(common) Scheduling,
equipment Hygiene
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AREAOF RECOMMENDEDFUTUREEMPHASIS HUF_NFACTORSISSUE
37. Clearly identify(hardware,procedura] Violationof Safety
software)safety criticalsegmentsof tasks
to ensuremandatorycompliance
38. Preparetask flow charts that identifyas Violationof Safety
many contingencyoperationsas possibleto
determineresponseneed
39. Screen all.carry-onpersonalequipment Violationof Safety
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